Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to Heysham Power Station available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Heysham Local Community Liaison Council and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at Heysham. These reports are distributed quarterly. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate attend LCLC meetings and will be happy to respond to any questions raised there by members of the LCLC. Any other person wishing to enquire about matters covered by this report should contact the HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151-951-4103.
The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) site inspectors made visits to Heysham on the following dates during this quarter:
3, 8, 16, 17, 28, 30 October 2002
7, 8, 14 November 2002
2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19 December 2002
14, 16, 18, 24, 28, 29 October 2002
4, 5, 8, 19, 20 November 2002
3,11,12,17,19 December 2002
Other members of the NII, including specialist inspectors, also visited Heysham site during the period. At Heysham 1 a review of the station's progress towards completing safety improvements resulting from the Periodic Safety Review was carried out. NII inspectors also attended technical meetings to discuss matters associated with safety case development.
At Heysham 2 NII specialist inspectors attended site to consider matters associated with the periodic shutdown of reactor 7. An NII superintending inspector attended the reactor 7 start-up meeting with the NII site inspector and his successor.
As part of our routine work we inspect for compliance against the requirements of the Stations' Nuclear Site Licence, the Health and Safety at Work Act and other relevant safety legislation. We monitor events, plant operations, projects, modifications and safety case changes which are important to safety.
During the period a team of NII inspectors led by one of the superintending inspectors for AGR reactors witnessed a demonstration of the emergency arrangements at Heysham 1. NII witnessed exercises are carried out annually at each station and are in addition to the station's own training exercises. The emergency exercise scenario was developed from a matrix that ensures all aspects of the station's emergency arrangements are exercised and inspected on a regular basis. The exercise was conducted, out of normal working hours, during the evening of 11 December 2002 commencing at approx 18.00 hrs. The scenario was based on the failure of a pipeline containing reactor gas and tritiated water, a fire in the turbine hall and a boiler tube leak on unit 1, two casualties resulted and no significant off site radiological release occurred. A joint Heysham 1/Heysham 2 muster was exercised and both Emergency Control Centres (ECC) were operational.
Overall the exercise was judged to be an adequate demonstration of the station's emergency arrangements. In line with expectations for continuous improvement a number of learning points were identified by NII and the licensee which will be actioned through the programme of emergency arrangements staff training and shift exercises planned for 2003.
NII Inspectors reviewed progress with BEGL staff on closing out the findings from the Heysham 1 Periodic Safety Review (PSR), as detailed in the public report issued in December 1999. The PSR findings relate to commitments made in the report to implement a number of safety related improvements by December 2002. We found that BEGL had made satisfactory progress with the required work which was summarised by the licensee in a close-out report. NII's assessment of some PSR related improvements will continue into 2003 and will need to reach a satisfactory conclusion before final completion statements can be issued. A number of emergent areas of work have also developed during the process of implementing the PSR improvements and NII is actively seeking the early completion of these additional tasks.
During the annual demonstration of emergency arrangements at Heysham 1 power station, reported above, the Heysham 2 power station also carried out a full muster of station staff and established the Heysham 2 emergency control centre to support the Heysham 1 station. Overall, the aspects of the Heysham 2 station demonstration that formed part of this exercise, were judged to be adequate.
Reactor 7 commenced a periodic shutdown for maintenance, inspection and test on 4 October 2002. All scheduled work was reported to have been completed during the outage, and no issues were identified which might prohibit a 3 year period of further operation. The NII Consent to restart reactor 7 was granted on 7 November 2002.
Both NII site inspectors attended the Heysham Power Station Local Community Liaison Council meeting which took place on 8 November 2002. NII's inspection activities were summarised to members and further detail, for example in relation to BE's stock exchange announcement, was provided in response to members' questions.
Following the introduction of Condition 36 to the Nuclear Site Licence the licensee developed compliance arrangements for the control of changes to organisational structures and resources which may affect nuclear safety. Following its assessment process NII has issued Licence Instruments to both Heysham 1 & 2 approving the high level statements (Preface) to the arrangements. This regulatory approach ensures that future alteration or amendment of the Preface is prevented unless a further NII approval has been granted.
In advance of possible industrial action by the Fire & Rescue Service the NII site inspectors carried out inspections to establish the ability and readiness of Heysham 1 & 2 to respond as might be required during strike periods. We found that both stations had developed contingency plans and were working closely together to maximise the effectiveness of the considerable on-site fire and rescue resources. We noted the stations had in place arrangements to carry out additional fire watch tours and were briefing staff to be extra vigilant and identifying measures to further reduce risk. We found the stations were reviewing work schedules to identify tasks involving hotwork, working at height, handling bulk chemicals and working in confined spaces. We welcomed the rescheduling of these tasks, where possible, outside the period of proposed industrial action. In summary we found the Heysham 1 & 2 response had been proactive and, from evidence obtained during the first period of industrial action by the Fire & Rescue Service, we were satisfied that it was adequate. The NII site inspectors are continuing to monitor the situation.
Following British Energy's announcement to the Stock Exchange on 5 September 2002, that it had entered into talks with the Government on refinancing and restructuring, NII stated that its regulatory business would continue as normal and site inspectors would continue to check BE's compliance with licence conditions and other relevant safety regulations.
Through routine site inspection activities the NII site inspectors at Heysham 1 & 2 have maintained an increased awareness of the stations operations during the current period of financial uncertainty to ensure that the licensee's focus on nuclear safety is maintained. We encouraged Heysham 1 & 2 to develop and monitor performance indicators relating to incidents, accidents, supply of goods/services and staff morale which to date don't show any adverse trends. From our inspections we are satisfied that the financial uncertainty has not had an adverse effect on nuclear safety performance at the Heysham power stations.
NII site inspectors for the Heysham 1 & 2 nuclear power stations held on-site discussions with counterparts from the DTI's Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS). The inspectors reviewed matters of common interest that had arisen on the Heysham site from their respective regulatory inspections. NII and OCNS work closely together to harmonise health, safety and security requirements and during the discussions the inspectors reinforced the need to maintain a close local working relationship at Heysham and to complete some joint inspections in the coming year.
As part of our planned inspection of the stations we examine safety related events which have occurred and the licensee's response to them. From such inspections we are satisfied that the events which have occurred during the period were relatively minor and responses by the stations have been appropriate. We have summarised our response to the Heysham 1 gas circulator failure below.
A gas circulator failure occurred at Heysham 1 on 15 December 2002. The reactor was shutdown at the time of the incident and the circulator was providing decay heat cooling. In response to the plant failure the NII site inspector completed a number of reactive inspections. The site inspector's investigation established that operator actions were in line with the expectations of increased vigilance following the Torness AGR gas circulator impeller failure in May 2002 and the station's arrangements to investigate the plant failure through a formal Technical Panel of Investigation were appropriate. Following the removal of the gas circulator from the reactor the station completed inspections confirming there was no damage to the reactor pressure vessel liner or the gas circulator impeller, enabling a conclusion to be drawn that the machine did not exhibit the failure mechanisms as seen at Torness. The site inspector is satisfied that the Heysham 1 reactors can continue to operate safely.
The following regulatory documentation was issued during the quarter:
(1) Consent Number 10 was granted on 7 November 2002 for the start up of Heysham 2 Reactor Number 7 following its periodic shutdown.(2) Approval Number 27 was granted on 23 December 2002 providing NII approval to the Heysham 1 Preface to the Management of Change Schedule HYA/SCH/051 Issue 2.
(3) Approval Number 28 was granted on 23 December 2002 providing NII approval to the Heysham 2 Preface to the Management of Change Schedule MOC/HYB/001 Addendum 1, Issue 2.
Published on the HSE web site 12 March 2003