Health and Safety
Executive / Commission
Nuclear
LLC reports
This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Hartlepool Local Community Liaison Council and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at Hartlepool Power Station. These reports are distributed quarterly. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (part of the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Directorate) attend LCLC meetings and will be happy to respond there to questions raised by members of the LCLC. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact the HSE, Nuclear Directorate Information Centre on 0151 951 4103.
I visited the site on six occasions during the quarter:
22nd to 24th AprilSpecialist NII inspectors also visited the site during the period to inspect arrangements for change management, adoption of electronic personal dosemeters for statutory purposes, the treatment of contaminated spent fuel pond water, fuel integrity, fire safety and changes to the quality control documentation. I was also accompanied at one inspection by one of the HSE directors.
As part of our routine work NII inspectors inspect for compliance against the requirements of the Station's Nuclear Site Licence, the Health and Safety at Work Act and other relevant safety legislation. We monitor events, plant operations, projects, modifications and safety case changes which are important to safety. Topics covered during the quarter included the fire safety case, maintenance of essential cooling water systems, marking of the site boundary and control and supervision of carbon dioxide systems. I also held a routine meeting with safety representatives.
In general the stations arrangements were found to be satisfactory, with a commitment to remedy matters where that was not the case. However the fire safety inspection, which followed up issues identified at a previous inspection, identified poor progress in completing the outstanding work. I ensured that the station are very clear about the work required to close the issues, the timescales, and the potential regulatory consequences of failure to complete the work.
At the demonstration exercise held in November 2001 it was considered that, although the overall demonstration was adequate, there were weaknesses in some aspects of command and control. Station was requested to provide a repeat demonstration of these aspects. Consequently the station embarked on a series of refresher training events for each shift and provided a re-demonstration of these aspects in desk-top exercise Viper in May. Together with a colleague I witnessed the exercise and concluded that a satisfactory level of performance was demonstrated.
As part of my planned inspection I examine safety related events that have occurred and the Licensee's response to them. Generally the Licensee's internal system for following up events is robust and the appropriate actions are implemented. Events which I consider to be significant are summarised below.
Further isolated examples of fuel pin leaks within a reactor occurred during April. Transfer operations on one of the suspect elements removed from the reactor resulted in enhanced levels of caesium in the spent fuel pond water and a transport flask.
I inspected the station's response to this event and held a meeting on site, which included relevant NII technical experts. I concluded that the station was taking the appropriate actions. The flask containing the leaking element has been segregated and is being held within a controlled area and station has agreed that they will not handle the flask prior to a safety paper being submitted to NII to detail the approach.
All leaking fuel has now been discharged from the reactor and some elements have been delivered to Windscale for physical examination to determine the cause of the failures. NII are actively monitoring the outcome of this examination to ensure that any relevant lessons are learned and applied.
I investigated the reactor trip, which occurred when the automatic protection systems shut down the reactor in response to high neutron flux. I established that the station's own investigation had been thorough and the relevant causes had been established. I am continuing to follow up the station's progress to address the resolution of the issues arising.
The Inspectorate has powers under the Nuclear Site Licence to issue Consents, Approvals and Directions. In addition, the Inspectorate uses Licence Instruments to issue Specifications and Agreements under the conditions attached to the Site Licence.
One Licence Instrument has been issued during the period covered by this report, to permit use of the refuelling machine hoist at higher speeds when handling fuel assemblies at the reactors.
Published on the HSE web site 1 July 2003