Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Hartlepool Local Community Liaison Council and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at Hartlepool Power Station. These reports are distributed quarterly. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (part of the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Directorate) attend LCLC meetings and will be happy to respond there to questions raised by members of the LCLC. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact the HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151 951 4103.
This report will be placed on the HSE website at www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear under “Local Liaison Committee Reports.The site inspector visited the site on seven occasions during the quarter:
| 12th to 15th July | 5th to 7th September |
| 15th to 16th September |
In addition specialist NII inspectors visited the site during the period to assist with inspections related to human factors and civil engineering.
As part of their routine work NII inspectors inspect for compliance against the requirements of the Station’s Nuclear Site Licence, the Health and Safety at Work Act and other relevant safety legislation. They monitor events, plant operations, projects, modifications and safety case changes and any other matters which are important to safety. Planned inspections during the quarter included emergency planning (LC 11), safety documentation (LC 14), maintenance (LC 28) and accumulation and disposal of active Waste, (LCs 32 and 33) .
In general the station’s arrangements were found to be satisfactory. In those areas where improvements were identified, satisfactory commitments to address the issues were made by the station. Routine aspects of particular significance are summarised below:
The inspectorate has continued to monitor progress and quality of the work to replace this important system. We are anticipating final safety submissions to be produced during the final quarter of 2005 and have issued Licence Instruments to prevent final commissioning before we are satisfied with the case for the new system.
During the reporting period the station embarked on a 20-week trial of a proposal to change the shift pattern for operations technicians, from the current 3-shift pattern to a 12-hour shift system. NII inspected the trial and preliminary outcome during July and provided advice to the station regarding collation and analysis of the trial data.
As part of their planned inspection site inspectors examine safety related events that have occurred and the Licensee’s response to them. Generally the Licensee’s internal system for following up events is robust and the appropriate actions are implemented. More noteworthy events during the period include the following:
NII and EA held a joint inspection on 16th June to review the station’s response to this event, which occurred in June 2004. There was good evidence that all the station’s numerous actions have been effectively dealt with. The condition of the facility has been significantly improved and we concluded that the actions required to address the previous issues have been successfully concluded. There is a major on-going programme of further refurbishment and improvement, which NII will continue to monitor.
The Site Inspector has continued to progress the station’s development of an improved risk assessment process. The intention to have an improved process embedded by September has been delayed due to the difficulty of modifying BE’s generic work scheduling tool, Passport. The site inspector has accepted that the station are acting in good faith to expedite improvements and will re-inspect during November.
NII have continued to work with BE to develop the case for boiler closure unit (BCU) studs subject to standing water throughout the reporting period. In response to a finding from Hartlepool of an acidic environment in Reactor 2 BCU 2B2 stud tube 25, NII issued specifications to require the shut down (or maintain that condition for those already shut down) of all Hartlepool/Heysham 1 reactors, pending demonstration of an appropriate safety case in regard to this finding.
On 5th September station discovered significant corrosion in a high-pressure nitrogen pipe forming part of the SSD system (which is required to be available whenever the reactors are operating). The Site Inspector was on site and requested the station to provide a justification for retaining the system in service, noting the potential conventional safety hazard from the pressurised system, as well as the nuclear safety requirements. On 8th September station took the conservative decision to shut down the operating reactor to enable the pipe to be repaired.
Under Health and Safety legislation the Site Inspector, or other HSE Inspectors, may issue formal notices to secure improvements to safety. No such notices were issued during the reporting period.
Th e Inspectorate has powers under the Licence to issue Consents, Approvals and Directions. In addition the Inspectorate uses Licence Instruments to issue Specifications and Agreements under the conditions of the Licence. These are all called Licence Instruments. Three Licence Instruments were issued to Hartlepool during the quarter:
Licence Instrument 504, requiring British Energy not to implement the LPBUCS replacement detailed in revision 2 of the design substantiation.
Licence Instrument 505, agreeing to the implementation of the LPBUCS replacement detailed in revision 1 of the design substantiation.
Licence Instrument 506, preventing British Energy from restarting either Hartlepool reactor under the "interim" case for boiler closure units, without NII’s formal agreement.
HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 5th December 2005
St Peter’s House
Stanley Precinct
Bootle
Merseyside
L20 3LZ