HSE publishes its response to ministers on the explosion at ICL Plastics and launches consultation on LPG regime

Date:

27 August 2009

Release No:

E071:09

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has today published its preliminary formal response to the official Inquiry, led by Lord Gill, into the fatal explosion at the ICL factory in Maryhill, Glasgow, in 2004.

Following publication of Lord Gill's report on 16 July, Work and Pensions Secretary Yvette Cooper asked HSE to outline what action it was taking to address areas of concern identified by the Inquiry.

In its response to Yvette Cooper, Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill and the Secretary of State for Scotland Jim Murphy, HSE reported that it:

• Pledged to learn lessons and acknowledged that Lord Gill's inquiry into the facts leading up to the explosion was fair and accurate
• Had moved on significantly from 1980s and 1990s inspection practices to better appreciate, track and audit issues of regulatory concern.
• Had been thorough in producing a proper safety assessment of the risks associated with the use of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and was making progress with industry on preparing a risk-based and prioritised replacement programme for underground metallic LPG pipe-work, to be complete by end of 2015.
• Went further than Lord Gill suggested in developing plans for tackling the risks to domestic properties with LPG supplies
• Had initiated a 12-week preliminary consultation on the proposals for changes in the regulation of the LPG industry system, and the application of Lord Gill's recommendations to other areas of health and safety regulation.

Judith Hackitt, HSE Chair, said:

"The Board and staff of HSE take the lessons of this tragic event very seriously and will continue to scrutinise our systems to ensure that we maintain the highest standards of management and oversight.

"While Lord Gill rightly concluded that the responsibility for the disaster lay with ICL Plastics and ICL Tech, who were convicted and fined heavily for their actions, I want to reiterate our heartfelt sorrow and regret that HSE's interventions were not more successful in preventing this terrible tragedy.

"There is good reason to believe that even during the time period leading up to the explosion, HSE's dealings with ICL were far from typical of our normal interactions with duty holders.

"Good progress was already being made in areas Lord Gill highlighted for action. And although the development of the LPG pipe-work replacement programme with the LPG supply industry has taken some time, this was due to the need to act on the basis of evidence and to do the necessary preparation for such a major undertaking.

"It is important that all interested parties now respond to our consultation on the proposed changes to the LPG regulatory scheme and on the wider issue of whether risk assessments should require third party validation."

Notes to editors

1. Nine people were killed and many more injured in an explosion at the ICL Plastics factory in Maryhill, Glasgow, on 11 May 2004. The explosion was caused by a leak of LPG from an underground metal pipe into the basement of the four-storey Victorian factory, which ignited and caused the building to collapse. On 27 August 2007, two companies - ICL Plastics Ltd and ICL Tech Ltd - were fined £200,000 each at the High Court in Glasgow, after pleading guilty to breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974: ICL Plastics Ltd for breaches of Sections 2 and 4, and ICL Technical Plastics Ltd pleaded guilty to breaching Sections 2 and 3 of the Act.
2. The full text of the response to ministers is published online at http://www.hse.gov.uk/gas/lpg/letter.htm
3. HSE and the LPG industry body, UKLPG, agreed a high-level plan for the replacement of underground metallic service pipe-work in June 2009. Although replacement work has already started, once a survey to prioritise premises is finished, this will be ramped up from October 2009. Businesses with buried metallic service pipe-work, which can corrode over time, will be required to replace it with more durable materials, such as polyethylene. The oldest buried metallic service pipe-work in the least well-maintained condition and located in the most corrosive soils will be targeted first. Higher risk pipe-work is targeted to be replaced by the end of 2013. Overall, there are estimated to be between 15,000 and 40,000 industrial/commercial premises with buried metallic pipe-work and between 24,000 and 54,000 domestic properties. Current estimates are that the risk of a fatality from explosions involving LPG is less than that from natural gas.
4. HSE today launched a preliminary consultation on the recommendations made by Lord Gill for reform of the regulatory system for LPG. It seeks initial views on key proposals, including that:
   • A new safety regime should be put in place governing the installation, maintenance,
   • monitoring and replacement of all LPG systems.
   • A new scheme should be introduced that would require all LPG suppliers to be registered and accredited.
   • The current risk assessment system should be improved by the addition of an independent audit process.
   
   
   The consultation document is published online at http://www.hse.gov.uk/lpgconsultation/index.htm
5. The Health and Safety Executive is Britain's national regulator for workplace health and safety. It aims to reduce work-related death, injury and ill health. It does so through research, information and advice; promoting training; new or revised regulations and codes of practice; and working with local authority partners by inspection, investigation and enforcement.

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