Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above sites available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group (WCSSG) and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at BNGSL Sellafield and Drigg, and UKAEA Windscale.
These reports are distributed quarterly and will be available on the Internet. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) attend WCSSG meetings and will be happy to respond to any questions raised there. Any other person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151 951 4103.
This report will be put onto the HSE Website at under Local Liaison Committee Reports at http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/llc/index.htm
NII Inspectors made a total of 73 visits to the Sellafield, Calder Hall, Windscale and Drigg sites during the quarter. This involved a total of 263 days on site (see Table 1 for details). The more significant issues identified during these inspections are summarised below.
[back to top]The aim of this project is to work with BNFL, BNG and BNGSL to achieve sustained improvements in managing for safety and safety culture. Good progress was made during the quarter; constructive meetings were held with BNGSL on organisational infrastructure and safety performance indicators, and with BNFL, BNG and BNGSL on leadership and management. A pilot study, developed by NII as a means of providing insights into safety culture, was undertaken on one of the site’s plants and gave promising results.
"Level 1 Emergency Exercise “Dunnock” was carried out on the 21st November 2006 to demonstrate BNGSL’s response, under the Emergency Plan, to an incident associated with B205. The scenario was considered both realistic and challenging and a well prepared test of the BNGSL Emergency Response.
However, due to the failure of the criticality reception centre to quickly and adequately deal with and process evacuating staff, serious knock on effects were caused to the emergency response. The ICC and ACP were not set-up within acceptable timescales and hence were not able to deal with the escalating plant instability. This position was exacerbated by the failure of the SECC to monitor and challenge delivery of actions raised and thus they failed to recognise these downstream problems and intervene proactively to resolve the problems. As a consequence to the above, NII did not consider this exercise to be an acceptable demonstration of the sites emergency preparedness for this scenario. BNGSL has been asked to provide a further demonstration of this aspect of their arrangements in June 2007. This will be in addition to their existing exercise programme."It was reported last quarter that there had been a gradual unexplained increase in aerial discharges from FHP and BNGSL had confirmed that the FHP 12 month rolling discharge for caesium-137 to the end of August was slightly in excess of the plant limit. Since then BNGSL reported that the caesium-137 aerial discharge at the end of October had reached about 120% of the plant limit.
BNGSL carried out a detailed investigation into the reasons for the increased discharges and identified the cause. Consequently changes were made to the way the plant was operated. BNGSL has reported that discharges have returned to their normal levels although the 12 month rolling discharge for caesium-137 is predicted to remain above the plant limit until around the middle of 2007. BNGSL is investigating the cause in more detail and it expects to report the findings in January 2007. NII is working closely with the Environment Agency to monitor BNGSL’s investigation. The Environment Agency is the lead regulator for off-site discharges.The Magnox Reprocessing Plant has been shut down due to issues with the Highly Active Storage Plant and consequently the rate of processing of Magnox fuel is falling behind programme. NII together with Environment Agency are discussing the issues for reprocessing with BNGSL.
Slow progress continues to be made with the processing of corroded fuel due to increased fuel handling and plant operability problems. NII continues to encourage BNGSL to investigate all the options to increase the corroded fuel reprocessing rate.
Work continued in accordance with the accelerated programme during the quarter. A satisfactory demonstration of THORP’s emergency arrangements was witnessed by a team from NII during October, and a joint NII/EA team undertook a close out inspection during November which provided increased confidence in BNGSL’s ability to safely restart the plant. Readiness inspections were completed and BNGSL completed all outstanding work associated with restart, including the provision of acceptable responses to outstanding issues raised by NII. It was anticipated that a Consent to restart would be granted in early January. Problems, with evaporators in an adjacent plant which takes active liquors from THORP, raised doubts about the ability for a full plant restart after the granting of the Consent.
NII wrote to BNGSL to raise regulatory concerns of strategic significance associated with HALES and to invite BNGSL to a meeting in our offices to present its proposed way forward. Our concerns relate to the integrity of evaporators and HASTs, and to staffing levels in HALES. In summary:
BNGSL explained their strategy for the return to service of Evaporators A, B and C, and the priority for their use. We explored the strategic significance of the strategy, in particular the effects on plants at Sellafield and on reactor operation. We discussed options for the acceleration of the Evaporator D project and the need for a second new evaporator, Evaporator E. We also discussed contingencies for managing HAST issues including consideration of replacement HASTs. Additional resources are being made available to assist the HALES team. NII will monitor developments closely.
There are three evaporators within HALES (referred to as Evaporators A, B and C). They used to evaporate High Active (HA) raffinate produced during reprocessing in order to reduce its volume for ease of storage and to facilitate subsequent vitrification. Once concentrated through evaporation, the raffinate is called Highly Active Liquor (HAL). The status of the evaporators (as of January 2007) is:
The restart of Evaporator C planned for late November 2006 was delayed on safety grounds because of indications that component thicknesses may be less than safety case requirements. Further work is being done, including inspections, to explore these findings and confirm actual component thicknesses.
Therefore, at present there is no HA evaporative capacity.
The position on evaporative capacity is evolving quickly and it is not possible at present to be certain as to the implications. But it is probable that the restart of Thorp reprocessing will be delayed and the processing of Magnox raffinate will be temporarily halted. The implications for other plants at Sellafield and for the nuclear industry in general are being considered.
BNGSL continues to provide NII with monthly reports summarising the quantities of highly active liquor (HAL) contained in the highly active storage tanks (HASTs). These figures are used by NII to judge whether BNGSL continues to meet the HAL Specification issued in 2000, which provides a limit on the amount of HAL that can be stored at any time and promotes HAL stocks reduction. Satisfactory performance of WVP coupled with the extended outage at THORP has meant that HAL stocks are currently well below that required by the Specification. Consequently NII is content that BNGSL has kept within the requirements of the Specification.
NII’s biennial review of the HAL stocks Specification is ongoing. The internal process is nearly complete. This will now be followed by a process of consultation with BNGSL to determine whether the revised Specification limits proposed by the review are reasonably achievable. NII’s biennial review is expected to be issued as a statement to April’s West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group meeting. In the meantime NII will continue to regulate the HAL stocks according to the existing Specification.
Previous WCSSG reports have indicated that HAST cooling components have suffered over the years from corrosion. A number of cooling coils have been declared failed. A failure causes a breakthrough of activity into the cooling water circuits which can lead to a radioactive release if not properly managed. There seems to be broad agreement that HAST cooling coil failure rates and the location of failed coils leads to uncertainty over the ability of the newer HASTs to service the needs of the HAL stocks strategy. If the plant starts to deteriorate more quickly then the ability of HALES to receive raffinates will be prejudiced (with knock-on consequences.
BNGSL’s present contingency plan is a project to dose the cooling water circuits with nitrates as a way of stopping or at least reducing the rate of corrosion failures. At present NII has a number of outstanding concerns connected with nitrate dosing. One of the options to insure against these problems would be to build smaller, inherently safer HASTs. In order for these to be effective on sensible timescales, work needs to start as soon as possible. NII wishes to see new HAST designs developed to a stage where their viability could be judged alongside other options under consideration. BNGSL has indicated that work to evaluate the need for new HASTs will start early in the next financial year.
The NII Chief Inspector carried out a planned visit to WVP. The particular focus for the visit was to inspect containment aspects of the safety case, specifically the conditions and limits and key safety systems which prevent or mitigate releases of radioactivity to the workplace and environment. On the basis of our limited sample inspection, NII was satisfied that BNGSL has adequate arrangements in place and we raised no significant concerns. Overall, NII was impressed by the positive attitude and enthusiasm of all staff we met, and of their knowledge of the plant and its safety case.
Two main areas for improvement were identified. Firstly, despite the drive to reduce the amount of waste held within the breakdown cells, the rate of reduction is too slow and BNGSL was asked to minimise, so far as is reasonably practicable, the amount of waste accumulated in these cells, and then to control the quantity of waste to a level consistent with operational requirements. Secondly, BNGSL was asked to consider improvements to control room ethics by limiting the number of people accessing the control room and to ensure that the ban on wearing protective headgear in the control room is enforced. The site inspector will follow up these aspects.
This project is progressing reasonably well though it is running slightly behind programme. Construction is all but complete and inactive commissioning is proceeding in stages. NII continues to engage regularly with BNGSL on regulatory issues in advance of the start of active commissioning early in 2007. These issues include the necessary interfaces with other facilities at Sellafield to ensure the safe and timely export overseas of containers of high level waste (in accordance with government policy on waste substitution). Standards of housekeeping and health and safety on REF remain generally good, although efforts continue to be made by BNGSL to learn from a number of minor conventional safety incidents and to improve safety awareness. The safety case for active commissioning is expected to be presented to NII in February 2007.
NII and EA inspectors carried out a joint team inspection of HLWP asset care. The aim of the inspection was to evaluate the effectiveness of the HLWP asset care regime in managing ageing and degradation of plant with nuclear safety and environmental functions. Overall the inspection revealed that BNGSL is devising good management systems which are being rolled out steadily across the site. There was evidence of asset care successes and examples of poor standards. There is clearly a long way to go before acceptable standards are the norm. The success on HLWP depends on the recruitment of additional resources because the current team is under-strength. There are questions to be asked with regard to the interface between Operating Units and Plant Services (which manages the provision of services across the site): we noted a generally poor standard of asset care of plant owned by Plant Services and which provides incoming essential supplies to HLWP. The outcome of the inspection will be conveyed to BNGSL by letter and the regulators will continue to monitor BNGSL’s response to our recommendations closely.
The HSE Fire Surveyor and the site inspector carried out a re-inspection of HLWP general fire precautions on 5 December 2006, further to our visit in July. We were pleased to note significant improvements in a number of areas. But despite the encouraging signs of improvement we noted a lack of organisation with respect to fire safety, which points to possible generic concerns with respect to compliance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (RRO). The poor progress in responding to the matters we raised in July is a matter of serious concern. A letter has been written seeking urgent action relating to means of escape in the event of a fire, and BNGSL confirmed satisfactory completion of these actions.
MOX commissioning operations again continued in SMP, whilst contributing to the manufacture of further fuel assemblies. NII plant inspection was limited due to priorities in Thorp. However, safety performance indicators continued to be reviewed at the quarterly project meetings. Assessment of the revised Consent to Operate safety case has been constrained by limited NII resources.
Several discussions have been held with SMP about the higher than expected stocks of recycle MOX awaiting re-feed into the process. The plant has produced a strategy for reducing this over several years. NII are monitoring delivery of this strategy and are receiving regular updates. However, there is a need for increased in-plant storage of material that as yet cannot be recycled. Further meetings have been held with SMP representatives, together with other regulators, about their proposal for interim storage of excess in line materials. Early proposals were unacceptable to NII. The proposals have been reconsidered and a further discussion was held with regulators in early January 2007. The outline appears acceptable but will need firming up before a formal response can be given.
Whilst reviewing some aspects of the safety case for the fuel assembly area, SMP recognised several fault sequences that had not previously been identified. Proposals were made to put in place modifications to implement interim arrangements to mitigate these fault sequences. These proposals were assessed by NII under a Category B PMP and when satisfied, NII issued a Licence Instrument to allow the work to proceed and the subsequent completion of the final assembly of some export fuel.
On completion of this work, the plant will be producing a different variant of PWR fuel. There will be a planned outage, which will involve a number of changes to the rod and fuel assembly plant equipment to accommodate the changed fuel design. There are a number of outage related PMPs for which SMP sensibly produced an Overarching Safety Case proposal. This describes the overall project and the linked PMPs, which will accomplish this. SMP submitted the Overarching Safety Case Paper and a Licence Instrument was issued permissioning the overall work, when NII were satisfied with the proposal.
On 10/1/07 a contamination event occurred within SMP involving five workers. The workers are subject to biological monitoring and definitive dose data will be available within a few weeks. However, preliminary results from BNGSL indicate that doses will be less than the annual limit for intake. BNGSL has set up a Board of Inquiry that is planned to report back in mid February. NII Inspectors are currently investigating the event.
On the 24th October 2006 a BNGSL employee suffered a broken arm whilst maintaining mechanical equipment inside a large glovebox suite in the Sellafield Waste Treatment Complex. Following an inspection of the equipment on site the following day by the NII site inspector, it was agreed with BNGSL that the plant would be shutdown until the incident had been fully investigated and any safety critical recommendations arising from the investigation had been addressed.
NII requested that a copy of the BNGSL Board of Inquiry report into the incident was submitted for NII review following its completion. The BNGSL Board of Inquiry report was published on 8th December 2006 and indicates that this was a serious incident that raises a number of issues with the operation of the facility.
Subsequent to the incident, BNGSL submitted a request for 'Consent to Operate' the facility for routine operation. Given the circumstances, NII intends to conduct a separate formal investigation of the incident, in conjunction with FoD, starting in January 2007 prior to issuing a 'Consent to Operate' for the facility.
The Gantry Refurbishment System (GRS) has now been installed on to the Magnox Storage Pond. The GRS is a key enabling measure to facilitate retrievals form the pond. NII have voiced concerns to the licensee over potential delays in the Sludge Packaging Plant (SPP1) programme. SPP1 is the plant that will receive sludge from the Magnox Storage Pond.
Our inspection of BNGSL’s activities aimed at discharge of the improvement notice on their maintenance arrangements revealed that good progress is being made and that there has been a step change improvement in the asset care process.
For both of these Silo facilities BNGSL continues to make good progress overall with:
We continue to press BNGSL to demonstrate that the options chosen for retrieving and processing the wastes from these silos will continue to reduce risk to levels that overall are as low as reasonably practicable.
We also continue to monitor the further development and implementation of the liquor management and leak mitigation strategies for the wet Magnox Silos. For example, BNGSL has indicated that the first phase of the trial to remove activity from the liquor in the silos was successful. We are now pressing them to progress the provision of a safety case that would show significant activity reduction in silo liquor would be achieved by bringing this into routine operation.
Following on from the recent major incident at THORP, a safety culture inspection at the wet Magnox Silos was carried out in December 2006. This represented the first use by NII of a safety culture framework based on work by the IAEA. The inspection was fully supported by BNGSL management and plant safety representatives. We found that BNGSL staff and contractors at all levels were willing to speak openly to the inspection team. We found evidence of good working to develop and promote a positive safety culture at the plant, and that there is an ongoing challenge to ensure that such improvements are fully embedded. In the coming period we will be discussing with BNGSL plant management our detailed findings, and also looking at how this approach can be used to support the further promotion and monitoring of safety culture at Sellafield.ND have participated in a joint FOD / Construction / ND Working at Height inspection. Key performance indicators for the inspection derived from the Work at Height Regulations were agreed with BNGSL in advance, and the inspection findings were reported against these indicators. Generally, the inspection found that BNGSL's control of working at height was of a good standard, but some areas for improvement were identified, in particular, the control of sub contractors.
A plant visit was carried out to the Effluent Plants Maintenance Facility (EPMF) and Decontamination Centre (DC). This visit was a follow-up to a presentation given to NII in August 2006 to explain the current site strategy for decontamination. BNGSL's strategy for the DC and EPMF is as follows:
EPMF has a range of facilities for decontamination of pumps, instruments etc, which could be adapted for general decontamination work. The main constraint would be item size, because of the dimensions of the inlet flasks. However, BNGSL proposed that size reduction of items could be carried out in the DC prior to decontamination in EPMF. A characterisation study is to be carried out to identify potential work for EPMF, and a pilot campaign in EPMF to decontaminate pumps from Legacy Silos is being considered.
The current safety case for the Analytical Services Laboratories was implemented in 1997, and it will expire at the end of March 2007. The revised / revalidated safety case was originally planned for delivery by the end of March 2006, with a possible date as late as the end of June 2006, and these dates were detailed in the BNGSL Periodic Safety Review (PSR) programme. Because of delays to the submission of the revised safety case, BNGSL submitted a proposal to NII to change the PSR programme dates. Evidence was provided by Analytical Services to detail the measures taken to recover the delivery of the Laboratories safety case. However, the revised / revalidated safety case will be submitted at least 9 months late, and consequently there may be similar delays to the completion of the Safety Significant recommendations that have been identified during the PSR.
Because of the considerable delays, and the non-compliance with BNGSL's mandatory arrangements, that are approved by NII, it was considered reasonable and proportionate to issue an Improvement Notice under LC 15(1). This was confirmed by the application of the Enforcement Management Model (EMM), and subsequent management review. The Improvement Notice requires that submission of the relevant parts of the safety case should be completed by the date specified in BNGSL's proposal.
An inspection of HAL sampling was carried out with the HLWP Site Inspector in order to track the sampling process from the HLWP storage tanks to the high active cells in the Analytical Laboratories. In general, the HAL sampling process in HLWP was carried out satisfactorily, but several areas for improvement were identified including identification and storage of HAL transport containers ready for dispatch. The 'flasking-in' process to the HA cells was carried professionally, and there was evidence of good practice in the handling of samples and tracking of samples for analysis.
The system was originally inspected during the transition of NSTS to Nexia in March 2005, and several major deficiencies were identified. The system is based on Peoplesoft software, and did not contain the functionality of the BNGSL training system, CTMS. Nexia developed the software and invested significant resource to address the areas for improvement. The Nexia system was re-inspected in July 2006, and was still found to contain major deficiencies, particularly in the area of recording and tracking of DAP authorisations and training.
Since July, Nexia have dedicated more resource to the project, and have made further software modifications. A major data cleansing and training record reconciliation exercise has been completed, and significant QA effort has been directed at the system. A detailed inspection carried out in November determined that the deficiencies had been rectified, and that the system performed well. Nexia have incorporated enhanced functionality into system that could be replicated in other training systems.
An emergency exercise was held in BTC as part of the requirements for assessing the readiness for the active commissioning of phase 1b, the active gloveboxes in the Level 3 laboratories. The scenario was based on an activity release from a dropped filter cartridge during a filter change on one of the active gloveboxes, and a failure of part of the ventilation system.
In response to the incident, the building was evacuated, an Access Control Point and an Incident Control Centre were set up, and emergency response teams carried out entries to the active area. All aspects of the BTC emergency arrangements were adequately demonstrated, with good command and control at each control point, and good performances from all of the teams.Since providing NII’s Agreement to an extension of active commissioning of B241, enabling BNGSL to recommence re‑suspension of the buffer tank and continue with the reduction of the hazard within B241, both B241, the Enhanced Actinide Removal Plant (EARP) and the Waste Packaging and Encapsulation Plant (WPEP) have been experiencing operational challenges. These challenges have limited the number of batches of Floc transferred from B241 and treated through EARP and WPEP and delayed the completion of active commissioning. Consequently, NII has given Agreement to a further extension of active commissioning of B241 to 31 July 2007, following a request from BNGSL.
The first phase of the project to deliver the new Encapsulated Product Store (EPS3), site preparation and foundations, is progressing. There has been some slippage and this phase is approximately one month late and is now due to complete in April 2007. The second phase of the project, construction of the store, has been sanctioned by NDA. The next stage of approval for this phase requires NDA to submit the project proposal to DTI for their approval. It is anticipated that DTI’s decision will be made during January 2007.
The safety case for B13 expired at the end of December 2006. UKAEA approached NII in September to discuss how the safety case could be kept extant given the late start in making safety improvements to the building. UKAEA prepared a modification to the new safety case and, having received advice from its Nuclear Safety Committee, sent this to NII in mid December. The Nuclear Safety Committee also advised UKAEA that it could accept a one-month extension of the old safety case to allow time seeking NII agreement to the proposal. The proposal allows use of the new safety case, but restricts operations that are permitted until safety improvements are completed.
NII’s has been concerned at the lack of progress with safety improvements over the two-year period since the new safety case was originally submitted to NII. This concern will be factored into permissioning of this proposal.
No Exercise has been observed this quarter.
NII has received an application for use of B546.1 by BNGSL demolition group for final sentencing of demolition wastes. As was reported last quarter, NII is treating this application in two parts to allow early occupation of the office accommodation. NII’s work on this is almost completed; it is anticipated that the Licence Condition 3 Consent will be given early in the new year. Once UKAEA and BNGSL have finished the additional documentation to allow the waste sentencing a variation to the agreement will be processed.
A meeting was held with UKAEA and BNGSL to discuss the possibility of building a new block for office accommodation and change rooms on the Windscale site that would service the Separation Area on the Sellafield site for BNGSL. NII was not satisfied with the proposal, particularly with the proposed arrangements for control of contamination. The meeting suggested an alternative that would allow office accommodation and a new canteen on the Windscale site, and the conversion of the existing offices and canteen to change room space.
Following a readiness inspection, NII issued a licence instrument allowing the site to move into the “shadow working” phase that is intended to provide firm evidence that the Site Licence Company has adequate capability. This is a pre-condition to re-licensing.
As part of the process of separating the LLWR from the Sellafield organisation, the site will need its own emergency plan and arrangements. The proposed new arrangements were successfully demonstrated to NII in December 2006 but will not come into force until the site is relicenced.
Quarterly returns for Sellafield, Calder Hall, Drigg and Windscale during the quarter 1 October to 31 December 2006
| BNGSL Sellafield 1 | BNGSL Calder Hall 2 | BNGSL Drigg | UKAEA Windscale | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of visits | 64 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
| Inspection days on site | 231.5 |
10 |
7 |
14.5 |
| Enforcement actions 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Incidents in the quarter likely to be published in HSE’s quarterly “statement of nuclear incidents at nuclear installations” | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Consents, approvals | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Licence instruments | 11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 The figures shown for BNGSL Sellafield are those for BNGSL’s chemical plants. They do not include figures for the plants within the Electricity Generation Group (see note 2 below)
2 The figures shown for BNGSL Calder Hall are those for the plants on the Sellafield site operated by (or for) the Electricity Generation group, primarily Calder Hall nuclear power plant.
3 An enforcement action may be a Direction issued by HSE under the nuclear site licence, an Improvement Notice, or a Prohibition Notice, or the laying of information in pursuit of a prosecution.
Approvals, consents, directions and withdrawals issued during the quarter 1 October to 31 December 2006
| Date | Type | Ref. No. | Description | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BNGSL DRIGG Nuclear Site Licence no. 29A | ||||||
| BNGSL Sellafield (and Calder Works) – Nuclear Site Licence no. 31G | ||||||
04/12/06 |
Consent |
520 |
Consent to licensee varying the Licence to Occupy Parts of B14 for Nexia Solutions LTD |
|||
29/11/06 |
Consent |
519 |
Consent to licensee varying the Licence to Occupy Parts of B12 for Nexia Solutions LTD |
|||
| BNGSL Windscale – Nuclear Site Licence no. 46B | ||||||
Licence instruments issued during the quarter 1 July to 30 September 2006
| Date | Type | Ref. No. | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| BNGSL DRIGG Nuclear Site Licence no. 29A | |||
|
|
|
|
| BNGSL Sellafield (and Calder Works) – Nuclear Site Licence no. 31G | |||
12/12/06 |
Acknowledgement |
633 |
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF SAFETY DOCUMENTATION – SMP Management Safety Committee Paper ‘MMSCP(06)097 – Modifications to be implemented to SMP plant hardware and software to achieve capability to build Framatome Grohnde 16 x 16 fuel’ |
18/12/06 |
Agreement |
632 |
Agreement to extension of stages a & 5 active commissioning of FLOC Retrieval Plant |
14/11/06 |
Acknowledgement |
628 |
Acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation for modification to an existing plant via PMP B299/315: B299 PSR implementation Phase 2 – document switchover PMP |
19/12/06 |
Notification |
627 |
Notification to submit a Safety Case and not commence operation of the relevant process without the Consent of the Executive |
17/11/06 |
Acknowledgement |
626 |
Acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation for modification to an existing plant: THORP MASFE replacement project and modification of intention to examine PMP 12 (Crane operations) |
24/10/06 |
Agreement |
624 |
Agreement to change PSR programme delivery dates for the B750 LTPR submissions |
17/10/06 |
Agreement |
623 |
Agreement to commence modification to an existing plant. Implementation of safety memoranda 10242, 10243, 10450 & 10449 |
13/10/06 |
Agreement |
622 |
Agreement to commence: construction and installation of the EPS3 project |
06/10/06 |
Agreement |
620 |
Agreement to commence implementation of PMP 1000/349P : implementation of SM cult No 10247 criticality assessment of acute and chronic liquor leaks in area 300 excluding cell 336, THORP |
03/11/06 |
Agreement |
613 |
Agreement to commence modification to an existing plant : implementation of PMP 0800/552 - processing of the cell 220 recovered liquors through THORP chemical plants |
03/10/06 |
Specification |
611 |
Specification under Licence Condition 25(4) |
| UKAEA Windscale – Nuclear Site Licence no. 46B | |||