Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive’s commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to Heysham Power Station available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Heysham Local Community Liaison Council and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at Heysham. These reports are distributed quarterly. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate attend LCLC meetings and will respond to any questions raised there by members of the LCLC. Any other person wishing to enquire about matters covered by this report should contact the HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151-951-4103.
This report will be put onto the HSE website at http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/index.htm under ‘Local Liaison Committee reports’.Visits
The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) site inspectors made visits to Heysham on the following dates during this quarter:
| Heysham 1 | Heysham 2 | |
|---|---|---|
| 6,7,12,19,28 | April 2005 | 19,20,22,26,27 |
| 17,18,19,20,24 | May 2005 | 18,20,23,24,25 |
| 8,9,15,16,21,24,28 | June 2005 | 3,15,21,22,29 |
Other members of the NII and specialist inspectors visited the Heysham site during the period, as follows.
Heysham 1
The NII Site Inspector, specialist NII Inspectors and Superintending Inspector attended site during the period in relation to matters associated with: planned and reactive inspection activities; the 2005 Periodic Shutdown of Reactor 2; events on the site; and implementation of measures to enhance protection against hazards.
Heysham 2
The NII site inspector, specialist NII Inspectors and an NII Superintending Inspector attended site to carry out routine inspection, attend the annual station review of safety meeting and to carry out inspections associated with matters arising on Heysham 2. A team of inspectors, including the site inspector, attended site to observe demonstrations associated with the station emergency arrangements.
As part of our routine work we inspect for compliance against the requirements of the Stations’ Nuclear Site Licence Conditions and the arrangements made under them, the Health and Safety at Work Act and other relevant safety legislation. We sample activities on site that may affect safety, and in this report include details of the following matters.
Heysham 1 & 2
Local Community Liaison Council.
The Heysham NII site inspectors attended the Local Community Liaison Council meeting, which took place on 20 May 2005. The site inspectors’ reports for the preceding period were presented .
Heysham Emergency Exercise Review Meeting.
The Heysham NII site inspectors attended a joint annual emergency exercise review meeting on 19 April 2005. The meeting reviewed actions arising from a 2004 joint station emergency exercise and the objectives and requirements for the 2005 Heysham 2 emergency exercise.
Heysham 1
Heysham 1 Emergency Exercise Review Meeting.
The Heysham 1 NII site inspector attended a station annual emergency exercise review meeting on 9 June 2005 to review actions arising from a further demonstration exercise, which NII had requested following the 2004 joint exercise, and the objectives and requirements for the 2005 Heysham 1 emergency exercise.
Reactor 2 Periodic Shutdown.
The triennial periodic shutdown of reactor 2 commenced on 6 May 2005. The NII site inspector and specialist inspectors completed a programme of inspections that will inform NII's judgement on the readiness of Heysham 1 to return the unit to service for a further period of operation. On 16 June an NII Superintending Inspector accompanied the NII Site Inspector on a tour of the plant ahead of the reactor 2 start up meeting held on 17 June. The meeting agreed a number of actions and station gave its commitment to address a number of priority issues before seeking NII's consent to start up reactor 2.
Heysham 2
Heysham 2 Level 1 Emergency Demonstration Exercise for 2004 – Further Demonstration.
On 27 April a team of NII inspectors observed the Heysham 2 further demonstration of aspects arising from the level 1 emergency exercise in 2004. The NII team concluded that Heysham 2 had provided an adequate further demonstration of its emergency arrangements, which concluded the overall demonstration for 2004.
Heysham 2 Level 1 Emergency Demonstration Exercise for 2005.
On 25 May a team of NII inspectors observed the Heysham 2 level 1 emergency demonstration exercise for 2005. The NII team concluded that Heysham 2 had provided an adequate demonstration of its emergency arrangements for 2005. Station has agreed to address areas for improvement identified during the course of the demonstration.
Heysham 2 Annual Review of Safety Meeting.
The NII Superintending Inspector and the NII site inspector attended the annual review of safety meeting with Station on 22 June 2005. Matters were considered which have the potential to affect safety, and Station agreed to respond to actions placed concerning points arising on which NII requested further information.
We respond to non-routine matters arising on site that may affect safety, and in this report include details of the following matters.
Heysham 1 & 2.
COMAH Regulations.
Stations are reviewing the arrangements for complying with COMAH regulations, which were amended on 30 June 2005. Under the revised regulations both stations will be considered to contribute to the inventories of substances included in the regulations for the site as a whole. They report that they intend to comply with the requirements of COMAH as a site having substance inventories appropriate to a “lower tier” site under the regulations .Hazards Safety Case.
The NII Site Inspector and Specialist Assessment Inspectors conducted a series of inspections that examined the station readiness to implement measures aimed at enhancing protection against flood and fire hazards. The inspections identified a number of issues, which the station has addressed to the satisfaction of NII. The station has now implemented the measures, which deliver an interim commitment to improve the protection of reactors against hazards. Heysham 1 is committed to further enhancement of this protection.
Control and Supervision of Operations.
Following its investigation of an event related to the disposition of safety control rods during the 2004 Periodic Shutdown of R1 last year, NII advised station that they would monitor completion of the Station corrective actions. During the 2005 Periodic Shutdown of Reactor 2 the NII Site Inspector considered the adequacy of the arrangements implemented to avoid central control room (CCR) personnel being diverted from their core duty of controlling reactor operations, a factor which contributed to the earlier event. The Site Inspector is satisfied that station has implemented improvements to address the circumstances that contributed to the safety control rod group event during the 2004 outage. Station will carry out a final post outage review to evaluate the effectiveness of the arrangements put in place.
Heysham 2
Heysham 2 Station Emergency Arrangements – Rapid Reach.
On 22 April NII inspectors observed a demonstration of the proposed Heysham 2 Rapid Reach System, intended to provide automated notification to station staff with duties in the event of an incident on the site. The NII team concluded that Heysham 2 had demonstrated the usefulness of the system, with some minor issues to be resolved and additional commissioning tests to be completed prior to implementation. Similar systems are in use at other British Energy stations, including Heysham 1.
Events on Site
As part of our inspection activities at the site we investigate safety related events that occur and follow-up those which are perceived, initially, to have the potential to be more significant, we particularly examine the licensee’s response to such issues and events. From our inspections in this quarter we are satisfied that events which occurred did not represent a significant challenge to the safety case, and response by stations has been in accordance with appropriate arrangements. We summarise our reaction to the selected events as follows.
Heysham 1 & 2
The NII has followed up the following event during this quarter.There are no events on-site to report this quarter affecting both Heysham 1 & 2 .
Heysham 1
The NII has followed up the following events during this quarter.
Fuel Transport Flask Processing.
In February, the station reported anomalies in the documentation for the processing of a fuel flask. A subsequent Significant Adverse Condition Investigation (SACI) by station established that the flask had been processed in accordance with station arrangements, but that staff had not ensured that documentation was correctly completed. NII has investigated the event, and is satisfied that the SACI identified appropriate corrective actions.
Auxiliary Iodine Beds.
The function of the auxiliary emergency iodine bed (AEIB), and the auxiliary iodine bed (AIB), is to remove gaseous isotopes from coolant gas exiting the fuelling machine, irradiated fuel dismantling facility (IFDF) and buffer stores prior to discharge through the authorised route. Routine performance testing of the beds revealed that both the AEIB and the AIB did not meet the performance requirements. Station reported that previous tests of the beds had proved satisfactory. They immediately suspended fuel-handling operations and declared the beds unavailable. Station has commissioned a Significant Adverse Condition Investigation (SACI), which established that:Station has reinstated both beds and resumed handling of normal fuel with gas discharged via the AIB. The station has established arrangements that ensure the AEIB is adequately maintained and available for use in the event that it is required to process gas from fuel with reduced containment. The Site Inspector is satisfied that station's immediate response to the unexpected degradation of the AEIB was appropriate and that it implemented adequate arrangements to address the circumstances of the event and to permit the resumption of fuel handling. The SACI into the cause of the degradation in performance is continuing.
Control Rod Contactor Cubicles.
In June the maintain technician preparing to undertake periodic shutdown work on the diverse control rod contactor cubicles noticed anomalies in the work instructions and took the decision not to proceed with the work. Station has established that the anomalies have probably existed for some time and, as a consequence, is unable to confirm that a similar activity was performed at the 2004 Periodic Shutdown of R1. A Significant Adverse Condition Investigation (SACI) has considered the implications of this event for continued operation of reactor R1 and the return to service of R2. The station's Operation Safety Review Committee (OSRC) has also considered the implications of the event for the operating reactor. The station has:The Site Inspector is satisfied that station's response to this event is appropriate
Heysham 2
The NII has followed up the following events during this quarter.
Heysham 2 Unavailability of Reactor Data Processing System (DPS).
On two separate occasions in June the reactor 8 DPS was rendered unavailable for periods of less than a shift duration. The Station Safety Report confirms that sufficient alternative indications and alarms are provided to the operator to permit safe operation without the DPS facilities for steady operation in the short term. However, NII has examined the circumstances surrounding these events, and has requested station to review and revise as necessary the arrangements for tracking and recording responses to operational limits and conditions contained within the Operating Rules.
No regulatory documentation was issued during the quarter: