Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Harwell Local Liaison Committee (LLC) and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at the UKAEA Harwell licensed site. These reports are distributed quarterly. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate normally attend LLC meetings and will be happy to respond to questions raised there by members of the LLC. Any other person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact the HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151-951-4103.
The Site Inspector and specialist inspectors visited Harwell on the following days:
| 30 September | SW-PSR assessment (not included in previous LLC report |
| 13 - 16 October | Site inspection; NDA stakeholders' meeting |
| 23 - 24 October | SW-PSR assessment |
| 27 - 29 October | Site inspection |
| 10 - 13 November | Site inspection; SW-PSR assessment, ALARP presentation |
| 27 - 28 November | Site inspection; LLC meeting; SW-PSR assessment |
The Site Inspector and colleagues spent a total of 21 man-days on site, including time spent by specialist inspectors as part of their assessment of the Harwell Site-Wide Periodic Safety Review (SW-PSR).
The Site Inspector attended a Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) stakeholders' meeting, held at Abingdon on 13 October. These meetings are designed to promote engagement between NDA and likely stakeholders.
Specialist inspectors made several visits to Harwell this quarter to complete the gathering of information in support of their assessments of the SW-PSR. The task of collating the findings and issues has started. NII aims to finalise its report by June 2004, and the findings will be made public. The outcome will be covered in later reports to the LLC.
Key issues continue to be discussed with the Environment Agency. Included was the proposal for the divestment of AEA Technology's remaining nuclear-related business, Waste Management and Technology Division. This matter is reported separately below.
A specialist NII inspector made a presentation to Harwell staff on the HSE document "Reducing Risks and Protecting People" 1 and the NII guidance document "Demonstration of ALARP" 2 (as low as reasonably practicable), with particular reference to decommissioning operations.
UKAEA's response to the team inspection in April/May 2003 was discussed. It was found that Harwell is making good progress and is working well with UKAEA Safety & Assurance Division to ensure that the improvements made are consistent across the Harwell facilities and between all sites.
NII considered UKAEA's response to the team inspection in November 2002, and the maintenance aspects related to building structures, using as an example B583 (a depleted uranium store operated by AEAT as tenant to UKAEA). UKAEA has made good progress since the team inspection. NII was concerned to learn of delays to the maintenance of key safety related equipment and of equipment required to be maintained under conventional safety legislation (such as lifting equipment) and will look for improvements in the future.
The relationship between UKAEA and AEAT at B583 was close and actioning of maintenance activities and significant defects appears well controlled by both. There appears to be a weakness in the annual building surveys in terms of understanding their role in support of safety cases, however there is no shortfall at B583 because of the comprehensive survey undertaken as part of the Engineering Substantiation activities. The adequacy of building surveys affects all sites and so is being managed as a corporate issue.
The Site Inspector, accompanied by a specialist inspector from NII, carried out a planned inspection of B462. The purpose of the inspection was to verify compliance with LC32 across all of the facility and to assist in the assessment of the process engineering aspects of the Site-Wide PSR. No issues of significance arose, though NII questioned the application of modern standards and the approach to consistency both across the site and between sites.
The Site Inspector discussed with UKAEA and AEA Technology the proposals for the divestment of AEAT's remaining nuclear-related business, Waste Management and Technology Division. The divestment mainly affects Winfrith, but some facilities at Harwell are also included in the sale. Completion is expected in 2005.
Further discussions were held with UKAEA on this project. This was to have been the first such project for which Private Finance Initiative (PFI) funding is being considered. However, following consultation with the HM Treasury it was decided that UKAEA would not pursue the WETP project as a possible PFI project. Discussions continue on the future of the WETP, which is an important project for the management of the legacy waste at Harwell. Meanwhile UKAEA work continues on design and development work associated with the WETP.
An incident occurred in the B462 pressurised suit area during the emptying of bags of plutonium contaminated material (PCM) for size reduction prior to treatment and disposal. A routine biological sample of a person employed as a dresser indicated a potential internal dose uptake. A follow-up sample indicated that the person had received a second potential internal dose uptake. All PCM operations were stopped. UKAEA has completed its investigation and its report is considered to be thorough and identifies several significant shortcomings in the management of the pressurised suit area. The dose uptake was confirmed as being well within legal limits.
An oven exploded in a laboratory operated by Harwell Scientifics Ltd as tenant of UKAEA. No-one was hurt, but two people nearby were treated for shock. There were no radiological implications. The tenant has reported the incident under RIDDOR (Reporting of injuries, diseases and dangerous occurrences Regulations 1995). UKAEA and the tenant have carried out a joint investigation. The cause of the explosion is believed to be the unexpected presence of an organic flammable compound in the oven. Changes have been introduced to prevent a recurrence.
The purpose of RM1 is to retrieve historic intermediate level waste from B462.2 so that it can be repacked prior to encapsulation and safe long-term storage. UKAEA requested an extension of the current period of trial operations of RM1, so that waste retrieval can continue in parallel with the preparation of the safety case for full operations (Pre-Operational Safety Report, POSR). The Site Inspector, accompanied by a specialist inspector from NII, met UKAEA to discuss the regulatory and assessment issues associated with this project. UKAEA provided assurance that the work completed on RM1 satisfactorily addressed NII's previous assessment concerns. Subject to receipt of further confirmation, the way appears clear for NII to accept the extension of trial operations (since granted on 16 January 2004). Further, and probably more extensive, assessment of the POSR is expected to take place in 2004.
NII has powers under the licence to issue Consents, Approvals and Directions. In addition, NII uses Licence Instruments to issue Specifications, Acknowledgements and Agreements under the conditions attached to the Licence, or under arrangements made by UKAEA for complying with those conditions.
During the period of the report, no Consents, Approvals or Directions under conditions attached to the Site Licence were issued.
No Licence Instruments were issued during the quarter.
1.
Reducing risks, protecting people, ISBN 0 7176 2151 0, available from
HSE Books, PO Box 1999, Sudbury, Suffolk CO10 2WA,
www.hsebooks.co.uk.
2. Demonstration of ALARP, available from ND
website http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/.
Published on the HSE web site 1 April 2004