Information on advance notifications to the IAEA and the European Commission of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made during 2001 is shown in the table below. The withdrawals involved small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers or radiological shielding. Information on advance notifications of withdrawals from safeguards is made available in the same format as in the paper provided to Parliament in July 2000 (28 July 2000, Official Report, column 1094W) and the written answer to a Parliamentary question provided in March 2001 (01 March 2001, Official Report, column 732-733W).
| Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 | Reason for withdrawal |
|---|---|
| five notifications involving plutonium (Pu), µg quantities | material to be used for analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration)2 (all from NPL Teddington) |
| nine notifications involving high enriched uranium (HEU), total ~16g | eight for material contained in radiation detectors2 and one for material to be used for analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) (eight from Centronic Ltd and one from UKAEA Harwell) |
| four notifications involving depleted natural and low enriched uranium (DNLEU), total ~17kg | three for material to be used for analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration)2 and one for material for use as radiological shielding (three from NPL Teddington and one from UKAEA Harwell) |
1 the tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by DTI and which resulted in the eventual withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.
2 there are no facilities outside safeguards that manufacture material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.