Information on advance notifications of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made during 2006 is shown in the table below. Data are shown in the same format as those provided previously. The withdrawals involved small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers or radiological shielding.
| Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 | Reason for withdrawal |
|---|---|
| one notification involving (Pu), µg quantities | material to be used for analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) 2 (from NPL Teddington, sample also contains µg quantities of depleted uranium) |
| three notifications involving high enriched uranium (HEU), total ~3g | for material contained in radiation detectors 2 (all from Centronic Ltd) |
| twelve notifications involving depleted natural and low enriched uranium (DNLEU) or thorium, total ~380kg | ten for material for use as radiological shielding (from High Technology Sources Limited) 3; one for material to be used for analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) ( from NPL Teddington) 2; and one for return of customer’s material following research experiments/analysis (Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) |
1 tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by DTI and which resulted in the eventual withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.
2 there are no facilities outside safeguards that manufacture material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.
3 the advance notifications of withdrawal for depleted uranium shielded containers were for temporary withdrawals, the containers being used during the replacement of spent radioactive sources at UK defence establishments.