Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to Heysham Power Station available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Heysham Local Community Liaison Council and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at Heysham. These reports are distributed quarterly. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate attend LCLC meetings and will respond to any questions raised there by members of the LCLC. Any other person wishing to enquire about matters covered by this report should contact the HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151-951-4103.
On the 1 April 2004 NII appointed a new nominated site inspector for Hesham 1. This is in line with NII's policy of changing the site inspector after a period of 3 to 4 years.
The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) site inspectors made visits to Heysham on the following dates during this quarter:
|
Heysham 1 |
Heysham 2 |
|
22,23,27 & 28 April 2004 |
6, 7, 15, 16, 20, 21, 29 & 30 April 2004 |
|
19, 20, 21, 25 & 26 May 2004 |
5, 25 & 26 May 2004 |
|
8, 16 & 17 June 2004 |
24, 25, 29 & 30 June 2004 |
Other members of the NII, including specialist inspectors visited the Heysham site during the period, as follows.
The NII site inspector, and specialist inspectors attended site on a number of occasions during the period in relation to matters associated with the Fire Certificate (Special Premises) regulations and the maintenance of documents, records and certificates.
The NII site inspector, and specialist inspectors attended site on a number of occasions during the period in relation to matters associated with the periodic shutdown of reactor 8, meetings to discuss matters relevant to safety at the site, to inspect matters associated with events at the site and routine site inspection..
As part of our routine work we inspect for compliance against the requirements of the Stations' Nuclear Site Licence Conditions and the arrangements made under them, the Health and Safety at Work Act and other relevant safety legislation. We sample activities on site that may affect safety, and in this report include details of the following matters.
The NII site inspectors attended the Local Community Liaison Council meeting, which took place on 21 May 2004. The site inspectors' quarterly reports for Heysham 1 and 2 were presented and further information was provided in response to member's questions, as necessary.
British Energy are implementing changes to the Heysham power station's management structures, which are intended to improve operational focus and the management of work. NII is monitoring Heysham's arrangements for managing these changes and, in particular their management of any aspects, which may affect nuclear safety. Station arrangements require that Management of Change (MoC) documents must be provided for all changes, which are safety related, in advance of the change being implemented.
Heysham has submitted a revised Site Emergency Plan to NII for approval. The plan includes new arrangements for notifying the public within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) of a radiation emergency, in the event that this should become necessary. Specifically, the revised plan now reflects changes made in relation to such notifications, frequently termed the 'Warn and Inform' function, and is consistent with the statements made on the Public Information Calendars for 2004 already distributed to persons within the DEPZ
The NII Site Inspector and Superintending Inspector attended the annual NII Review Meeting, which took place on 17 June 2004. Prior to the meeting, NII conducted an inspection of various parts of the plant. At the meeting the station presented a review of operational safety over the previous 12 months and outlined the operational and business plans for the 2004/2005. NII noted that the future programmes included proposals that aim to achieve higher standards of safety performance.
The triennial periodic shutdown of reactor 8 was conducted during April and May 2004. During this period the NII site inspector and specialist inspectors carried out inspections and assessment of the work being undertaken. Station completed their planned work with significant issues being identified. Audits of outage activities carried out by themselves and independent agencies found no significant shortfall in the performance of safety related work. A formal start-up meeting was held between NII and station on 30 April 2004. A Consent to start up of reactor 8 was granted by NII on 11 May 2004.
The NII Site Inspector and Superintending Inspector attended the annual review of safety meeting on 26 May 2004. Prior to the meeting NII conducted an inspection of various parts of the plant. During the meeting the station presented a review of operational safety for the previous year and outlined key features of their operational and business plans for 2004/2005 that have the potential to affect safety. Station provided a commitment during the meeting to improve safety performance and reduce current levels of outstanding work.
We also respond to non-routine matters arising on site that may affect safety, and in this report include details of the following matters.
As part of our inspection activities at the site we investigate safety related events that occur and follow-up those which are perceived initially to have the potential to be more significant, we particularly examine the licensee's response to such events. From our inspections in this quarter we are satisfied that events which occurred did not represent a significant challenge to the safety case, and response by stations has been in accordance with appropriate arrangements. We summarise our reaction to the selected events as follows.
The following events were followed up at the station during this quarter.
A programme of tests on samples of stainless steel used in the manufacture of reactor components revealed the need to re-evaluate creep crack growth rates. This issue is generic to British Energy's fleet of AGR reactors. Heysham 1 has given a commitment to undertake the additional inspections required to inform the update of creep crack growth evaluations. These will commence with inspections of Reactor 1 reactor components during the forthcoming Periodic Shutdown.
Station reported that they had recently discovered that control rod mechanisms (CRMs) refurbished since 1995 are fitted with bearings that used plastic rather than steel cages. This change had occurred without going through the formal station arrangements. Heysham 1 has now reverted to the use of bearings with steel cages. The station has established a safety case for the continued use of the limited number of CRMs containing bearings with plastic cages until their next scheduled refurbishment when the bearings will be replaced. The NII site inspector is satisfied that station's response to this incident is appropriate.
The following events were followed up at the station during this quarter.
During the recent outage of reactor 8, station discovered indications of possible defectiveness on one circulator impeller routinely exchanged during the outage. The affected circulator had already been removed from its duty in the reactor. Whilst station considered that the extant safety case was not affected by the inspection results, they submitted a case to return reactor 8 to power to their Nuclear Safety Committee and produced a justification for the continued operation of the other reactors. The company has established a working group to investigate further the matter of circulator defectiveness at both Heysham 2 and Torness.
Station reported a fire, which occurred in an electrical supply cubicle mounted on the fuelling machine. The fire was discovered by operators who were close by, and was promptly extinguished by members of the station fire team. No personnel were affected and no radiological hazard resulted. Subsequently station implemented interim measures to provide improved fire protection provisions and established an investigation into the event. Station has confirmed that the fire remained within the bounding fire hazard for the fuelling machine considered as part of the station Periodic Safety Report. Their investigation will seek to identify remedial measures to improve fire protection for the fuelling machine.
Reactor 7 tripped in May on high boiler gas outlet temperatures in quadrants B&C. Subsequently a case was made to return the reactor to service, however the reactor has operated at reduced load because of operational temperature limits on the boiler pipework. During this period, the start-up and standby pumps have supplied boiler feed while the main boiler feed pump has undergone refurbishment. Station has produced a corrective action plan in response to the event and continues to monitor plant conditions.
The following regulatory documentation was issued during the quarter:
Consent Number 31 to restart reactor 8 at Heysham 2 following its periodic shutdown was granted on 11 May 2004.
Published on the HSE web site 25 October 2004
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