E089:05 29 June 2005
ConocoPhillips Limited was today fined a total of £895,000 and ordered to pay £218,854 costs at Grimsby Crown Court, after pleading guilty to breaching health and safety legislation at an earlier hearing. The case follows an investigation by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) into two incidents: a fire and explosion at the Humber Refinery, South Killingholme, North Lincolnshire on 16 April 2001 and a release of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) at the Immingham Pipeline Centre, Immingham Dock, on 27 September 2001.
At an earlier hearing at Grimsby Crown Court, ConocoPhillips pleaded guilty to seven breaches of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the Pressure Systems and Transportable Gas Containers Regulations 1999.
The first incident happened on 16 April 2001 when 170 tonnes of highly flammable LPG was released from ConocoPhillips' (then Conoco Ltd) Saturate Gas Plant at its Humberside oil refinery. The gas cloud ignited causing a massive explosion and fire. As the fire burned it caused failures of other pipework resulting in another explosion and fireball.
The fire burned for approximately two-and-a-half hours. There were no serious injuries but considerable damage was caused to other processing plants and buildings on the refinery and to properties off-site. HSE's investigation found that the initiating event was the failure of a 15 cm diameter pipe at an elbow, due to corrosion and erosion. The most likely source of the ignition was a gas-fired heater in an adjacent processing unit.
During HSE's investigation a second incident occurred at the company's nearby Immingham Pipeline Centre. Over the night of 27 September 2001, approximately 16 tonnes of LPG leaked from a road tanker and the liquid pool and gas cloud dispersed without ignition. As a result, HSE launched a detailed investigation into the cause of the release.
After the hearing, Kevin Allars, head of HSE's Chemical Industries Division, said: "The incident at the Humber refinery was possibly the most serious chemical incident in Britain since the Flixborough disaster in 1974 and it is fortunate that there were no deaths or very serious injuries. This was mainly because the incident occurred on a Bank Holiday and during a shift change when the limited staff on site were away from the plant. The potential for loss of life was great.
"However, the extent of the damage to the site and to properties in the nearby village of South Killingholme indicates the violent nature of the explosion. The severity of the events at the Humber Refinery have been reflected in the penalties imposed by the court today."
Allars added: "HSE will be publishing a detailed report into the investigation of this incident and we will be encouraging the chemical and downstream oil industry to learn the lessons from the ConocoPhillips event.
"Our investigation revealed a systematic failure by the company to inspect the pipework in certain parts of the refinery. It is vital that companies who operate high-hazard sites - such as oil refineries and chemical plants - put rigid and robust systems in place for inspecting pipework to detect corrosion or other defects."
a) Section 2(1) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, in that between 1 January 1996 and 17 April 2001 at the Humber Refinery, the company did not ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all of its employees.
b) Section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, in that between 1 January 1996 and 17 April 2001 at the Humber Refinery, the company did not conduct its undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, that persons not in their employment who might thereby be affected, were not exposed to risks to their health and safety.
c) Regulation 9(1)(a) of the Pressure Systems and Transportable Gas Containers Regulations 1989 in that between 15 October 1998 and the 12 May 1999 at the Humber Refinery, the company did not ensure that the pressure system PSV183 protecting D154 GOHDS Feed Surge Drum which was included in the scheme of examination, was examined by a competent person within intervals specified in the scheme.
d) Regulation 9(1)(a) of the Pressure Systems and Transportable Gas Containers Regulations 1989 in that between 4 July 1998 and 18 August 1999, at the Humber Refinery, the company did not ensure that the Rupture Disc RD5783 protecting X5781 Quench Condensers (A-H) on the Closed Blowdown System, which was included in the scheme of examination, was examined by a competent person with the intervals specified.
e) Regulation 9(1)(a) of the Pressure Systems and Transportable Gas Containers Regulations 1989 in that between 11 January 1999 and 24 September 1999, at the Humber Refinery the company did not ensure that the Hydrogen Feed Preheater X4152 which was included in the scheme of examination, was examined by a competent person within the intervals specified.
f) Regulation 9(1)(a) of the Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000 in that between 26 June 2000 and 24 day of August 2000, at the Humber Refinery the company did not ensure that the Propylene Bullet T8847 was examined by a competent person within the intervals set out in the scheme.
g) Section 2(1) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 in that between 26 and 29 September 2001 at the Immingham Pipeline Centre the company did not ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all of its employees. This charge followed a release of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) at the centre on 27 September 2001 while employees were engaged in the sampling of LPG fuel from road tankers.
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