HSE press release E110:03 - 26 June 2003
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) today published a consultation paper seeking views on an application by Network Rail for exemption from a requirement of the Railway Safety Regulations 1999. The Regulations require Network Rail to fit the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) at certain categories of permanent speed restriction where, the company argues, there is little safety benefit.
HSE is proposing to grant the exemption and attach conditions requiring Network Rail to prepare a programme of alternative train protection fitments, which would provide greater safety benefit. HSE seeks views on this approach.
TPWS automatically applies a train's brakes in certain hazardous situations. It can help reduce two types of risk: where a train fails to stop at a signal set at danger (known as a SPAD) and could collide with another train; and the risk of derailment if a train is travelling too fast (overspeed).
The industry-wide TPWS fitment programme required by the Regulations is now largely completed. Nearly all passenger (99%) and most freight (66%) trains have been fitted and the majority of track fitments (some 11,500 - or 79% -of a planned 14,500) have been completed. TPWS is already providing real safety benefits, as HSE's monthly SPAD reports show. Between April 2002 and March 2003, TPWS correctly intervened 49 times to apply the emergency brakes when a driver failed to react correctly to a danger signal.
Network Rail's application is concerned with a particular category of overspeed risk at certain diverging junctions. These are permanent speed restrictions (PSRs) at diverging junctions with approach controlled signalling (ACS), where the company considers the risks to be low and already adequately controlled. Network Rail estimates there are 1800-1900 such locations.
HSE has carried out its own preliminary assessment of Network Rail's application and, based on that assessment, is minded to grant the exemption, subject to consultation, because Network Rail has argued:
HSE's proposed conditions would require Network Rail to develop a programme including fitting TPWS at higher-risk signals and some fitting of TPWS+, an enhancement of TPWS not available when the Regulations were made. Network Rail would be required to agree this programme with HSE, thus ensuring an early commitment to fit TPWS and TPWS+ at those locations on the infrastructure likely, on a risk basis, to achieve greater safety benefits.
HSE is now consulting widely with the rail industry, passengers councils, trade unions and victims groups, and is also inviting comments from the public before deciding whether or not to grant the exemption and, if so, whether to attach conditions. All comments received will be taken into account as HSE continues to review the case for exemption before taking a final decision.
Network Rail's exemption application, the HSE consultation paper (both a summary and the full version) and other documents are available on HSE's website at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/liveissues/tpwsconsult.htm. Printed copies of the paper are also available from HSE at the address given below.
HSE's decision will be published on the Internet at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/rollst/index.htm
1. On 28 April 2003 Network Rail submitted to HSE a formal application for an exemption from the Railway Safety Regulations 1999.
2. The locations covered by Network Rail's application are junctions where a line branches away at a significant curve from the main line, known as diverging junctions. Trains need to travel down the diverging line at a lower speed, so permanent speed restrictions (PSRs) are in place and the signals are set to slow down trains' approach - known as approach controlled signalling (ACS). A driver controls the speed of the train by observing the speed restriction signs and by slowing for the signals.
3. Regulation 3(1) of the Railway Safety Regulations 1999 requires that "no person shall operate, and no infrastructure controller shall permit the operation of, a train on a railway unless a train protection system is in service in relation to that train and railway." Though this duty is not qualified by the caveat "so far as is reasonably practicable" (unlike most health and safety law), the Regulations' definition of "train protection system" mean that the system required is Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS), unless it is reasonably practicable to install full Automatic Train Protection (ATP). The required train protection systems must be fully in service by 1 January 2004.
4. Regulation 6 of the Regulations allows the Executive to grant exemptions from any requirement imposed by the Regulations and to attach conditions to any such exemptions.
5. TPWS has been designed to be simple to fit to existing track and trains. TPWS automatically applies a train's brakes if it approaches a signal too fast, or if it fails to stop at a signal set to "danger" (red). It will not stop the train at the signal but should do so in the "overlap" - the portion of track beyond the signal before the point where danger occurs (usually 200m). This system's effectiveness depends on the speed of the train. Higher speed (above about 70mph) means that TPWS may not ensure that the train stops in the overlap. Poor or defective brakes, or low wheel adhesion, could exacerbate the problem.
6. TPWS+ is a development of TPWS that extends the range of speeds over which TPWS is effective (typically up to 100 mph) by installing additional speed traps further back from the controlling signal.
7. The full process for seeking exemption from the Regulations is explained on HSE's website at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/liveissues/tps.htm
All enquiries from journalists should be directed to the HSE Press Office
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