HSC press release - C004:03 - 5 February 2003
The Health and Safety Commission's (HSC's) advice to the Government on developing and fitting effective automatic train protection (ATP) to Britain's rail network has been accepted and is published today.
Following recommendations to introduce the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), which includes the safety benefits of ATP, made by the Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems in March 2001, the rail industry's ERTMS Programme Team produced a report in April 2002. The Government then agreed that HSC should undertake an independent review of the industry's proposals.
Independent reports from the HSC review were published on 14 January (see press release E007:03). These reports informed HSC's consideration and advice to the Government.
The text of a letter from HSC Chair Bill Callaghan has been released and Transport Secretary Alistair Darling has made a Written Statement to Parliament today (5 February). Key points in the letter are:
HSC's advice also stresses the safety benefits - and limitations - of the existing Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS). Regulations for introducing TPWS by the end of 2003 have proved successful: TPWS is now fitted to 97% of passenger trains and 76% of track locations.
Delivery of TPWS+ (effective at speeds above 70 mph) by the rail industry is being pursued. HSC will assess whether regulations are needed to mandate fitment, recognising that TPWS and TPWS+ are only stopgap solutions.
The full text of the Commission's letter is below
1. Automatic Train Protection (ATP) prevents trains from over-speeding and from running past signals set at danger. It intervenes automatically to slow or stop the train. After the Ladbroke Grove train crash in October 1999, the Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems, chaired by Professor John Uff QC and the Rt Hon Lord Cullen PC, considered train protection and warning systems; the future application of ATP and measures to prevent Signals Passed At Danger (SPADs).
2. The Uff/Cullen Inquiry report was published in March 2001. 11 of the report's 39 recommendations deal with fitting the European Train Control System (ETCS - the train control part of ERTMS) in the UK.
3. The railway industry's ERTMS Programme Team (EPT) was established after the Uff/Cullen report's publication to produce "the Industry Plan for the implementation of ERTMS in the UK". The ERTMS Programme Board (EPB), jointly chaired by the SRA and Railway Safety, oversees its ongoing work. The Health & Safety Executive (HSE), along with the Department for Transport and Office of the Rail Regulator, has observer status on the EPB.
4. HSC's most recent report on rail industry progress in implementing public inquiry recommendations was published in November 2002. This can be accessed on the HSE web site at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/railway/railpublic.pdf
5. Full text of HSC's letter
Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP
Secretary of State for Transport
Zone 5/13
Great Minster House
76 Marsham Street
London SW1P 4DR
5 February 2003
ERTMS
The Health and Safety Commission has reported to you on progress on the recommendations of the public inquiries by Lord Cullen and Professor Uff, most recently last November. Following our meeting of 31 January, I am writing to confirm our advice on the best way forward for developing and installing effective automatic train protection (ATP) on Britain's railways. I am grateful that you have agreed that this advice be made public.
Your predecessor as Secretary of State asked us for advice on the rail industry's report ("The ERTMS Programme Team (EPT) Final Report", published in April last year) on how best to implement the recommendations of the Joint Inquiry into Train Protection (March 2001 - the Uff/Cullen report). The Joint Inquiry was established to look into the train protection issues arising from the Southall (1997) and Ladbroke Grove (1999) crashes in which 38 people died in accidents which could have been prevented by automatic train protection (ATP).
The Joint Inquiry Report recommended that, to ensure that effective automatic train protection is provided in Great Britain, the European Train Control System (ETCS) - part of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) - should be fitted to our high-speed lines by 2010, and to all mainlines by 2015, and that regulations made under health and safety legislation should drive the process. It also commended the Government's decision, based on our advice, to press ahead with the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS), by means of regulation, as an interim measure pending full automatic train protection.
The Government welcomed the Uff/Cullen report. Lord Macdonald (then Minister of Transport) said, "The Government is .. keen to see the new European train protection system introduced on our high speed network as soon as practicable". A News Release added, "The Government stands behind the categorical assurance given to Parliament last July by the Deputy Prime Minister that the Ten Year Plan will deliver measures arising from the inquiry."
More recently you told Parliament, "The vast bulk of the Cullen and Uff recommendations after Paddington and Southall have been or are on the way to being implemented. Some issues, such as whether ERTMS should be fitted, are under discussion. When evidence was given to Cullen he was led to believe that there was an advanced European system that could be incorporated on our railways, but unfortunately it turns out that the system he had in mind does not work on any railway anywhere in Europe. It makes sense to evaluate systems to establish whether they would work, and whether they could be adapted for our railway system."
The Commission congratulates the SRA and Railway Safety for their initiative in establishing the EPT, and for co-chairing the Project Board that oversees the team's work. Given the structure of the rail industry, the need to bring together the various parties was urgent, and the solution adopted has proved valuable - not least in ensuring coherence. The work of the EPT has been of high quality, though we share the view of the economic review team that the process would perhaps have benefited from an even more strategic approach.
The Commission believes strongly that our advice needs to be developed in ways that are open and transparent. We also recognised the need for our advice to be based on truly independent assessments of the EPT's work. We therefore commissioned three substantial independent reviews of EPT's work as well as receiving advice from HSE's Railway Inspectorate. The independent reviews covered not just the technical and economic issues (taking account of later refinement by EPT). Innovative means were also developed to help us understand public attitudes to safety on the railways and these have been an important part of our consideration. We think it important to research and fully consider public attitudes when dealing with issues, such as ATP, that have the potential to cause major public and political anxiety. We have also involved SRA, the Rail Passengers Council, ORR and your officials throughout the process, and had detailed discussions with a full range of stakeholders, including representatives of those bereaved or injured in the Southall and Ladbroke Grove crashes.
The three research reports have been published and provided a firm evidence base for the Commission's discussions. I enclose copies of the reports and have summarised their principal conclusions below. Although these confirm the main thrust of the EPT's conclusions, there are some significant differences and a number of the EPT's detailed arguments have needed revision. In particular, the EPT's arguments on the cross-modal safety effects of changed railway capacity were flawed.
The context for our advice is the fact that the railways are a relatively safe mode of transport - certainly safer than travelling by car. The railways also bring important environmental benefits. But the railway needs to maintain the trust of the public who, as our research has found, assume that railways are safe and are surprised to learn of the low level of technology that currently helps drivers avoid signals being passed at danger. It is helpful that the current programme for installing the TPWS is already delivering real safety benefits, as shown by the number of times TPWS is being activated. Details are included in our monthly SPAD reports.
We have no doubt that, as Lord Cullen and Professor Uff anticipated, prescriptive regulations for introducing TPWS to a set timetable have proved successful. Although there is some discussion about the details of the final part of the programme, the industry is on target to complete fitment by the end of 2003 as planned. As a result between 65 and 80% of ATP preventable accidents will be prevented. However there remains an important residual risk since at speeds higher than 70 mph even TPWS+ (whose fitment has not yet properly started) can do no more than reduce the speed of collision impact. We explain below why this remaining risk cannot be eliminated in the immediate future. In the meantime, HSE is pursuing the delivery of TPWS+ with the industry. This technology is essential to minimise the consequences of SPADs where train speeds are above 70mph. The Commission is keen to see the industry increase its efforts to commence installation as early as possible and there must be a clear programme for fitment. If necessary, the Commission will initiate work to assess whether regulatory action is needed to mandate its fitment.
Like Lord Cullen and Professor Uff, we recognise that TPWS and TPWS+ is only a stopgap solution. It follows that providing full ATP remains an important safety priority for the railways. This is reflected in the clear public expectation that ATP should indeed be provided, particularly on high-speed lines. When TPWS+ is eventually in place, installing ERTMS could probably further reduce the frequency of ATP-preventable accidents (with an average of 4 fatalities each) from 1 every 10 years to 1 every 60 years. However it is clear that the necessary technology is not yet sufficiently mature, and that the costs of installing Level 1 ERTMS to an accelerated timetable are very high. An accelerated timescale also risks an ERTMS induced accident.
The Commission therefore accepts that the Uff/Cullen timetable for installing ERTMS is not viable. It also believes that the current state of the technology means that at the moment further use of health and safety law to mandate ERTMS is not appropriate. However the Commission also believes it important that there is a clear and credible path to the installation of ERTMS at a future date. ERTMS would be essential if train speeds above 125 mph are contemplated. It has the potential to deliver significant non-safety benefits to the rail industry, including increased capacity. These capacity benefits, which also provide some additional safety benefits (including improved safety for trackside workers), mean that we endorse the industry's preference for Level 2 ERTMS. We are also concerned that Level 1, because of reduced capacity, may increase passenger discomfort and frustration with the consequent increased risk of violence to railway staff.
But we recognise that investment in ERTMS is not only - or even mainly - about delivering safety benefits. It is about the vision that the nation has for its railways in the 21st century. The political and financial dimensions of such strategic decisions mean that they cannot be left to the industry alone. Government must take a lead.
The Commission therefore recommends that Government should confirm the need for continued sponsorship of a single national programme for ERTMS development, with the SRA providing strategic direction and support. The HSE , Rail Regulator, and, when established, the Rail Safety and Standards Board should be involved in arrangements for its establishment and management. There need to be milestones so that progress can be monitored and reported publicly. There may also be some areas of work in the future that would benefit from regulatory support and the Commission will keep that under review.
I think that it would be useful for us to meet to discuss this advice and the next steps. These should, I think, include a wider meeting involving Richard Bowker and Tom Winsor. Our sponsoring Minister, Nick Brown, may wish to be present.
The Commission believes that risks have to be managed on the railways - as in all areas of economic life - and it does not think that it is practicable to insist on ERTMS at present. It is of course essential that the industry presses ahead with its development and implementation. We must all recognise though that a serious ATP-preventable incident remains a measurable risk and if that risk materialises we will all, not least the Government, face justified criticism unless there is a clear national strategy for introducing ERTMS, with a credible programme for its implementation. Hence the importance of an agreed and announced national programme.
I am copying this letter to Andrew Smith, Nick Brown, Richard Bowker and Tom Winsor.
Bill Callaghan
Chair, Health & Safety Commission
6. Principal conclusions of the research undertaken on behalf of the Health and Safety Commission by:
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