Office for Nuclear Regulation
An agency of HSE

IAEA Withdrawal Notifications 2004

Information on advance notifications of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made during 2004 is shown in the table below. Data are shown in the same format as those provided previously. The withdrawals involved small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers or radiological shielding.

Table: Summary of Notifications of Withdrawals from Safeguards (January 2004 to December 2004)

Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 Reason for withdrawal
five notifications involving plutonium (Pu), µg quantities material to be used for analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) 2 (all from NPL, Teddington)
one notification involving high enriched uranium (HEU), total ~0.3 g material contained in radiation detectors2 (from Centronic Ltd)
thirteen notifications involving depleted, natural or low enriched uranium (DNLEU), total ~129 kg ten for material for use as radiological shielding (from High Technology Sources Limited3) and three for material to be used for analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) (from NPL Teddington)2

1 tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by DTI and which resulted in the eventual withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.

2 there are no facilities outside safeguards that manufacture material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.

3 all advance notifications of withdrawal for radiological shielding were for MOD-owned depleted uranium containers temporarily under safeguards during the replacement of spent radioactive sources for UK defence establishments.

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Updated 30.07.10