Initial Radiological Protection Inspection prior to Reactor 2 (R2) Statutory Outage 2013

Executive Summary

Purpose of intervention

In accordance with the Radiation Protection Plan for the ONR's Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme, two radiation protection (RP) inspections are carried out during statutory outages of civil nuclear reactors. This report covers the first of these inspections: to inspect the station's readiness to offer adequate radiation protection during the forthcoming Hartlepool Reactor 2 2013 Statutory Outage.

Interventions carried out by ONR

I examined the radiological protection arrangements for the forthcoming outage with station staff and sampled a range of documentation. I also took the opportunity to undertake inspections of relevant plant areas.

This intervention covered:

• Inspection of RP aspects of basic-overview training provided to people required to work in the radiation/contamination controlled areas.
• Update on current radiological protection resources (people, equipment, plant).
• Discussion on appointment of new radiography contractor.
• Structured discussion around list of issues e.g. cooperation between employers, focusing on areas previously identified as requiring improvement.
• Inspection of areas of the plant.
  • "Iron maidens" - these are containment facilities on rails which can be moved around the circulator hall to allow control of radioactive contamination associated with the maintenance of the gas circulators.
  • Barriers and signage for areas containing contamination (C2 areas).
  • Storage of radioactive waste materials.

Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgements made

• The RP aspects of the basic-overview training relating to radiation/contamination was well delivered in the short time available.
• Overall there has been no significant change in the RP resources available to the station and the ability of RP staff to act in a proactive manner is still limited.
• I understand the new radiography contractor may be using more conventional open-site radiography techniques (at least initially). The station will need to ensure sufficient oversight and surveillance of radiography activities early-on to ensure that adequate standards of protection against inadvertent exposure of personnel are maintained.
• The station have made some improvement in their ability to monitor completion of the survey-schedule, although further work is still needed in this area.
• The "Iron-maidens" used to carryout work on the gas circulators appear to be in better material condition than on previous inspections, but area designation signage and condition of vision-panels could be better.
• C2 signage and barriers were of mixed quality. There are a number of signs taped to walls or propped up against equipment which could easily be moved - these would benefit from proper mounting. Additionally legacy-barriers are in use with markings which could cause confusion - these markings should be removed.
• The active waste facility and the north boiler access shaft contained a lot of stored material giving the impression that little additional space would be available to store wastes arising during the outage. A campaign of waste processing should be undertaken before the outage commences

Overall, despite minor areas of non-compliance, I judged the standard of radiological protection arrangements on the plant were adequate.

I have discussed the issues described above with the station and they have agreed to address them and provide me with an update at the next inspection planned for late February.

Conclusion of intervention

From the evidence obtained during this intervention, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety on the station at this time. Corrective actions resulting from this intervention have been captured within the station Corrective Action Programme arrangements, in the actions recorded in this intervention report or in the ONR issues database as appropriate. Therefore, no additional regulatory action arising from this visit is considered necessary at this time.

Recommendations

The planned interventions set out in the Integrated Intervention Strategy for Hartlepool remain valid and will be followed for future inspections.