The regulation of conventional health and safety on UK nuclear sites

T/INS/051 Issue 02

Issue date:: 11/02/09
Review date:: 10/02/12
Open Government Status:: Fully Open
Approved By:: K Allars

1 - Purpose and scope
2 - Definitions
3 - Arrangements - From 9/2/2009
4 - Liaison
5 - Conventional health and safety accident / incident selection criteria
6 - Enforcement and / or matters of evident and potential major concern
7 - Health and safety considerations
8 - References
Annex A - Matters of evident and potential major concern

1 - Purpose and scope

This guidance gives details of the new arrangements and responsibilities of FOD, HID and ONR inspectors for the regulation of conventional health and safety on nuclear sites.

2 -Definitions

2.1) Conventional health and safety (CS) on nuclear sites refers to risks arising from operations not associated with nuclear material, ionising radiation (eg IRRs 1999) or nuclear licensed activities (NIA 1965 as amended); and includes, for example, risks from: work at height, hazardous substances, noise, confined spaces, vibration, electricity, asbestos, machinery, construction, lifting equipment and transport.

2.2) Fire Safety inspection. Article 25(b) of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (RR(FS)O) establishes the HSE as the fire enforcing authority. ONR Fire Safety inspectors will continue to inspect and regulate the provisions of the RR(FS)O at nuclear sites. ONR inspectors will also provide advice on the RR(FS)O and general fire precautions. The RR(FS)O is not a relevant statutory provision (RSP) under the HSW Act 1974. For Scotland, the equivalent legislation is the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 which mirrors the requirements of the RR(FS)O.

3 - Arrangements - From 9/2/2009

The arrangements are:

3.1) ONR will continue enforcing nuclear health and safety law, the Ionising Radiations Regulations (IRRs), and will also continue to regulate fire safety (RRO). FOD will regulate all conventional health and safety legislation including rsps on nuclear sites. This work will include site radiography but exclude the Ionising Radiation Regulations (IRRs). However, ONR may regulate site radiography when this work is undertaken by the Licensee. HID will continue to regulate COMAH on nuclear site enclaves. ONR inspectors remain responsible for matters of evident and potential major concern relating to conventional health and safety. Fire safety on all nuclear sites will continue to be inspected by ONR.

3.2) A conventionally trained health and safety inspector at B2 level (or B3 on TP to B2), the Conventional Health and Safety Co-ordinator, is embedded within the ONR. This inspector will coordinate the overall CS regulatory strategy between ONR, FOD and HID. The inspector will be the first point of contact for FOD and HID inspectors. The inspector will also act as a central resource within ONR for conventional health and safety.

3.3) Information to facilitate the changeover of responsibility has been sent to inspectors. This includes a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) which gives details on which Directorate is responsible for certain topics/areas. Liaison between inspectors from Directorates is essential to enable the MoA to be a practical and realistic document. In order to facilitate liaison, a list of nuclear licensed sites and the relevant ONR, FOD and HID inspectors for them is available on TRIM on 1.1.2.131, 2008/648913, Nuclear sites and FOD/ONR/HID inspectors for them. Guidance for FOD and HID inspectors is also available in OM 2009/001, The Regulation of conventional health and safety on UK nuclear sites.

3.4) Four geographical liaison groups have been set up to plan joint regulatory interventions, monitor progress and share information. The Midlands and North East Divisions do not have a liaison group as there is only one nuclear site in these Divisions. The liaison groups will be convened on an annual basis by the Conventional Health and Safety Co-ordinator.

3.5) During 2009, a corporate intervention strategy will be run and will initially be with one company, looking across several of their sites. This will be directed and coordinated by the Conventional Health and Safety Co-ordinator embedded within ONR.

4 - Liaison

4.1) It is vital that the relevant inspectors for each site liaise with their counterparts in other Directorates. Ideally, this liaison should be either face to face or by telephone in the first instance.

5 - Conventional health and safety accident / incident selection criteria

5.1) FOD will investigate conventional health and safety accidents and incidents according to HSEs current selection criteria as detailed in Operational Procedures. The selection and investigation of complaints will also follow the FOD Operational Procedure for complaints.

6 - Enforcement and / or matters of evident and potential major concern

6.1) Any prosecution decisions relating to conventional health and safety will be taken by FOD/HID, according to the Operational Procedures, and the Enforcement Management Model (EMM). ONR inspectors should ensure that they have ongoing liaison with the FOD/HID site inspector during any investigation and particularly prior to any decision to prosecute.

6.2) FOD/HID inspectors should inform the relevant ONR inspector either before issuing a Prohibition Notice, or at the earliest possible opportunity after the notice has been issued, in order to ascertain if there are any implications for nuclear safety. If the FOD/HID inspector intends to issue an Improvement Notice, liaison should take place with the ONR inspector beforehand in order to consider any impact on nuclear or chemical safety.

6.3) ONR inspectors are still required to deal with any significant conventional health and safety hazards they see or are made aware of with the potential to cause death or serious injury, as matters of evident and potential major concern (see Annex A and OC 18/12). The ONR inspector should take the appropriate action to eliminate or reduce the risk to an acceptable level. This may include discussion and persuasion and/or the issue (or intention to issue) a Prohibition Notice. If the ONR inspector is unsure of the appropriate action and where there is a serious risk of personal injury, they should seek advice from the FOD site inspector and, if they are not available, the ONR embedded Conventional Health and Safety Co-ordinator. If no advice, is available, the ONR inspector should stop the hazardous activity, either by verbal advice or immediate Prohibition Notice. A verbal instruction should usually suffice at a nuclear site but in the unlikely event that it does not, then the ONR inspector should not hesitate to use an immediate Prohibition Notice.

6.4) It is emphasised that inspectors may issue Prohibition Notices without reference to other authority if the circumstances warrant such action. It will usually be prudent to inform Line Managers as soon as possible following the issue of such a notice.

6.5) If a matter is brought to their attention by safety representatives or workers, the ONR inspector should investigate the matter to establish the seriousness of the potential hazard and then proceed in accordance with the principles set out above.

7 - Health and safety considerations

7.1) Site inspectors are responsible for arranging their own protective equipment for site use, taking advice from the ONR Conventional Health and Safety Co-ordinator as necessary. This may include hard hats and ear defenders, protective shoes, safety glasses and high visibility jackets. Site inspectors should comply with any relevant local instructions in use at site and ensure that if conditions warrant the use of additional protective equipment, then such suitable equipment is used (e.g. full face visors, safety harnesses, breathing gas monitors, boots, chemical suits, gloves etc.). Specialist Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) may require authority from the ONR line manager (eg confined spaces) and training prior to use.

8 - References

8.1) The following references are applicable:

OM 2009/001 - The Regulation of Conventional Health and Safety on UK Nuclear Sites
HSE Enforcement Guide
OC 18/12 - Matters of Evident Concern and Potential Major Concern
Health and safety supplements

Annex A - Matters of evident and potential major concern

Fire and explosion

1) Blocked means of escape eg locked fire doors etc.

2) Uncontrolled open fire doors on a protected route

3) Accumulations of flammable materials in escape routes e.g. corridors and stairways.

4) Hot work with the potential to cause fires.

5) LPG storage and associated pipework eg underground pipework, proximity of vehicles, security of store

6) Poor storage and maintenance of highly flammable liquids (HFL)

Electricity

7) Non-use of 110v centre-tapped-to-earth supply for portable tools.

8) Work near live overhead cables.

9) Use of unsuitable equipment or suitable equipment in unsuitable conditions (temporary cables in long grass, wet conditions, potentially explosive atmospheres etc.).

10) Unsuitable live working

Confined spaces

(Caution. The range of confined spaces encompasses vessels and tanks to large rooms depending on circumstances. Hazards include lack of oxygen, elevated CO2 levels and can arise from the introduction of flammable and toxic material. There are a number of hazards not specified in the Confined Spaces regulations such as extreme low temperatures and use of electrical equipment such as arc welding machines. In general HSE policy is that inspectors do not themselves enter a Confined Space with any of the above potential risks. ONR instructions require the line manager to carry out a risk assessment justifying the need for entry.)

11) 'Unopened' confined spaces without warning notices (Areas assessed to be treated as Confined spaces but not currently being worked in).

12) Open confined spaces not barriered / guarded whilst entries are in progress

13) Confined spaces with for example asphyxiant or toxic atmospheres where LOCAL rescue arrangements are required but during entry work are found to be NOT available or inadequate.

Rescue arrangements not in place.
Breathing apparatus not available
Harness and ropes not available.
Correct PPE not available or not in use
Evidence of inadequate communication

Lifting equipment

(The track record of the industry shows compliance with Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations (LOLER) to be a problem. Inadequate risk assessment and / or lack of knowledge of the load have led to a number of incidents. Look out for:

14) Poor general condition of equipment, retest labels out of date.

15) Working under suspended load.

16) Incorrect positioning of slings.

17) Obvious hazards in use (access to moving cranes and loads, tortuous lifting path).

18) Incorrect setting up of mobile cranes (Outriggers not used soft ground or services under outriggers.).

19) Slinging of loads using centre point lifting without correct equipment.

Construction / scaffolding

20) Obvious unsafe scaffolding (instability, poor bracing, not tied to building, poor edge protection, pivots on boards, poor condition, overloading) without safe access to or egress from the working platform to the ladder.

21) Work in unsupported excavations.

22) Inadequate precautions for working at height e.g. no harnesses, no edge protection, and /or materials not stored safely.

23) No hard hats in areas with a risk of falling objects or head damage from protruding objects.

24) Unsafe tower scaffolds (not firm and level, outriggers not deployed or ties not used, castors not seated and braked, tubes/frames/joints/bracing in poor condition, no internal ladder access, boards not fitted)

Asbestos

25) Detailed asbestos precautions are not set down here but it should always be borne in mind that whenever old systems are being worked on or when plant is being demolished an asbestos hazard could be present. (NB. Do NOT enter an obvious asbestos area. Call for help from FOD).

Machinery safety

26) Obvious exposure to dangerous parts/trapping points.

27) Use of unsafe working practice with regard to moving equipment.

28) Obvious lack of essential safeguards (interlocks).

29) Defeated / defective guards / interlocks

Hazardous substances

30) Spraying of isocyanates without Local Exhaust Ventilation (LEV) or suitable PPE.

31) Prohibition of eating, smoking etc.

32) Designation of areas, facilities, warning signs.

Noise and vibration

It is unlikely that hazards arising from noise or vibration will be such as to lead to death or serious injury. Refer the matter to FOD.

33) Non use of hearing protection by an employee in an obviously high noise area or in a designated hearing protection zone.

Transport

34) Poor segregation of moving vehicles and pedestrians, inc Fork Lift Trucks. e.g. No pavements, and / or no barriers in high traffic areas.