



**Health & Safety
Executive**

**PROGRESS ON BNFL'S RESPONSE TO THREE
REPORTS ISSUED BY HSE ON 18 FEBRUARY 2000
FEBRUARY 2001**





HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate

SUMMARY

February 2001

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Summary

On 18 February 2000 the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) published three reports Refs 1,2 & 3 relating to the work of its Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) in the regulation of the BNFL Sellafield site.

These reports were :

- **An investigation into the falsification of pellet diameter data in the MOX demonstration facility (MDF) at the BNFL Sellafield site and the effect of this on the safety of MOX fuel in use.**
- **HSE team inspection of the control and supervision of operations at BNFL's Sellafield site.**
- **The Storage of Liquid High Level Waste at BNFL Sellafield - an updated review of safety.**

The publication of the reports created significant interest and led to major changes in the management of the company. This report provides an update on the position reached by the NII in its consideration of BNFL's responses to the recommendations from the three reports one year on from their publication.

Overall we are encouraged by the vigour and commitment that BNFL has given to addressing issues raised by all three reports.

MDF Data Falsification Report

All recommendations associated with the MDF Data Falsification Report have been satisfactorily addressed and "closed out"¹. We will regulate the restart of MDF, now a development facility, in the same manner as any other plant on the Sellafield site and we have required BNFL to submit a re-commissioning safety report.

Control and Supervision Report

The company has taken significant action to address the concerns identified in our report on the Team Inspection into the control and supervision at Sellafield. The BNFL Board has been restructured, and the Sellafield site management reorganised to provide a single individual who is responsible for operations and safety of the site. Greater clarity of roles and responsibilities have been identified and staffing at Sellafield has increased. A programme to ensure a "conscious compliance" culture has started and independent inspectors within BNFL and compliance advisors have been appointed. We have found evidence to support the claims that both the management and workforce are determined to ensure that the improved systems are effectively implemented. With one exception all planned key deliverables identified in BNFL's "Going Forward Safely" report Ref 4 have been delivered on time. Experience has shown that formal close out of recommendations will take longer than previously envisaged due to the time required for the changes to be implemented and for evidence of this to be provided. This will affect the overall timescales for final close out. Hence, we have asked BNFL to review its plans for all of the outstanding team inspection recommendations.

High Level Waste Report

We have accepted BNFL's revised proposal for the reduction of stored Highly Active Liquors (HAL) and formalised this by issuing a Specification on BNFL, a legal requirement for action. BNFL has responded to all of the report's 22 recommendations, and following extensive discussions these are now all closed out. There are further ongoing programmes of work that we are monitoring as part of our normal regulatory activities.

¹"Close out" is the term used between NII and BNFL to signify NII's acceptance that BNFL has responded satisfactory to the recommendation in a HSE/NII report.

MDF DATA FALSIFICATION REPORT



We wrote to BNFL on 18 December 2000 closing out the last of the 15 recommendations contained in the HSE report of 18 February 2000. This has been a significant achievement which has been brought about by major efforts by BNFL's staff and our inspectors. It has involved BNFL preparing its detailed responses to each of the recommendations. Once completed our inspectors took nothing for granted but rigorously tested the evidence supplied by BNFL. No recommendation was closed out until our inspectors and the Superintending Inspector of our BNFL Chemical Plant Inspection Unit were satisfied with BNFL's response.

Our original investigation revealed significant shortcomings in the suitability of the plant, safety culture and management, especially the control and supervision of operations. The required improvements were contained in the report's 15 recommendations.

BNFL responded initially on 18 April 2000 by publishing its report 'Rebuilding Trust' Ref 5. This provided commitments against each of the recommendations detailing aims, key activities and completion programmes grouped against the following headings: plant; people/culture; and organisation/management. BNFL provided detailed formal responses for each recommendation, beginning in July 2000, in the form of close out files.

While BNFL was producing its submissions we developed our strategy for their review. We assigned a minimum of two inspectors to assess/inspect BNFL's submission against each of the recommendations. Submissions were examined by specialist inspectors in quality assurance, human factors and control and instrumentation and members of the Sellafield Site Inspection team. Our strategy recognised the principles we adopted for managing closure of Team Inspection recommendations which are described later. However as closure of MDF recommendations was both more localised and on a much shorter time scale a formal protocol was considered not to be necessary.

Our reviews reflected the type of issue being covered. For plant based issues, such as automating the AQL inspection position, we inspected hardware and operations at site. With people/culture issues we looked at what

BNFL had done to ensure that staff knew why and how tasks needed to be undertaken. This important area was closely scrutinised by one of our human factors specialists. BNFL's processes for identifying staff involved and taking the appropriate action of discipline, relocation or retraining were key aspects of people/culture. For recommendations 4, 5 and 9 (disciplinary investigation of management and workforce) two inspectors spent several days at site. They interviewed the managers carrying out the investigation and disciplinary processes and examined detailed evidence files. Their objective was to determine whether BNFL's process was rigorous. The conduct of BNFL's disciplinary process was also discussed with Trade Union officials who represented staff being investigated. From all of this information our inspectors concluded that BNFL's process had been rigorous and thorough.

Our inspectors examined the organisation/management response to see if BNFL had correctly identified those factors which may have led to the falsification. They looked at the sequence of local organisational changes which might have had an impact. It became clear that a further backward look was needed to make sure lessons had been learned. BNFL undertook this work and made a further submission before we closed out recommendation 11.

Other aspects of organisation/management were examined by NII's quality assurance and management of change specialists. Again this involved inspections at Sellafield as well as examining BNFL's submissions.

The final recommendation to be closed out was a key element of BNFL's response on organisation and management. This was recommendation 15 (why BNFL's senior management had allowed the situation in MDF to develop). We had always recognised the importance of this recommendation; it was essential that the root causes leading to the falsification were identified. This was necessary to provide assurance that all the corrective measures being put in place would be effective in the longer term. Having received BNFL's close out file on the recommendation two inspectors spent several days at BNFL's offices in Risley interviewing senior staff. The objectives of the interviews were to obtain their views on:

- **What were the root causes of the event?**
- **What has been done to overcome them?**
- **What will the company do to prevent a recurrence?**

Senior staff interviewed included the Chief Executive, directors and managers with executive responsibility for MDF, and directors and managers not having executive responsibility but with functions associated with MDF. There was clear evidence that BNFL has applied considerable effort in establishing root causes and is working to overcome them. Initiatives aimed at preventing a recurrence include:-

- **Reorganisation at Sellafield.**
- **The decision not to use MDF as a production facility.**
- **More visibility of the Chief Executive.**
- **A greater focus on operation compliance and quality.**
- **The intention to appoint staff with a greater fuel manufacturing background.**

A number of these, and other, initiatives will take some time to implement fully. We will continue to monitor them as part of our normal regulation at Sellafield.

While we have closed out all of the report's recommendations BNFL does not yet have NII's agreement to restart MDF, even in its new more limited role - a development and support facility rather than a production plant. We have required BNFL to produce and submit a re-commissioning safety case. Once this has been received we shall assess it and carry out readiness inspections before agreeing to a phased restart under commissioning control. During the recommissioning phase we shall witness a number of the tests BNFL will need to carry out.

The MDF event has clear implications for the new Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) which is undergoing commissioning with uranium. As part of our SMP inspection activities we are checking to see whether relevant lessons from MDF are being applied to this plant.

CONTROL AND SUPERVISION REPORT



We carried out an in-depth inspection of the management of control and supervision of activities at BNFL Sellafield in September 1999. Our report of the inspection was published in February 2000, contained 28 recommendations and required the company to prepare an action plan to address significant shortcomings by 18 April 2000.

BNFL responded by developing a programme of work which was published in its “Going Forward Safely” document on 18 April 2000. This document outlined BNFL’s strategy for addressing the recommendations and identified a programme of “key deliverables” which it believed would be necessary to address the recommendations. BNFL collated the recommendations into 6 themes:

- **Safety Management Systems.**
- **Safety Management Practices.**
- **Management of Change.**
- **Control and Supervision.**
- **Safety Related Operations.**
- **Safety Culture and Initiatives.**

It set up teams to co-ordinate the work for each theme and appointed “champions” for individual themes and recommendations. BNFL developed “Task sheets” which identified the measures planned for each recommendation and the criteria by which success would be measured.

At the time of the publication of BNFL’s response in April 2000 we considered the company’s plans were a good basis on which to go forward. We welcomed the changes in company management and highlighted that there remained areas where more detailed plans were required to be developed.

Whilst BNFL was developing its detailed project arrangements, we set out our approach to regulating the close out of the recommendations. This included identifying an experienced inspector to lead on each recommendation. The lead inspector was responsible for liaison with the BNFL champion. She/he has the responsibility for all aspects of the recommendation but is supported by other inspectors including technical specialists.

In addition to the contact between inspectors and BNFL dealing with each recommendation, the Superintending Inspector of our BNFL Chemical Plants Inspection Unit maintains regular contact with the relevant BNFL Project Manager. Project meetings are held approximately monthly to monitor progress and resolve any disagreements. We have also used a database to monitor the status of work against each recommendation. Progress reports are generated from the database and used during the routine meetings.

We devised a protocol for liaison with BNFL and monitoring progress against the recommendations. This protocol sets out the means of communication, how BNFL is expected to submit its evidence, and how NII formally gives its agreement to close out of a particular recommendation.

Agreement to the scope of the task sheets is the first major stage. This involved us in assessing if BNFL had properly identified what was needed to address each recommendation and whether the criteria by which success will be measured are appropriate. Where these plans were considered not to be fully adequate our lead inspector provided an explanation to BNFL and offered advice on what needed to be addressed. When a recommendation task sheet was judged to be adequate our lead inspector confirmed this in writing to BNFL and the status was marked as "scope agreed" in the database.

Each task sheet identified a number of actions or deliverables which are expected to be achieved to discharge the recommendation. These built on the key deliverables that BNFL identified in its first response to our recommendations - "Going Forward Safely".

Our acknowledgement of BNFL's achievement of a deliverable is the second stage of the protocol. BNFL submits evidence and our lead inspector makes a judgement as to whether the agreed action has been completed. The judgement is based upon an assessment of the written submissions and evidence from inspection of plant, looking at records, interviewing staff etc as appropriate. We acknowledge the achievement of the deliverable in writing to BNFL. Again, if agreement cannot be obtained our lead inspector provides an explanation of her/his opinion and offers advice on the matters to be addressed

The third stage occurs when BNFL considers that all the requirements of the recommendation have been met and supplies evidence to NII to support this view. We then adopt a similar process to that already outlined. If our lead inspector is satisfied with BNFL's response then she/he prepares the case for close out. This is peer reviewed by another inspector before presenting to the Superintending Inspector to obtain NII management agreement to formal close out. We inform BNFL in writing of the close out of the recommendation. Should the case not be made then our lead inspector informs BNFL by letter why close out is not being recommended and indicates where further evidence is required.

There is inevitably a time lag between BNFL submitting its case for close out and NII agreeing to close out. This lag occurs because we are not only challenging BNFL's submission but are also looking for evidence that the particular improvement has been effective. For example, we only cleared recommendation 3 (clearer management structure with identified safety responsibilities and accountabilities) when it was obvious that the head of site was effectively in control of the site within his revised range of responsibilities.

BNFL has submitted task sheets for all the recommendations and these have been reviewed. Some were accepted as submitted while others were revised following comment from NII. We have agreed task sheets for all of the 28 recommendations.

BNFL assembled a large project team to respond to the 28 recommendations. The company is expending significant effort to overcome the inconsistencies and different practices across the site. We do not consider that the number of recommendations closed is a good indicator of the substantial amount of work undertaken by BNFL in response to this report. The amount of work committed and delivered is not visible by simply counting the number of recommendations closed out which currently stands at three (1, 3 and 28). In the year since publication of the report a better measure of progress is the key deliverable count.

With the exception of the "Baseline" assessment document, associated with recommendations 17 and 19, BNFL has delivered all the key deliverables to programme. BNFL decided to delay the submission of information to respond to these recommendations, by one month, in order to ensure that it has fully covered all of the work necessary to support these extensive and important deliverables. While disappointed that BNFL missed these deliverables we support BNFL's actions. They show a commitment to getting things right.

There has been good progress against most of the 28 recommendations. In one case (recommendation 20) we have not been able to agree to BNFL's request to close out the recommendation since further evidence of effective implementation is still required. Annex A to this report provides a summary of the current state of each recommendation.

During our inspections we are seeing evidence of the high priority being given by the company to implementing safety improvements related to our recommendations. There are the obvious indicators such as major changes at Board level and in the senior management structure and accountabilities. We are also seeing evidence of a systematic approach to activities such as determination of operational structures, training and appointment of staff, control of plant handovers and some aspects of learning from experience. These are less obvious to the outside observer but are important features of progress which give us confidence.

Some of the changes will take time to take effect, for example the work necessary to meet recommendations 14 and 15 (reporting and investigating incidents and learning from experience). Reviews by BNFL and NII have established that arrangements issued in January 2000 are yet to be fully implemented. As a result of our experience to date we have asked BNFL to review its process for implementing new arrangements and to apply any lessons learned to other team inspection recommendations.

Overall this has been a highly challenging year. A considerable amount of work has been undertaken and more remains to be done. In the future we will be looking, in particular, to see evidence that safety culture enhancement is occurring at all levels of management, that the new systems are being effectively implemented at the workplace and that new corporate and Sellafield independent inspection and compliance functions are delivering the desired safety improvements.

BNFL's programme shows completion of its submissions by October 2002. We acknowledge that BNFL has made a good start, but many of the changes will take time to take effect. BNFL needs to maintain the momentum for change while it continues to operate its plants safely. We will continue to monitor progress as part of our normal regulation of Sellafield.

CURRENT STATE OF TEAM INSPECTION RECOMMENDATIONS


1	A revised corporate health and safety policy has been issued which has been signed by the Chief Executive. The workforce representatives have been consulted on this policy and are supportive of this revised policy.	Closed Out
2	BNFL has reviewed the scope and adequacy of the corporate health and safety procedures. It has prepared and issued a number of revised procedures and a programme to revise the others.	Scope Agreed
3	The newly appointed Chief Executive has made significant changes to the organisation at the most senior level to ensure responsibilities and accountabilities are clear. A person with overall responsibility for the Sellafield site has been appointed. The BNFL Board of Directors has established a Health and Safety sub committee to ensure that it is provided with independent objective advice on health and safety performance.	Closed Out
4	A team of corporate inspectors has been recruited and have recently commenced work. The Sellafield team of independent compliance advisors have been in post for around 6 months and are starting to be effective. The WANO peer review system has been adopted, but few assessments have yet been completed.	Scope Agreed
5	A programme for the review and development of a single set of Sellafield site arrangements has been prepared. Some of the revised documents have been issued and are in the process of being implemented.	Scope Agreed
6	BNFL has introduced standards for performance expectations for all staff on the site and is developing guidance for those carrying out control and supervision duties.	Scope Agreed
7	A new organisation structure and accountabilities have been defined for all management positions on the site. Work is in hand to implement these changes in line with the requirements of licence condition 36 (Control of Organisational Change)	Scope Agreed
8	Action has been taken to ensure that BNFL personnel are directly responsible for all work undertaken by a contractor on the site. Additional controls have been identified and these are in the process of being implemented.	Scope Agreed
9	Targets for the time plant managers spend on safety related issues have been set. Work is in hand to reallocate priorities to ensure that they can be achieved.	Scope Agreed
10	A review of safety work load of staff has been undertaken in line with the response to recommendation 7	Scope Agreed
11	A consistent process for identifying, assessing and recording training needs and delivery has been defined. Work is currently being taken to implement this across the site.	Scope Agreed
12	A consistent process for assessing and appointing Duly Authorised Persons and others with safety duties has been defined. Work is currently being undertaken to implement this across the site.	Scope Agreed
13	The task sheet is fit for purpose and it is clear that a policy for continuing improvement is to be instigated.	Scope Agreed
14	Revised arrangements for reporting, recording and investigation of incidents have been issued. However, these are not yet being consistently implemented across the site.	Scope Agreed

CURRENT STATE OF TEAM INSPECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

15	Revised arrangements for learning from experience have been issued. However, these are not yet being consistently implemented across the site and within the company at large.	Scope Agreed
16	Formal arrangements for the exchange of information with other chemical and nuclear operators have not yet been established.	Scope Agreed
17	The baseline resource assessment for the Sellafield site has been completed.	Scope Agreed
18	Arrangements for establishing minimum staffing levels have been established. These levels have been included as part of the baseline assessment work.	Scope Agreed
19	Key roles have been identified as part of the baseline assessment, but further work is required.	Scope Agreed
20	Revised management of change arrangements have been issued. NII considers that there is insufficient evidence of implementation to allow closure of the recommendation. An inspection to test the effectiveness of the arrangements is planned for April 2001	Scope Agreed Close Out Claimed ²
21	Based on best industry practice, BNFL has developed systems for confirming that the plant is operating within its safety case at all times. These are being introduced in the near future on a trial basis	Scope Agreed
22	BNFL has specified processes for better control of operations with particular reference to deviations from normal conditions.	Scope Agreed
23	A programme for implementing consistent arrangements for plant labelling and plant configuration control has been developed together with the provision of up to date drawings. Work against this programme is on target	Scope Agreed
24	A revised safe system of work procedure has been issued. Training of key personnel in the operation of this system has commenced.	Scope Agreed
25	A revised system of isolations, handover and handback has been issued. Training of key personnel in the operation of this system has commenced.	Scope Agreed
26	A bench mark assessment of the safety culture/behaviour at Sellafield has been completed. An action plan to address areas of concern has been developed.	Scope Agreed
27	This will be one of the last recommendations that can be closed out as it relies on the majority of other recommendations.	Scope Agreed
28	A review of initiatives has been completed and this has resulted in a number being terminated whilst others have been rationalised.	Closed Out

² "Close out claimed" is the term used within NII to denote that BNFL has submitted a close out file for the particular recommendation and has requested NII's formal agreement to close out.

HIGH LEVEL WASTE REPORT



In February 2000, HSE published NII's report giving an updated review of the safety of the storage of Highly Active Liquors (HAL) at BNFL Sellafield in the Highly Active Liquor Evaporation and Storage (HALES) plant, B215.

The report reviewed the major safety issues which had been identified in an earlier (1995) report in relation to HAL storage at Sellafield. In providing this update, we took into consideration our further assessments of the periodic review of the safety case, undertaken by BNFL in 1994; such reviews are required by Conditions attached to the Nuclear Site Licence. We also included an initial assessment of a further revision of the safety case that was being prepared as a result of the Company's safety case improvement programme Ref 6.

Our February 2000 report concluded that B215 operations were acceptably safe but that there were a number of areas in which the justification provided by the safety case could be enhanced in scope and content. The review identified 22 recommendations in total, 17 of which were essentially associated with development of the safety case and 5 of which specifically addressed the reductions of HAL stocks.

BNFL provided its response on 31 July 2000, before the target date, to all 22 recommendations including presenting proposals for HAL stock reductions. The target for clearance of the latest update of the safety case for continued operation (the Continued Operation Safety Report or 'COSR'), was set for 29 September 2000, the Company having submitted the COSR in September 1999. This was later revised to early 2001 to allow BNFL to implement the training and documentation changes associated with the identified engineering and operational improvement work.

We have held regular project meetings with the BNFL project team to review and progress issues with both the COSR and the HAL stock reduction proposals. We closed out the last of the recommendations at the end of January this year with BNFL's implementation of the new operational clearance certificates associated with the revised safety case and the associated programme of identified engineering and operational improvements.

HAL Stocks


In January 2001 we issued BNFL with a Specification (a legal requirement for the licensee to take action) to formalise a programme to reduce levels of HAL stored in the water-cooled storage tanks at the Sellafield reprocessing plant. The stock reduction plan is aimed at minimising the amount of HAL and achieving the residual or 'buffer' stock required to feed the vitrification (glass-making) process by the year 2015. This formalises a stock reduction strategy which has been the subject of extensive discussions with BNFL. It marks a major step forward in an ongoing regulatory process aimed at securing the conversion of the current stocks of HAL held in water cooled storage tanks to a passively safe form of storage (as glass blocks) as soon as reasonably practicable.

The proposals are linked to the performance of the vitrification plant in such a way as to require restriction of inputs from reprocessing if performance does not meet expectations. Consequently, we will not hesitate to use our regulatory powers to halt THORP reprocessing should that be necessary in order to keep BNFL within the Specification.

With the Specification the maximum permitted holding will reduce from 1575m³ by about 35m³ per year until 2012 when it is decreased rapidly to the buffer stock limit of 200m³ allowed in 2015. BNFL is expected to keep the actual volume below the upper stock reduction limits. This allows for the dilution that occurs from time to time, because of the additions of inactive water and acid for operational reasons. These do not contribute to the radioactivity in the tanks but add to the volume. We expect BNFL to control the real HAL quantities, i.e. Actual volume less the dilution, by standardising the volume for control purposes, once an agreed method is developed.

The major contributor to the hazard potential comes from Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) derived HAL. Thus, we have also specified controls on the amount originating from THORP. As BNFL blends this material with Magnox HAL as soon as possible in order to optimise the HAL vitrification rate, the control relates to blended plus unblended HAL. The control level of such HAL will be reduced from 770 m³ currently to 500 m³ by 2007.

The limiting and controlling envelopes are replicated in fig 1 for illustration.



Associated with the Specification is a programme of commitments from BNFL aimed at developing further improvements in the stock reduction programme; in particular, ensuring the performance of the vitrification plants is improved and eliminating operational constraints so as to reduce even further the buffer stock and improve the rate of reduction.

BNFL committed significant resource to developing the modelling needed to evaluate options for stock reductions and resultant buffer volumes. At an early stage in the project the BNFL modelling of options identified 200m³ as a realistic level of HAL stocks in B215 needed to support plant operation and the vitrification of HAL as it arose. This was based on the existing engineering and processes. In parallel, a framework of potential developments and options for alternative plant and processes was developed with the object of determining the feasibility of even further reductions in the projected buffer stock.

To take account of such developments in technology and the changing circumstances of BNFL's own business plans, we intend to carry out a critical review of the strategy and overall programme every two years in order to identify further reasonably practicable reductions. Such reviews may lead to a further tightening of the legal requirements on BNFL. BNFL is also required to provide an annual review of progress against the specified limits and programme of committed improvements. We will report our findings of both the biennial review of the strategy and assessment of BNFL's annual reports on HAL stocks as part of our normal regulatory activities to the Sellafield Local Liaison Committee.

Safety Case

As described above, recommendations 1 - 17 of the NII's February report on high level waste were essentially aimed at enhancements to the scope and presentation of the safety case for the HALES plant. The updated safety case was presented for assessment in September 1999 in accordance with agreed procedures. We therefore undertook assessment of the submission as normal regulatory business in respect of periodic review, but we also considered it against the first 17 recommendations of our February 2000 report.

Our overall conclusion of the assessment and the responses to the 17 NII recommendations is that nothing has been identified which should prevent operation of the plant until the next periodic review, given the continuing programme of work identified as part of the periodic review process. Thus we have concluded that the plant remains safe and the associated risks remain acceptable.

In advance of the submission of the updated safety case in September 1999, a number of significant engineering and operational improvements to the plant were identified through the safety case review process. A programme for their implementation was set in motion in accordance with arrangements set up under the Nuclear Site Licence Conditions. The more significant areas of work have already largely been implemented. These include the cooling water pipe work replacement, extra cooling water isolation valves, improved tank temperature monitoring, and ventilation system upgrades. All of these represent significant and tangible improvements to the safety of the plant. Others are the subject of on-going project work.

FUTURE REPORTING INTENTIONS

We will continue to provide reports to the Sellafield & Drigg sites Local Liaison Committee (LLC). These reports are available on HSE's Internet web site. In addition our site inspector will continue to provide oral reports to the LLC at its regular meetings. We will also publish later in the Spring an addendum to the High Level Waste Report as stated in that report. This will give more detail on our assessment of the B215 COSR, the related recommendations from our February 2000 report, and will set out in more detail our review of BNFL's proposals for HAL stock reduction and the considerations that led to the issue of the Specification in January. With regard to the Control and Supervision Report recommendations we intend to provide a further update in a year's time.

HM NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS INSPECTORATE February 2001

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4. Going Forward Safely. BNFL's response to HSE's recommendations included in the Team Inspection report. Published by BNFL, April 2000.
5. Rebuilding Trust. BNFL's response to HSE's recommendations included in the report on data falsification in the MOX Demonstration Facility at Sellafield. Published by BNFL, April 2000.
6. Article "BNFL Safety Case Improvement" in Nuclear Safety Newsletter, HSE, February 1999.

Acknowledgements

HSE wishes to thank BNFL for providing the photographs used in this report.

PUBLIC ENQUIRIES:

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<http://www.hse.gov.uk/nsd/nsdhome.htm>