Annex 1: Detailed Supporting Guidance - Emergency Arrangements - Control Centres and Activities

T/INS/011

1 Introduction
2 Supporting Guidance

1 Introduction

1.1 The sections below provide detailed guidance on the issues that will require the attention of an inspector allocated to the identified centre or activity during a Level 1 demonstration emergency exercise. The sections should be read in conjunction with Appendix 2 of T/INS/011 LC11 Emergency Arrangements. They are based on a reactor structure; plant with dispersible radioactive source terms have similar centres and additional points are dealt with under the Plant with Dispersible Radioactive Source Terms section. They are aimed at inspectors with only limited experience in judging emergency exercises; as such they are not intended to be fully comprehensive but to give a sound basis on which to base initial judgements. As experience is gained the inspector will develop his/her own list of points to be considered, hopefully adding to the issues identified here.

1.2 The sections are too detailed and extensive to be taken into exercise locations. They are intended to be read through in the office once an inspector knows which areas he/she will be inspecting. Appendix 2 of the T/INS/011 LC11 provides a simple aide memoire if required.

2 Supporting Guidance

2.1 Command and Control

Controller to stand back and take strategic view – not involved in running of centre / incident point. He should provide calm, clear leadership of the team setting the team’s environment.
Controller considers most likely and worst case outcomes – thinking ahead and basing actions on most likely outcome but putting (additional) resources in place for the worst case.
Controller briefs the team regularly summarising the present position and providing the focus points (on a board visible to whole team) for the next phase of the event. Everything should stop for the 90 secs (or so) that the briefing should take.
Decision making is clear, timely, and based on best information; decisions and associated actions are transmitted clearly to team. Decision should be on strategic issues.
Key objectives will be to protect the public; recover casualties/ protect on-site personnel; bring the incident back under control/ stop or mitigate any release (sometimes put public/ people/ plant/ environment); and provide information to (and liaise with) off-site centres.
Controller to monitor the achievement of the strategic actions and intervene if they go off track.
The Controller should be thinking ahead and monitoring the progress/ completion of his/ her strategy for handling the incident. He/ she should be monitoring the completion of actions placed – both within the room and on sub-ordinate control centres – and intervening if they are not being achieved.

2.2 Off and On-site countermeasure advice

The Police will require written public protection advice as early as possible. This is likely to have been provided by the FCC on declaration but should be reviewed by the ECC when it takes over.
Wind direction and strength (usually available in the FCC) should be used to make an initial assessment of any muster points that could be in the plume. Steps should then be put in hand to have those individuals moved to safer areas.
The first advice will be based on an initial assessment of the event (possibly based on fence post monitors or on-site survey results). It will need to be reviewed and possibly amended once off-site survey information becomes available. Erring on the side of caution is preferable. If not already required, the review should include the requirement to apply automatic counter measures, e.g. KIO3 tablets for both on and off-site personnel and emergency services (reactor site).
Routine reconsideration of off-site advice is required until the off-site centre is operational and takes the role. Hand over to off-site should be clear cut.
Evacuation of on-site muster stations within the plume should be considered.
Evacuation of non-essential personnel from site should be considered.

2.3 Roll call/ on-site personnel management and information

The site should be closed up; access and egress should be controlled.
Reconciliation of roll call and identification of missing personnel should be completed in time to allow the search and rescue teams to retrieve injured parties within the golden hour.
Consideration should be given to movement of staff with emergency handling skills e.g. first aiders, additional entry team members, Health Physics (HP) support, movement of materials (e.g. recharged BA bottles), etc as well as access/ egress for shift change over.
Safe routes should be established for essential personnel movement.
Staff at muster stations should be told the ECC has taken over from the Facility Control Centre (FCC) and subsequently kept informed of the situation by regular appropriate communications, e.g. tannoy announcements – and should be reminded to keep doors and windows shut, ventilation systems turned off, etc.

2.4 Emergency Services Liaison

2.4.1 Interface with the ECC

Team leaders/ liaison officers from Fire Services, Ambulance, Police will attend the ECC and require initial/ routine briefs about the current position, the likely hazards, safe routes, what they are to be asked to do, etc.
Emergency services should input information that comes directly to them through their radio links with their teams and the off-site centre.
ECC Controller should be kept informed of emergency services resource position and should factor it into his/ her forward thinking.

2.4.2 Reception

The emergency services should be met by a member of the licensee’s staff whose specific role is facilitating their entry to site.
There should be people available who can escort the emergency services and/ or their leaders to the required places on site.
Vehicles should be routed to a holding area to ensure the gate remains clear; this may be in an intermediate position (out of the plume) or close to the ICP. Both the gate and the roads inside/ outside the site should be considered when avoiding congestion.
The senior team leader will be routed to the FCC/ ECC (depending how quickly they arrive) for briefing, the operating leaders will go with their teams to the holding area and thence to the ICP.

2.4.3 Safe Routes

Emergency Services should not be allowed to enter site until they have a safe route – out of the plume – to their holding/ assembly area.
This will apply to the team leaders seeking to reach the FCC/ ECC or the ICP, and the vehicles moving to their holding/ assembly area.
Depending on the time taken for the services to arrive the safe routes should be provided by the FCC or the ECC.
If the emergency services are unfamiliar with the site (NB some teams may contain site staff as retained firemen) vehicles and team leaders should be escorted by site staff to ensure they follow the route provided and park in the right place.
Once the vehicles are parked the escorts can then take the operating team leaders to the appropriate ICP.

2.4.4 PPE

The emergency team members should be issued with a standard pack of dosimetry – usually a dosemeter, KIO3 tablets (Reactor sites), and (for the Fire Brigade at least) Electronic Personal Dosemeters (EPDs) to be used during their entries.
While initially moving into position on the site the teams will not be wearing their PPE - although their vehicles will give them some protection. They should not be routed through the plume.
Any vehicle leaving the site should be monitored – although ambulances leaving with severely injured casualties are likely to be waved through.

2.4.5 Communications

It should be remembered that the radio frequencies used by the ambulance, the fire service and the site will all be different so that messages/ instructions that come in to the gate house e.g. from the FCC/ ECC may have to be hand carried if the teams have already left for their assembly point.

2.5 On and off-site communication

The ECC should be in routine communication with the FCC, ICP, the on-site and off-site survey vehicles, the SCC, and the off-site technical support centre.
Strategic focus points (and even copies of status boards) should be faxed to the FCC & ICP and their tactical focus points/ status boards should be returned to the ECC.
Tactical issues should be dealt with by the subordinate centres; strategic issues should be passed to the ECC for resolution.
Of key importance is the transmission of public protection advice (i.e. counter measures) to the Police and until the SCC is able to take over.
Requests for resources/ information/ technical questions beyond the capability of those on-site should be passed to the licensee senior management (technical centre where available) through the ECC.

2.6 Information management, action management & record keeping

Boards should be updated regularly. They should be segregated e.g. incident info, casualties, action tracking, etc. It should be possible to follow the event from the board information. Key information should be timed.
The action board is of key importance – this should be run by the deputy controller.
Actions should have both an initiation and completion time. Actions should not go over the completion time – although this can be updated.
A record should be kept of the boards as the event progresses (before they are overwritten) to assist with any later inquiry.
Records should be kept of communications to and from the SCC/ECC/ICP to allow for later analysis.

2.7 Tenability

Unless designed to withstand the worst an event can do, the centre should be monitored initially and then regularly thereafter for radiation/ air activity levels, gas concentration (gas reactor), etc. If the centre is not tenable the backup centre should be used.

2.8 Declaration

The first task is to recognise the emergency and its severity - and whether it is likely to cause (or could escalate to cause) an off-site release.
These decisions will be based on the symptoms coming from plant indications, the physical environment (as seen on CCTV) and, if available, indications from site monitoring systems. In addition, maintenance work ongoing/ just started should be checked as a possible cause of the incident.
The possible diagnosis of the incident should consider the most likely and the worst possible causes for input into the declaration decision.
The declaration should be made on the best available information and should be timely – not waiting for more and more information.
Once the declaration decision is made, the site alarms should be sounded and the required instructions communication, e.g. tannoy announcements. This should cover what is thought to have happened (in outline), what people are required to do (e.g. go to muster station, close all doors and windows/ shut down ventilation, take KIO3 tablets, etc), affected areas, etc. Information on safe routes for people to reach their emergency / muster stations should be provided.
Initial steps in the off site notification chain should then be carried out. This can include automatic electronic notification systems reaching the general public.

2.9 Plant Control

The Facility Control Centre staff should seek to understand the extent of the incident, its likely causes and its implications.
If possible steps should be taken to mitigate the event – e.g. for a gas reactor blowing down through an iodine bed to reduce the pressure as quickly as possible and thus limit the release.
Use should be made of instructions aimed at handling beyond design basis events, e.g. Situation based emergency response guidelines (SBERGs) on reactor sites.
Manual operation of plant could be required – the relevant instructions/ operator familiarity should be apparent.
The FCC needs to get the plant to a safe, stable state. This can be an intermediate state e.g making use of the Xe peak in reactors or provision of containment in process plants, but longer term thinking is required to make sure the plant goes into a safe state and stays there.

2.10 FCC Interface with ICP/ ECC

The FCC needs to brief the ICP on the diagnosis of the event and what the initial entry team(s) should aim to achieve.
The FCC should brief the ECC Controller before he takes over on the incident information available so far and the actions taken – on the plant, to protect the on-site personnel and to protect the public off-site. Any interactions with the emergency services should be included.
There should be a regular exchange of status and focus point information between the FCC, the ICP and the ECC to ensure the whole emergency team remains in step and attacks the strategic objectives being set by the ECC.

2.11 Entry Team co-ordination and control

In the first phase the first incident review team (IRT) should be put into the incident area as soon as possible to assess the situation on the ground. Before any team goes into the incident area there should always be a back up team of at least two people dressed, wearing appropriate RPE /PPE (BA if the incident requires) i.e. ready to go at a moments notice to support the entry team if they get into trouble/ require assistance.
Each team will require a clear brief before entry. Information from Facility monitoring stations / CCTV cameras should be used to inform the briefing, (See Briefing 2.15.4).
Once the IRT team has reported in or has returned and been debriefed, the second phase begins. Decisions will be made by the ICP controller on the next set of objectives that the teams have to achieve – e.g. search and rescue, further assessment of areas not seen by the initial team, casualty recovery, assessment of specific environmental conditions in specific areas, damage repair preparations, etc, etc.
Decisions on priorities and on whether to run teams in series or parallel will need to be made - parallel teams usually reduce the time to locate injured casualties (but can load up the decontamination area as the teams leave the incident area). The objectives and how they are to be achieved should be briefed to the ICP team.
Information brought back by the teams should be entered on the boards and key issues fed to the FCC and the ECC. This will enable progress to be monitored, priorities reassessed, and thought to be given to what is required to mitigate/ terminate the incident. Instructions – usually from the FCC - are then given to get this work put in hand by the Damage Repair Team (DRT) personnel.
The ICP controller or deputy will need to have a clear picture of what has been searched and what remains to be done – recorded on one of the boards. This board should be used by the controller to amend his tactics for finding the missing persons. Missing persons should be accounted for once they have been recovered to the ICP. Key achievements should be briefed to the ICP and fed to the FCC and ECC.
On return from an entry the doses that each team member has incurred should be recovered from the EPDs and recorded. This information should be checked before team members are allowed to enter for a second or subsequent time.

2.12 Breathing Apparatus (BA) Control

Before entry into the incident area, all team members (TMs) must supply their BA tag or tally to the BA board controller. One individual should be in charge of the BA board full time.
The BA board controller should put on the board the TMs name, tag number and the time of entry.
In general all TMs wearing BA should be under one BA control system. However, sometimes Fire Brigades (FB) insist on using their own system and two boards are run in parallel – one by the licensee and one by the FB.
Before entry the dressing of TMs should be checked – usually by other TMs. BA set pressures should also be checked to establish bottles are full.
On exit the names/ TAG numbers must be removed from the board(s).

2.13 Contamination Control

All entry TMs should have PPE and RPE appropriate to the incident. This usually involves a top layer of oversuit / hoods (or chemical suits for FB) over a full change, gloves/ boots, and respirators or BA sets depending on the hazards. Some site FBs use their usual fire protection clothing plus BA –plastic oversuits not being appropriate for fires.
The entry and exit areas/ routes to/ from the incident should be well separated to avoid cross contamination.
The exit area should have double barriers separated by an area for monitoring/ further decontamination. If possible with decontamination zones physically separated and air flow from the clean to dirty side of the barrier. The floor of the space between barriers should be covered with a removable surface e.g. sizalcraft or have a decontaminable surface to simplify decontamination.
On return TMs should be prioritised according to the amount of air they have left. TMs should not undress themselves; they should be undressed by disrobers.
Disrobers on the dirty side of the barriers should likewise be wearing full change/ oversuits/ hoods and respirators. They should be wearing gloves which will be required to be changed between TMs and before they handle clean equipment e.g. before fitting of a clean respirator during the change over from BA.
Before undressing contamination can be fixed (tapped, glycerol spray), damped down (by shower) or removed (by vacuuming) to reduce the spread/ keep it out of the air.
The TM should be undressed on the dirty side of the first barrier - often standing in/ on a large plastic bag that will contain the contaminated clothing once undressing is finished. Starting with the head and thorax the hood and upper clothes are removed, if worn the BA set face piece is taken off and a clean respirator fitted. It is essential that clean gloves are worn when handling the clean respirator to avoid cross contamination. The team member is then undressed to remove the PPE, puts on a pair of overshoes as the boots are removed, and passes over the first barrier to be monitored. Respiratory protection should be maintained until monitored clear. If clean the TM can pass over the second barrier on to the clean side to be debriefed. Some sites break the supply from the BA bottle and provide a fixed clean air supply. The connections of these hoses need to be kept scrupulously clean since any contamination on them may result in a contamination intake.
While being monitored the probe should not touch the potentially contaminated surface – this can contaminate the probe foil and make it useless for further work – but is sometimes appropriate for final clearance monitoring for alpha nuclides.
Dirty clothing/ contaminated equipment should be routinely bagged, monitored and shifted to a clean area store to keep the exit area clear of clutter.
A severely injured casualty will need to be fast tracked through the ICP. Once they have been monitored they should be ‘bagged’ (wrapped in a clean plastic sheet; clean gloves are needed when handling the outside of the bag) and passed over the barriers as a ‘clean bundle’ for onward transmission to the Medical centre/ Occupational Health centre/ First Aid area.
The areas on the top of the barriers, between barriers, and on the clean side should be routinely monitored and any contamination spots found cleaned up or fixed to prevent spread or reduce material in the air.
Alarming air samplers should be run to check activity in air.

2.14 Dose Control

Although IRRs are disapplied, if a REPPIR Radiation Emergency is declared, it is still necessary to keep doses to all individuals ALARP.
All team members should be equipped with EPDs with the alarms set to appropriate levels. They should not be set on ‘standard’ limits e.g. 20 mSv if teams are going into low dose rate areas.
Consideration must be given to setting team tasks with a view to minimising the dose commitment to TMs e.g. setting up the approach to fire fighting to minimise fire team dose or moving deployed teams to low dose areas while decisions are made on task variations.
There must be a system for recording the dose that each TM receives during an entry. The entry dose/ dose rate must not exceed some predetermined limit (usually set in the EPD) and the accumulated dose should be kept within the limit specified in the Emergency Plan (which will have been agreed with HSE).
The ICP controller will usually have discretion to allow doses up to some pre-agreed limit, with the ECC Controller approving doses up to the emergency limit.
Checking of the prior dose commitment must be done before TMs are allowed to go on a second or subsequent entry.
Dose control for Fire Team members must be integrated into the facility system for recording doses.

2.15 Entry Teams

2.15.1 Communications

Communications to teams should be tested before entry.
In the ICP it is preferable that the communication to teams is handled by a single individual preferably in a quiet area. Key information being fed back should be fed into the rest of the ICP team via the boards.
Communication frequency should be agreed before team goes in. If the teams hit any radio dead spot(s) this should be noted and fed back at the debrief.

2.15.2 Team composition

All team members (TMs) should be trained for their likely roles prior to the emergency. They should have given their consent to being part of the teams. Entry teams should never be less that two people; a minimum of 3 is preferred for the initial entry teams.
Initial entry teams – e.g incident assessment, search and rescue – should include facility personnel who are familiar with the layout and potential hazards. They should show respect to those hazards e.g. not walking into hot gas clouds, very high radiation areas, contamination areas etc.
Initial teams should include HP personnel who have the necessary radiation, contamination and (reactor sites) gas monitoring instrumentation.
Once conditions have stabilised and are known, teams can be led by experienced facility personnel or well briefed fire personnel. However, note that if there is a fire to be fought, some FB teams will not accept the inclusion of facility personnel (but can accept site fire team members).
Initial teams should contain personnel who are competent to give first aid to stabilise any casualties they encounter. They should also have been trained in casualty handling by whatever means (e.g. stretcher, portable chair) is used for recovering casualties on the facility.
Teams should have members who are competent to undertake the task they have been allocated.
For integrated teams of the FB and facility staff the lead/ follow position should be clearly understood.

2.15.3 PPE/ RPE/ Dosimetry

Initial entry teams should operate in full change and a (preferably impervious) protective top layer – which can be a plastic suit/ hood, normal (onsite) FB uniform, or (offsite FB) chemical suit. Gloves/ gauntlets and suitable footwear (e.g. boots) should be worn and taped to the outer layer to prevent/ reduce the possibility of contamination ingress. [Note that nothing keeps out tritium!]
Initial teams should go in wearing BA sets until the extent of the hazard has been established and the incident is stabilised. It may be possible to switch to respirators at that point.
All TMs should carry EPDs with the alarms set (by HP in the ICP) for both dose rate and accumulated dose for the entry.
Before entry TMs should check each other to establish that they are correctly dressed (e.g. hoods attached properly/ over BA face masks, etc) and that they have adequate air pressure in the bottles.

2.15.4 Briefing

As the incident response progresses more will be known about what has happened and what the conditions are that the team will face. Briefing will therefore need to change to match the knowns and unknowns.
Initial assessment teams will need to know what is believed to have happened, what the team is required to do (and how they will know they have done it), known and likely/ possible hazards, dose limitations (both rate and accumulated), action to take if EPDs go into alarm, action to take if they encounter adverse conditions (e.g. hot gas), action to take if the team has a problem (e.g. a team member is injured), routes in and out/ areas believed to be safe in the event of a problem, communication frequency, action to take if casualties are encountered, etc.
For search and rescue they will also need which areas have already been searched, how many are still missing, what they had gone in to do, where they are believed to have been last (all of which should help the search concentrate on most likely areas first), what to do if multiple casualties are encountered, positions of stretchers, etc
For DRTs information required includes routes in and out, known conditions in the area they have to work in, time in repair area (if working in a high radiation environment), and dose control limitations (which could vary for each team member!).

2.15.5 Approach to Entry

All equipment –communication, cameras, radiation instrumentation, repair tools, etc, etc – should be tested to establish they work before the team goes over the barrier.
Before they go in, the team should be perfectly clear about what they have to do, how they will know they have done it, what their limitations are, and what to do if things do not go to plan.
Before they go in TMs should check each other to ensure all are properly dressed, the BA sets have adequate pressure, and everyone is comfortable.
Once over the barrier initial entry teams should be led by the HP TM who has, and uses, the radiation, contamination and hot gas checking instrumentation (reactors). The instrumentation should be switched on. They should move forward cautiously checking before they go round blind corners, enter corridors/ closed areas to establish what the hazard is before committing to go in.
Information should be requested from Umpires – it should not be fed to the team whether they ask or not. They may have to be told they can hear escaping gas/ steam, or feel increasing heat, see a large fire, have just heard a loud noise, have seen an extensive pool of water, etc, etc, because these cannot always be simulated in a realistic way.
As a matter of routine TMs should check each other for the symptoms of heat exhaustion, remaining BA bottle pressure, protective clothing still in position, etc.
Later entries where safe routes/ areas have been established should recognise that the situation can have changed - requiring care at all times. Once the safe area limits are reached e.g. a new area is to be searched, the same level of caution and checking is required as was required during the initial team entry.
Teams should keep to the agreed communication frequency – reporting in regularly so that the ICP can keep track of their progress – and find them if they get into trouble.
The communication capability of the teams throughout the incident area should be checked and any radio black spots noted. In addition, difficulties with using radios in BA gear will also need to be addressed – using throat mikes for example.
If the team is required to split up (e.g. to handle multiple casualties) the team members should always be in pairs so that they can check each other.

2.15.6 Back up Rescue Team

When any entry team is in the incident area a back up team of two people (minimum) should be available, e.g. fully dressed wearing their BA sets (except for the face masks and hoods). They should be available to leave instantly to provide support to any team that gets into trouble or simply goes missing.
The team will need a clear brief – similar to an initial entry team - if they are called to respond to an entry team getting into difficulties. Clearly if the team simply goes missing they will be going into an unknown situation and will require a cautious approach.
Members of the back up team will need to be rotated regularly because even sitting around in full gear is tiring and will effect their performance.

2.15.7 Equipment

All equipment that is going to go into the incident area should be tested before entry to ensure it will work when called upon to do so. This should also be used to check TMs know how to use it and it can be used wearing all the protective gear.
Any complex task (repair proposals) should be thought through by technical staff to optimise the approach from a TM dose commitment/ hazard reduction viewpoint.
If complicated tasks are to be undertaken e.g. during the repair phase, they should be rehearsed in a clean, low radiation area so that each TM knows what they have to do; they should also consider what to do in various situations when all does not go to plan.
Consideration should be given to the ability to handle equipment deemed necessary for carrying out repairs, etc. The ability to transport it and use it when fully dressed and wearing BA sets should be taken into consideration before the task is attempted.

2.16 On and Off Site Surveys

2.16.1 Observing the surveys

There are 3 ways to observe the off-site survey viz travel with one of the vehicles, go with a licensee observer or follow the teams in your own car.
Staying with a single vehicle limits what an inspector can see and makes it difficult to get back on to site to see other aspects.
Joining a licensee observer provides more mobility, providing you both agree to see the same aspects. In addition, the licensee observer is likely to have a radio so the traffic between survey teams and the centre can be monitored.
If you use your own car it is worth obtaining a radio so you can monitor the survey team/ centre traffic and know where the teams are being sent.
On-site observation is clearly less difficult – although a radio will help the monitoring of both on and off site teams.

2.16.2 Team assembly/ vehicle checks

As soon as the site alarm is sounded, the HP teams that staff the on- and off-site survey teams should assemble either in the HP control room or at the vehicle garage.
Team members must muster and, if required, take KIO3 tablets (Reactors).
They should receive an initial brief – either in the HP control room or after they have established that their vehicles are ready to leave the garage.
The brief should cover (in outline) what is believed to have happened, wind direction/ strength, where they are expected to sample first, what they will be looking for e.g. activity in air, radiation levels, ground contamination, soil and grass samples, water samples, CO2 concentrations (Gas reactor) – or perhaps all of these.
On arrival at the garage they teams should check the vehicles are roadworthy – e.g. checking tyres, the brake pedal does not go straight to the floor, oil and fuel levels, it starts, the lights work, etc. (These checks may instead be part of an EMIT schedule).
In parallel with checking the vehicle, the instruments and PPE (suits, overshoes, gloves, respirators, etc) in the vehicle should be inventoried and the instrument calibration dates and functionality should be checked.
Once this has been done communications can be checked when the team reports that it is ready to leave the garage.
Their primary sample point should then be confirmed; the on-site vehicle will head for its first sample point and the off-site vehicles will leave site.

2.16.3 Instrumentation/ sampling

The vehicles will take the team into the path of the plume and must be capable of being sealed to provide additional protection; otherwise TMs will require appropriate RPE/PPE. It is good practice to be able to get activity in air samples without leaving the vehicle.
Once they arrive at the sample point the air sampler, (Maypack for Reactors), should be fitted to the sampler and the pump started to pull air through it. The sample flowrate and time will be required fairly accurately so the volume of air sampled will be known.
Care should be taken when fitting/ removing the air sampler to ensure cross contamination from one sample to the next does not occur. This is also true of the measuring instrumentation.
The sample can be counted on a scalar or a ratemeter or returned to the HP control room for counting. If a ratemeter is used the sample may be off scale and it will be necessary to use an attenuator – or deal with it some other way. If you are not an HP expert note what is done and check it with an NII HP.
If the team decide to leave the vehicle to get other sample results e.g. ground contamination (which usually gives a quicker indication of abnormal levels than air samples) before the air sample result is known, they should be wearing protective clothing and a respirator. If they do not it is worth checking how they know don’t have to wear the protective equipment and at what air activity level they would consider it necessary.
If they leave the vehicle, precautions should be taken to ensure the interior of the vehicle does not become contaminated as they leave and re-enter. The interior should be monitored and any spots of contamination should be cleaned up.
The interior should be checked routinely in any case to ensure contamination is not escaping from the samples/ sampling systems.
Once the results have been obtained they should be radioed to the centre together with the time of sample and the location.
The team should then be directed to their next sample point – or to a waiting station out of the plume.

2.16.4 Survey Strategy/ Control

For both on- and off-site teams the first sample point should be chosen so that it yields some positive information i.e. down wind and close to the plant or site.
The results should confirm (or not) that activity is being released on- and off-site. The data should be used to establish whether the on- and off-site precautions to protect staff and the public are appropriate and whether they need to be strengthened.
Subsequent samples should be aimed at defining the extent to the plume and its boundaries. It is usual for the sites to have predetermined fixed survey points so the teams do not have any difficulty in finding them.
Off-site checks down wind will provide information on the deposition of activity, the radiation and ground contamination levels, CO2 levels, etc at specific locations (e.g. perhaps in local ‘centres’ of population) to facilitate decisions of public protection counter measures.
On-site, the team can be used to define the boundaries of the plume and then parked just outside the boundary to monitor the impact of any changes in wind direction, etc.
Neither team should be left sitting in the plume while the centre decides where to sample/ what to do next.

2.16.5 Communication

The information from the survey teams should be radioed back to the central HP team in as soon as it becomes available.
As the emergency develops for some reactor sites the technical centre (Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC)) takes over the off-site survey control, and evaluation/ interpretation of results. Handover from one centre to the other needs to be clearly defined so it is always clear who is in control.
There are specific radio networks designed to handle the survey team/ centre exchanges and these should be tested during the exercise. For certain exercises the main network will be deemed to be failed and the back up system will be tested.
Once the information has been received and processed it should be fed to the FCC or ECC Controller (depending who is in control in the initial stages) interpreted into radiological consequences for on- and off-site. This will be used to formulate on-site and off-site public protection advice.
Ultimately it will go to the SCC once this centre has come on line to inform the public protection strategy and actions.
Handover of responsibility for off-site protection from site to SCC must be clearly defined.

2.16.6 Information Presentation and recording

The measurements are usually translated into colour coded points on a map of the area surrounding the facility/ site/ station (plume plots).
The HP team should use a plume model to confirm their understanding of the developing situation, provide interpolation where there is no immediate data, decide where the data is most needed next, etc.
They should use the combined output of measured results and the model predictions to provide information on the likely radiological consequences both on- and off-site.
The consequences information, and significant changes thereto, should be brought to attention of the ECC Controller while the ECC is responsible for the provision of the public protection advice.
The base measurement data and its interpretation in radiological advice should be recorded, e.g. by keeping copies of plume plots as they develop. This information will be of key importance for the review of actions taken that will follow a real event.

2.17 Mustering

2.17.1 Roll Call Methods

A range of methods are possible – from full site wide electronic systems, facility paper lists, collation of security passes/ identity cards/ criticality lockets, etc. For any system there should be a back up available.
For sites where a single event can affect the whole site almost instantaneously, e.g. failure of a reactor pressure circuit component, site wide electronic systems are prevalent.
For sites where operations are segregated into buildings designed to withstand/ contain the worst effects of an incident, local systems (e.g. based on identity passes) can be used to establish who was in the building at the time. The whole site muster will be required to be completed, but on a longer timescale than the immediate problem of knowing who was in the building at the time of the event.
Seriously injured casualties usually require to be recovered within the ‘golden hour’. Once beyond this time the prognosis becomes steadily worse for the casualty. Roll call effectiveness should be judged on the ability of the licensee to demonstrate it can identify and account for all missing persons to allow recovery within the golden hour.
Seriously injured casualties should not be considered accounted for until they are in the Medical Centre being treated.

2.17.2 Office Personnel muster points

People should muster quickly and not dribble in over an extended period.
One individual should assume the role of the assembly point controller (APC).
The APC should supervise the operation of the role call system – be it paper or electronic. The system should handle internal and external visitors as well as all the observers/ umpires, etc associated with the exercise.
Any known casualties or missing persons should be fed to the muster co-ordinating team immediately.
The APC should ensure that automatic countermeasures are applied:
- KIO3 tablets are taken if this is appropriate (Reactors). This should be simulated properly – with the necessary water available for people to drink.
- All doors and windows should be shut and ventilation systems turned off.
Muster points should be large enough to handle the likely number assembling.
The tenability of the muster point should be checked initially and then regularly thereafter. There should be instrumentation to do this e.g. radiation and/ or activity in air monitoring, CO2 concentration (gas reactors), etc.
The instrumentation may be used to check whether the plume is passing directly over the muster point.
- If this is the case the APC should, if at all possible, get permission before moving people.
- Permission will come from the FCC/ ECC depending who is in control at the time.
- If moving there should be sufficient respirators available to enable those assembled to evacuate through the plume should this prove necessary.
The site tannoy, where used, should be clearly audible to all of the people at the muster station and it should be used to keep them informed of the development of the event on a regular basis.

2.17.3 Muster points for those involved in the incident

In addition to the issues identified above, those who could have been involved could be contaminated. There will need to be a quick screening process to segregate those contaminated from those not.
Segregated decontamination facilities will be needed – perhaps showers with effluent handling facilities. Contaminated clothing should be collected and bagged to keep contamination out of the air. Air samplers should be running to detect whether contamination is being brought into the muster point – or the plume is passing overhead.
The clean and dirty areas should be regularly monitored and any spots of contamination found cleaned up or fixed to prevent it getting into the air.
TLDs should be collected to allow urgent assessment of an individual’s dose. Records will need to be kept of this information.
Individuals should be debriefed to establish what they know about the incident and who else was in the incident area with them. This information should be passed to the muster co-ordinators as soon as possible.

2.17.4 Additional points for Criticality Events

In addition to the above, personnel may have absorbed radiation doses that could give rise to deterministic effects.
Personnel should be checked to establish those who were close to the event – they could need urgent medical attention.
An immediate dose assessment method is required e.g. criticality lockets, indium foils in identity pass carriers, activated Na in the body.
Those (probably HP staff) handling the people should be actively looking for the effects of radiation sickness (nausea, confusion, passing out, etc) that could indicate exposure to high doses requiring urgent medical attention.
If individuals are identified as having potentially absorbed a very high dose they must be immediately transferred to a medical facility for treatment.

2.18 Casualty Handling/ Medical Aspects

2.18.1 PPE/ RPE

There should be a Medical Centre – usually on the edge of the active area - capable of providing triage for contaminated casualties.
It is sometimes connected to the outside world so that, once treated, patients can be transferred to an ambulance to be sent to a local hospital which has expertise in handling contaminated patients.
The people staffing this facility – ideally one or two nurses/ first aiders, a doctor and a HP monitor – should be wearing oversuits, (multiple pairs of) gloves, overshoes and respirators. This provides protection when they ‘unwrap’ patients and cut away contaminated clothing to get at the injuries; it also facilitates contamination control.
Gloves should be changed regularly to avoid cross contamination / wound uptakes (alpha nuclides).

2.18.2 Contamination control

Ideally the centre should be segregated into a dirty and clean area with the air flow from clean to dirty.
The floor of the centre should either be covered with a removable surface or be a readily decontaminable finish.
The centre should have an activity in air monitor running.
The clean and dirty sides should be monitored regularly and/ or between each patient (if this is possible) and any contamination spots found should be cleaned up or fixed.
Ideally the exit from the area to the waiting ambulance should be through an air lock to limit the spread of contamination.
A supply of clean blankets, plastic sheet, etc should be available to wrap patients who are still contaminated after treatment and require transfer to hospital in the ambulance.
Contaminated clothing/ wrapping material, etc should be bagged and stored out of the way to ensure the activity is not resuspended.
The centre should have available a supply of body bags to handle contaminated dead bodies.

2.18.3 Communication

The medical centre should be briefed, about contaminated casualties who will need triage, by the ICP before they are sent to the centre.
The medical centre should keep the ECC informed on the status of the casualties.
The ECC should be warned when a casualty is to be dispatched to hospital so that the ambulance can be cleared through the gatehouse and off-site.

2.18.4 Liaison with Ambulance Service

Ambulance staff are not usually dressed to be in contaminated areas and should, therefore, be kept on the clean side of the facility.
The ambulance team should be briefed on the extent of any remaining contamination. If this is very extensive the casualty should be accompanied by a licensee health physicist who can give advice on how to handle the casualty both within the ambulance and at the hospital.
Once the ambulance returns from delivering a contaminated casualty it, and its team, should be monitored to confirm the effectiveness of contamination control measures.

2.18.5 Overview of Exercise personnel

First aiders, nurses, and site doctors are usually heavily involved in exercises playing their normal roles.
In addition to their normal role in the exercise they should be monitoring other staff as they exercise to ensure they are not excessively stressed.
General fatigue and, for BA teams, heat exhaustion can reduce team member’s performance and lead to accidents. The medical staff deployed should be looking for indications that this is occurring and should intervene if necessary.

2.19 Plant with Chemical / Dispersible Radioactive Source Terms

These plant are usually located on an extended site that contains multiple facilities housed in different buildings. While the facilities required for emergency response will be similar to those for reactor sites, the titles of the various centres usually differ. However, if the principle function of a particular centre is known it can be inspected using the guidance given above. It should be noted that, unlike a reactor where the primary radioactivity is (at least initially) contained in a fixed matrix (fuel pins), chemical plant radioactivity can be in a highly mobile form. The primary containment is the equipmen t envelope, glove boxes and the vessel ventilation systems, with the cells/ caves within which the plant is housed and the cell/ cave ventilation system as the secondary containment. This can give rise to a somewhat different type of incident and produce different constraints on the emergency response. The key issues noted below have been chosen to provide guidance on likely issues.

2.19.1 Incident type

Spills

Solid or liquid spills need an assessment of the amount spilled to provide a source term. There should be records of the inventory of the original containers available in the originating plant.
The approach to the spill requires care and the appropriate PPE/ RPE. If external to buildings a knowledge of wind direction and the likely wind pattern around groups of buildings needs to be considered. Inside buildings the building air flow pattern/ ventilation system impact will need to be considered when deciding on the potential to spread material.
The area will need to be barriered off/ isolated and steps taken to limit the spread of activity to areas not designed to handle it e.g. storm drains, sumps etc.
Barriers should be set up with the intention of controlling access and contamination spread. For an external incident a mobile ICP – with all the associated requirements – should be set up if the licensee has such a thing. Ad hoc arrangements are not good practice and any arrangements should be assessed against the ICP criteria.
If material is to be picked up consideration of the potential for a criticality during this phase should be considered if fissile material is involved.
Material picked up should be held in appropriate containers i.e. designed to handle the level and type of activity which is being recovered.
If the spill is the result of an RTA which also involves injured/ trapped personnel, careful consideration of protection for the rescue services, prioritisation of casualty recovery, the potential to make the incident worse, possible delay in the assessment of incident impact, etc will need to be considered.

Criticality

When dealing with a fissile material incident it is essential to know the inventory of material in the immediate vicinity of the event and within the building/ environment as a whole. This enables realistic and worst case source terms to be estimated.
When dealing with liquid systems or the movement of dispersed solid fissile material, the potential for recovery operations to precipitate an initial or a further criticality must be considered.
Liquid systems can have continuing pulse criticalities (e.g. Tokia Mura) and this possibility should be considered when dealing with incidents involving fissile material in solution.
When considering fire fighting operations, areas of the plant where it is inappropriate to use water should be identified and communicated clearly to the fire fighting teams being sent into those areas e.g. fissile material stores.
Before entry is allowed into areas in which fissile material is stored, the increase in moderation caused by the water in the bodies of the entry team should be taken into consideration.
The potential to distribute fissile material/ fission products through the plant and building ventilation systems needs to be considered when assessing the possible impact of the incident. Collection of activity on unshielded ventilation filters can provide an unexpected source of high radiation. In addition, the potential for loaded ventilation filters to pass activity should be checked by looking at the instruments monitoring the discharges.

Miscellaneous

When looking at chemical plant incidents it should not be forgotten that other hazards may dictate the required response. For example an incident involving C2H2 cylinders in a fire in, say, a waste store; the possibility of sensitised explosive material being present; release of NOx, N2H4, H2, tritium, etc all of which are capable of energetic reactions which can require additional precautions to be taken.

2.19.2 Access to incident

Entry teams should make use of any fixed or mobile activity-in-air sampler systems in the building/ incident area by checking the status of the alarms as they inspect the plant to get a general idea of the spread of contamination.
Entry teams should be briefed on any areas which they should not enter under any circumstances i.e. regardless of damage. Such areas could be the interiors of cells/ caves containing high levels of radiation or contamination, fissile stores, etc.
Entry teams should also be warned to be careful near cave windows and check for high radiation levels. For caves with ZnBr windows loss of liquid means loss of shielding – even if the alpha glass remains in place preventing contamination release. Damage to a lead glass window can allow neutrons to stream up the sides.
The ingress and egress routes to/ from the contaminated area should be monitored routinely to ensure contamination control is being successful. For some plants trolley mounted floor monitors are available to check large areas comparatively quickly – but see comments under monitoring.

2.19.3 Monitoring for released material

Detection of Pu can be difficult, especially if the levels of Pu 241/ Am 241 are low. If the Pu is such that reliance has to be placed on alpha detection, probes need to be in close proximity to detect effectively. This, however, gives rise to the possibility that the probe touches the contaminated surface and thus becomes contaminated itself. It then becomes useless for detecting whether surfaces are clean – or not. In such situations back up monitoring equipment should be available to replace probes contaminated in this way.
Detection of even aged Pu can be difficult in the wet. Thus external contamination spread can be difficult to judge on a wet day. Licensees should be asked how they would deal with a real situation in such circumstances. HP expertise will be useful in understanding the response.

2.19.4 Multi-Plant Site Issues

These plant are frequently located on multi-facility establishments with significant physical distances between interdependent plants e.g. waste producers and waste stores. In these circumstances incidents can occur which require emergency response far from the ‘owner facility’ and (from time to time) far from any fixed emergency facilities. In these circumstances licensees would be expected to have a mobile ICP that can be deployed close to the scene of the incident to provide the control and management of the incident.
On chemical plants building ventilation systems can be interlinked downstream of the building filters and close to the discharge stack. Release of activity beyond a building into the ventilation system can cause contamination of the interlinked system; this should not be overlooked.
Complex sites with multiple plants and possibly multiple licensees/ non licensee companies (e.g. tenants / contractors) on site mean that protection of personnel site wide can become difficult. From time to time these satellite operations should be checked to ensure they participate and the employees have not, for example, all taken the day off to avoid becoming involved in the exercise.
On complex sites with multiple licensees/ non-licensee companies it is worth considering how long it is necessary to keep the site closed up during the exercise. Care is required in releasing such individuals to ensure they do not plough through the exercise area as they return to their normal duties.

2.19.5 Security conflicts

If the emergency is initiated by a security incident, the emergency response will need to consider the prioritisation of other operations e.g. armed security guards searching for armed intruders, the requirement to search for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), etc. If activity is believed to have been released, protection of individuals will need to be considered. Security and safety emergency arrangements require careful interface to ensure that all constraints are addressed.
The possibility that the security situation will dictate actions on the site should be considered e.g. which areas are considered safe to shelter on site personnel so that they are not (literally) in the line of fire.
Searching for IEDs etc and for other security reasons requires different training and skills to routine casualty recovery, etc. Teams should be chosen to have the relevant skills.