Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to Heysham Power Station available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Heysham Local Community Liaison Council and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at Heysham. These reports are distributed quarterly. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate attend LCLC meetings and will be happy to respond to any questions raised there by members of the LCLC. Any other person wishing to enquire about matters covered by this report should contact the HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151-951-4103.
The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) site inspectors made visits to Heysham on the following dates during this quarter:
| Heysham 1 | Heysham 2 |
|---|---|
| 10, 16, 17, 31 January | 14, 18, 23, 24 January 2002 |
| 11, 12, 18, 19 February | 7, 11, 12, 20, 21 February 2002 |
| 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21 March | 4, 5, 6, 11, 15, 19 March 2002 |
Other members of the NII, including specialist inspectors, also visited site during the period.
At Heysham 1, NII's specialist inspector for conventional safety visited the site and made two presentations to power station staff on general industrial safety awareness. The presentations highlighted industrial accidents that have occurred on UK nuclear industry sites and were programmed to increase safety awareness at Heysham 1 prior to the reactor 2 statutory outage when large numbers of contractors come to the site.
At Heysham 2 specialist inspectors attended the NII/BEGL regulatory review meeting, witnessed the repeat emergency arrangements demonstration, and inspected implementation of the increased enrichment fuel project and also nuclear fire safety arrangements.
As part of our routine work we inspect for compliance against the requirements of the Stations' Nuclear Site Licence, the Health and Safety at Work Act and other relevant safety legislation. We monitor events, plant operations, projects, modifications and safety case changes which are important to safety.
A statutory outage will take place on Heysham 1 Reactor 2 commencing 10 May 2002. An outage intentions meeting was held in January, attended by the Heysham 1 site inspector and a small team of NII specialist assessment inspectors. The outage intentions meeting is the starting point of a significant safety related activity to demonstrate compliance with the nuclear site licence. NII inspectors assessed the station's outage proposals to ensure that the inspections and maintenance to be carried out should be sufficient to support the station safety case for a further period of operation.
NII was not satisfied with the station's initial proposals for reactor core inspections which represented a lower level of inspection than was carried out during last years outage on reactor 1. NII's initial assessment of the station's revised core safety case identified a number of uncertainties in the analysis that required further justification. Following negotiation, the station agreed to increase the number of core inspections that should give increased confidence in the material and core behavior and properties assumed in the safety case.
Other areas discussed included inspections to the reactor pressure vessel, proposals to chemically clean the boilers, plant modification work and the general area of outage management to ensure high standards of safety performance. The NII site inspector and his team of specialist assessment inspectors will have a continuing inspection and assessment role through to completion of the outage. The outcome of the inspections will inform NII's decision as to whether the station has made an adequate case to operate the reactor for a further period.
A daycare nursery for children up to school age is located on the Heysham licensed site but outside the security fence. The nursery is managed by Heysham 1 staff. NII carried out an inspection of the daycare nursery emergency arrangements. By agreement with NII and the Local Authority the nursery currently has a limit of 30 children. The NII site inspector concluded that the daycare nursery is run in a professional way, the staff are well aware of their responsibilities in an emergency and there was strong evidence that British Energy maintains a high degree of ownership and control of the facility through the Heysham 1 management.
A meeting between NII and BEGL was held on 12 March 2002 to review the Station's last period of operation, to discuss plans for the period ahead and to progress any outstanding safety issues. Such meetings are held every 6 or 12 months. Prior to the meeting the NII team inspected various parts of the plant.
As reported in the last NII Site Inspectors' Quarterly Report, the Heysham 2 emergency exercise in November 2001 failed to demonstrate the adequacy of the station's emergency arrangements and that the station had subsequently put in place a programme of improvements. The resulting repeat exercise on 6 March 2002 involved a similar but not identical scenario, and utilised in essence the same station shift and emergency team, and was witnessed by the same NII team. The station's objective was, as normal, to demonstrate the adequacy of their arrangements but in addition in this case also to demonstrate that the issues arising from the November exercise had been properly addressed. At the end of the exercise the NII concluded that the demonstration had been successful, that no major concerns had been identified and that the previous issues had been satisfactorily addressed. As always, there were a number of learning opportunities and implementation of these will be monitored as part of normal regulatory business.
The NII has assessed BE's safety case to load new fuel with a slightly increased enrichment into the Heysham 2 reactors and found it to be adequate. In addition, an inspection was carried out of the on-site implementation programme which involved the preparation of supporting instructions, training of staff and changes to computer data inputs, and again this was found to be satisfactory. Subsequently, on 22 March 2002, a change to Operating Rule 2 was approved by NII allowing the station to start loading the new fuel. Later this year BEGL intends to present NII with a complementary safety case to allow the fuel to stay in the reactors for longer periods.
As a follow up to the issue of the closure of boundary doors as reported in the NII Site Inspectors' Quarterly Report (July to September 2001) in February 2002 the NII carried out a more wide ranging inspection of nuclear fire safety arrangements. This inspection concluded that relevant key plant and equipment (mainly nuclear fire barriers) was in good condition and that the original improvement programme whilst not yet complete was making sound progress. It additionally highlighted a number of areas where relevant management controls and inspection activities should be further strengthened. The Station are currently considering how best to incorporate these further improvements into their existing programme and NII will continue to monitor progress.
Both NII site inspectors attended the Heysham Power Station Emergency Planning Consultative Committee which took place on 15 March 2002.
As part of our planned inspection of the Stations we examine safety related events which have occurred and the Licensee's response to them. From such inspections we are satisfied that the events which have occurred during the period were relatively minor and responses by the Stations have been appropriate. However at Heysham 1 the following event required the NII to carry out a more detailed investigation.
British Energy reported to NII an event at Heysham 1 Power Station on 11 March 2002 involving a fuelling machine operation at the Additional Fuel Storage Facility (AFSF). The event involved the failure of a safety significant mechanical interlock. The NII site inspector visited the power station within a few hours of the event being reported in order to obtain further information and assess the station's response. NII confirmed that the actual nuclear safety significance of the event was low but could have been more serious had the fuelling machine been operating at the reactor. British Energy confirmed to NII that a full investigation of the event would be carried out and the existing refuelling safety case would be revalidated before returning the fuelling machine and AFSF to routine operational service. NII's regulatory response to the event has been to closely scrutinise the licensees investigation and safety case revalidation process in order to judge the adequacy of the actions put in place to ensure future safe operation of the refuelling equipment. NII used regulatory powers to specify that the licensee should seek NII's agreement to return the fuelling machine and AFSF to service. NII assessed British Energy's reissued nuclear safety proposal and concluded the licensee's investigation and recovery work was satisfactory. NII issued a licence instrument agreeing to the nuclear safety proposal. NII is continuing to monitor the longer term actions resulting from the event and will not hesitate to use regulatory powers if any shortfalls are found in the licensee's responses. The event was categorised as INES 2 (incident) on the International scale of nuclear events.
The following regulatory documentation was issued during the quarter:
(i) Approval Number 26 was issued on 22 March 2002 approving changes to Heysham 2 Operating Rule 2 which will enable the use of increased enrichment fuel.(ii) Licence Instrument Number 50 was issued on 16 April 2002 for Heysham 1 specifying that the Licensee shall submit to the Executive for Agreement the Safety case for the return to routine operational service of the fuelling machine and AFSF following a fuelling machine grab drive interlock failure.
(iii) Licence Instrument Number 51 was issued on 17 April 2002 for Heysham 1 agreeing to the implementation of the Safety case for the return to routine operational service of the fuelling machine and AFSF following a fuelling machine grab drive interlock failure.
Published on the HSE web site 20 May 2002