This report sets out the findings of a multidisciplinary team inspection carried out by HSE into the control and supervision of operations at BNFL's site at Sellafield.
The investigation was carried out under the control of the Deputy Chief Inspector of HSE's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate who is responsible for regulating safety at BNFL's sites. The inspection was carried out between 6 and 27 September 1999. HSE's team consisted of 11 nuclear inspectors and 2 inspectors from its Field Operations Directorate together with administrative staff.
The inspection was requested by the Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations following a series of events at Sellafield where the cause was seen to be weaknesses in control and supervision.
The team found that there were indeed weaknesses in this area and has made recommendations to overcome them. BNFL had also recognised shortfalls in the company's performance and had introduced initiatives to correct the shortfalls.
The weaknesses found showed that there had been a deterioration in safety performance at Sellafield. The recommendations identified in this report are those which BNFL needs to implement to fully meet the standards that are expected of a nuclear site licensee. Sellafield is not unsafe, but strong management action is needed to ensure that it both remains safe into the future and that BNFL makes the practicable improvements which can reasonably be expected.
NII has required BNFL to produce a programme for responding within 2 months to the recommendations of this report. Progress will be monitored as part of NII's normal process of regulation. Should progress be inadequate, NII will not hesitate to use its enforcement powers.
If you have any comments, or would like further information on the issues discussed in this report, write to the Chief Inspector at the address below:
Laurence Williams
Director of Nuclear Safety and
HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations
Health and Safety Executive
St Peter's House
Stanley Precinct
Bootle L20 3LZ
The BNFL Sellafield Site located in Cumbria contains two types of nuclear installations. Four Magnox type reactors provide steam and electricity for the Sellafield site and supply electricity to the national grid. The remainder of the site, comprising several hundred buildings, is associated with the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and the treatment and storage of radioactive wastes. The team inspection described in this report was carried out on the facilities associated with reprocessing and waste treatment and storage.
During the first half of 1999, an apparent increase in the number of incidents occurring at Sellafield was detected by NII. Investigation of some of these events by the NII inspection team for Sellafield indicated that inadequacies in BNFL's arrangements for the control and supervision of operations appeared to be a significant contributor to the poor safety performance. The Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations therefore decided that a team inspection should be carried out to investigate these apparent shortcomings in the control and supervision of operations.
A team comprising 11 NII inspectors and 2 inspectors from HSE's Field Operations Directorate was assembled. In selecting the team, care was taken to obtain a balance of inspectors with site inspection experience and specialist knowledge in the areas to be inspected and also with experience of inspection at both Sellafield and other nuclear establishments. In order to maximise the time available for inspection on site, planning for the inspection and examination of written information from BNFL was carried out prior to commencing the on-site inspection activities. The team spent two weeks on site in September 1999. Some members of the team also visited BNFL's headquarters at Risley. Whilst on site, the team generally operated as three groups (focusing on the topics of incidents, control and supervision of operations, and staffing and resources), but regrouped where appropriate to pursue central issues associated with the management of the Sellafield site.
One Improvement Notice was served during the inspection requiring improvements to BNFL's system for controlling risks to persons working at heights. On another occasion BNFL voluntarily stopped a plant when serious deficiencies were brought to its attention. BNFL has also agreed to undertake a systematic assessment of the baseline resource levels it requires for undertaking its current activities before any further changes are made to its organisational structure.
The inspection confirmed NII's original concerns about control and supervision. BNFL had already recognised a number of the shortcomings identified during the course of this HSE team inspection. In particular, it has recognised the need to bring about greater integration of the Sellafield site under the management of a team with authority to manage operations on the site and has begun to take steps to address this. It has also put in place a programme of initiatives intended to improve safety in a number of areas. Unless there are proactive systems for checking that the required standards are being maintained, non-compliances are likely either to go undetected, or to have caused significant problems by the time they are detected.
There are three key conclusions from this inspection. The first is that there is a lack of a high quality safety management system across the site which is compounded by an overly complex management structure. The second is that there are insufficient resources to implement even the existing safety management system. The third is a lack of an effective independent inspection, auditing and review system within BNFL. Without a vigorous independent inspection, auditing and review system, HSE does not see how BNFL can make acceptable and timely progress in delivering a high quality safety management system across the site.
Added to the HSE website on 18th February 2000