Office for Nuclear Regulation
An agency of HSE

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Meeting to discuss APEX work on Reactor 2 Outage 2013

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of the site visit was to discuss and review a sample of the statutory surveillances, inspections and tests to be undertaken by EdF New Generation Ltd (EDF NGL) to support their anticipated request for consent to return to service of Reactor 2 pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel at Hartlepool Power Station following the 2013 statutory outage. 

Interventions carried out by ONR

This was a technical discussion regarding the LC28 arrangements for the pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel.

Key findings, Inspector’s opinions and reasons for judgements made

I noted that the EdF-NGL appointed examiner has planned the statutory surveillances, inspections and tests in accordance with branch instructions and with additional tendon strand and anchor samples taken to account for known tendon “wetting”. A start- up statement, that summarises the work, will be submitted in support of the request for consent to return the reactor to service. This follows the expected process. No judgements were made.

Conclusion of intervention

I conclude from the information presented at the discussion that these statutory surveillances, inspections and tests, along with the additional tendon samples will proceed as normal.

Recommendations

I recommend that the normal processes for the statutory surveillances, inspections and tests (with additional tendon anchor inspections and additional tendon strand examinations) should continue; I will assess the outcome when presented in the start- up statement.

I also recommend that, in the event of significant corrosion being identified during tendon strand withdrawals, consideration should be given to withdrawing and examining additional strands to confirm the extent of the corrosion.

Updated 2013-03-25