Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Hartlepool Local Community Liaison Council and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at Hartlepool Power Station. These reports are distributed quarterly. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (part of the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Directorate) attend LCLC meetings and will be happy to respond there to questions raised by members of the LCLC. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact the HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151 951 4103.
The site inspector visited the site on five occasions during the quarter:
5th to 7th April
26th to 28th April
24th to 26th May
8th to 11th June
17th to 17th June
In addition specialist NII inspectors visited the site during the
period to assist with inspections related to their expertise -
structural integrity, civil engineering, control and
instrumentation, health physics and protection against internal
hazards. My Superintending Inspector also visited site during the
period for the Reactor 1 start up meeting.
As part of their routine work NII inspectors inspect for compliance against the requirements of the Station's Nuclear Site Licence, the Health and Safety at Work Act and other relevant safety legislation. They monitor events, plant operations, projects, modifications and safety case changes and any other matters which are important to safety. Planned inspections during the quarter were dominated by work associated with the reactor 1 outage (LC 30) but other topics included safety cases (LC 14) and maintenance (LC 28).
In general the station's arrangements were found to be satisfactory, with a commitment to accommodate the improvements identified. The Reactor 1 outage became extended for the reasons explained below.
Consideration of the safety case for cast iron cooling water systems indicated that there was a risk from flooding, due to postulated turbine disintegration, which could be avoided by shutting down Reactor 2 whilst Reactor 1 was open to air (which is required for some examinations and maintenance as part of the shutdown maintenance scope). The Inspectorate accepted a request to defer the "in air" scope of the outage until it was convenient to shut down Reactor 2, and thus carry out a double reactor outage, in autumn 2004. One of the inspections carried out indicated a need for further work on the boiler closure units, discussed below. Consent to restart the reactor has been withheld pending successful completion of this inspection.
During the inspections of the pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel (PCPV) in May, an unexpected level of corrosion was identified on one of the tendons. It was considered that this indicated a higher than previously recognised possibility of corrosion in two of the Reactor 1 boiler closure units, where the circumferential pre-stress system has been exposed to pressure vessel cooling water leaks. The station agreed that an inspection of the accessible parts of the pre-stress system should be completed before return to service. This work is expected to be completed during the final phase of the Reactor 1 outage in the autumn.
The Inspectorate has continued to monitor the station's replacement of degraded cast iron cooling water pipework and all above ground pipework is expected to be replaced during the double reactor outage scheduled for the autumn.
As part of their planned inspection site inspectors examine safety related events that have occurred and the Licensee's response to them. Generally the Licensee's internal system for following up events is robust and the appropriate actions are implemented. The site inspector investigated several events in detail, the most significant being the leakage of tritiated water on 9th June described below.
During routine operation a flange in the tritiated water system, located within the radioactive effluent treatment plant (REATP), leaked and approximately 2 cubic metres of tritiated water escaped. The water was confined to bunded areas within the building and recovered into the normal discharge route. However there was a significant amount of evaporation which caused some areas of the reactor building complex to have restricted access for several days. There was no significant dose either on or off site. The Inspectorate has now investigated this event and concludes that the actions identified by the station in their own investigation are appropriate to prevent a recurrence. However the Inspectorate also concludes that a generic issue regarding condition monitoring maintenance has been raised by this event, and we are requiring the station to address this. Progress of all related actions will be pro-actively monitored by NII.
The Inspectorate has powers under the Nuclear Site Licence to issue Consents, Approvals and Directions. In addition, the Inspectorate uses Licence Instruments to issue Specifications and Agreements under the conditions attached to the Site Licence. During the reporting period there were three Agreements issued:
Licence Instrument 47, allowing the station to replace neutron flux high linear trip group equipment,
Licence Instrument 48, allowing the station to replace neutron flux low log trip group equipment, and
Licence Instrument 49, agreeing to an extension of the operating period for Reactor 1.
Published on the HSE web site 18 January 2005
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