A series of detailed technical reports have been prepared as part of the initial assessment of the four nuclear power station designs, and these underpin the reports written for a more generalist audience
These technical reports include reports from the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) reports and detailed inspection and assessment reports from HSE specialist assessor reports.
The Technical Assessment Reports referenced below have not been written for lay members of the public. These are internal HSE reports that are being published on this web site in the interests of openness. The target audience for these reports is primarily for individuals with expertise in the specific field of nuclear engineering or science covered by the report. The main objective of Technical Assessment Reports is to provide an auditable record for why recommendations for regulatory action have been made.
A report which summarises the evaluation carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safety Division, at the request of HSE, of the four nuclear reactor designs subject to GDA. An international team of experts compared the safety cases submitted by the Requesting Parties against selected and applicable IAEA safety standards to determine their completeness and comprehensiveness.
A report of the evaluation carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safety Division, at the request of HSE, of the UK EPR nuclear reactor designs subject to GDA. An international team of experts compared the safety case submitted to HSE by Areva/EDF against selected and applicable IAEA safety standards to determine its completeness and comprehensiveness.
Report of joint regulators' team inspection of the quality management arrangements of EdF/Areva, particularly those arrangements relating to the development of the submission (the Safety, Security and Environmental report) made to the nuclear regulators under the Generic Design Assessment process.
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 assessment of the EPR Control and Instrumentation (C&I) systems. C&I systems on a modern nuclear reactor include such things as safety systems (e.g. reactor shutdown systems), plant control and monitoring systems (e.g. the reactor regulating system that controls reactor power) and communications systems.
The fault analysis assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the fault analysis and severe accident SAPS. It examines the ability of the innate safety of the plant and safety systems to cope with a range of initiating faults of varying severity and frequency to maintain core and fuel integrity and ensure no loss of activity. Should an infrequent situation occur where core damage and melting has not been averted further measures are examined to guarantee robustness and effectiveness to contain the activity within the containment systems for a range of fault conditions.
The civil engineering and external hazard assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the civil engineering and external hazards SAPS. External hazards are those hazards to plant and structures such as extreme weather, earthquakes and aircraft crash, which are typically outside of the control of the licensee.
The internal hazard assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the internal hazards SAPS. Internal hazards are those hazards to plant and structures such as fire, explosions, release of hazardous materials or gas, flooding etc, which originate within the site boundary, but external to the primary circuit.
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 Assessment of EDF AREVA's EPR approach to Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA)
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 Assessment of EDF AREVA's EPR approach to ALARP
The structural integrity assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the integrity of metal components and structures SAPs. The assessment considers the integrity of metal pressure boundary components and their supports. The scope of this assessment covers the reactor coolant loop pressure boundaries. Pressure boundary components include pressure vessels, piping, tubes, pump and valve bodies.
A report of the evaluation carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safety Division, at the request of HSE, of the ACR-1000 nuclear reactor designs subject to GDA. An international team of experts compared the safety case submitted to HSE by AECL against selected and applicable IAEA safety standards to determine its completeness and comprehensiveness.
Report of joint regulators' team inspection of the quality management arrangements of AECL, particularly those arrangements relating to the development of the submission (the Safety, Security and Environmental report) made to the nuclear regulators under the Generic Design Assessment process.
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 assessment of the ACR-1000 Control and Instrumentation (C&I) systems. C&I systems on a modern nuclear reactor include such things as safety systems (e.g. reactor shutdown systems),plant control and monitoring systems (e.g. the reactor regulating system that controls reactor power) and communications systems.
The fault analysis assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the fault analysis and severe accident SAPS. It examines the ability of the innate safety of the plant and safety systems to cope with a range of initiating faults of varying severity and frequency to maintain core and fuel integrity and ensure no loss of activity. Should an infrequent situation occur where core damage and melting has not been averted further measures are examined to guarantee robustness and effectiveness to contain the activity within the containment systems for a range of fault conditions.
The civil engineering and external hazard assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the civil engineering and external hazards SAPS. External hazards are those hazards to plant and structures such as extreme weather, earthquakes and aircraft crash, which are typically outside of the control of the licensee.
The internal hazard assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the internal hazards SAPS. Internal hazards are those hazards to plant and structures such as fire, explosions, release of hazardous materials or gas, flooding etc, which originate within the site boundary, but external to the primary circuit.
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 Assessment of AECL's ACR1000 approach to Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA)
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 Assessment of AECL's ACR1000 approach to ALARP
The structural integrity assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the integrity of metal components and structures SAPs. The assessment considers the integrity of metal pressure boundary components and their supports. The scope of this assessment covers the reactor coolant loop pressure boundaries. Pressure boundary components include pressure vessels, piping, tubes, pump and valve bodies.
A report of the evaluation carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safety Division, at the request of HSE, of the ESBWR nuclear reactor designs subject to GDA. An international team of experts compared the safety case submitted to HSE by GE-Hitachi against selected and applicable IAEA safety standards to determine its completeness and comprehensiveness.
Report of joint regulators’ team inspection of the quality management arrangements of General Electric-Hitachi, particularly those arrangements relating to the development of the submission (the Safety, Security and Environmental report) made to the nuclear regulators under the Generic Design Assessment process.
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 assessment of the ESBWR Control and Instrumentation (C&I) systems. C&I systems on a modern nuclear reactor include such things as safety systems (e.g. reactor shutdown systems), plant control and monitoring systems (e.g. the reactor regulating system that controls reactor power) and communications systems.
The fault analysis assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the fault analysis and severe accident SAPS. It examines the ability of the innate safety of the plant and safety systems to cope with a range of initiating faults of varying severity and frequency to maintain core and fuel integrity and ensure no loss of activity. Should an infrequent situation occur where core damage and melting has not been averted further measures are examined to guarantee robustness and effectiveness to contain the activity within the containment systems for a range of fault conditions.
The civil engineering and external hazard assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the civil engineering and external hazards SAPS. External hazards are those hazards to plant and structures such as extreme weather, earthquakes and aircraft crash, which are typically outside of the control of the licensee.
The internal hazard assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the internal hazards SAPS. Internal hazards are those hazards to plant and structures such as fire, explosions, release of hazardous materials or gas, flooding etc, which originate within the site boundary, but external to the primary circuit.
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 Assessment of GEH's ESBWR approach to Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA)
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 Assessment of GEH's ESBWR approach to ALARP
The structural integrity assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the integrity of metal components and structures SAPs. The assessment considers the integrity of metal pressure boundary components and their supports. The scope of this assessment covers the reactor coolant loop pressure boundaries. Pressure boundary components include pressure vessels, piping, tubes, pump and valve bodies.
A report of the evaluation carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA) Nuclear Safety Division, at the request of HSE, of the AP1000 nuclear reactor designs subject to GDA. An international team of experts compared the safety case submitted to HSE by Westinghouse against selected and applicable IAEA safety standards to determine its completeness and comprehensiveness.
Report of joint regulators' team inspection of the quality management arrangements of Westinghouse, particularly those arrangements relating to the development of the submission (the Safety, Security and Environmental report) made to the nuclear regulators under the Generic Design Assessment process.
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 assessment of the AP1000 Control and Instrumentation (C&I) systems. C&I systems on a modern nuclear reactor include such things as safety systems (e.g. reactor shutdown systems), plant control and monitoring systems (e.g. the reactor regulating system that controls reactor power) and communications systems.
The fault analysis assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the fault analysis and severe accident SAPS. It examines the ability of the innate safety of the plant and safety systems to cope with a range of initiating faults of varying severity and frequency to maintain core and fuel integrity and ensure no loss of activity. Should an infrequent situation occur where core damage and melting has not been averted further measures are examined to guarantee robustness and effectiveness to contain the activity within the containment systems for a range of fault conditions.
The civil engineering and external hazard assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the civil engineering and external hazards SAPS. External hazards are those hazards to plant and structures such as extreme weather, earthquakes and aircraft crash, which are typically outside of the control of the licensee.
The internal hazard assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the internal hazards SAPS. Internal hazards are those hazards to plant and structures such as fire, explosions, release of hazardous materials or gas, flooding etc, which originate within the site boundary, but external to the primary circuit.
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 Assessment of WEC's AP1000 approach to Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA)
This report covers HSE's GDA Step 2 Assessment of WEC's AP1000 approach to ALARP
Reports of joint regulators' team inspections of the quality management arrangements of each Requesting Party.
The structural integrity assessment report considers whether the RP has claimed to have met the integrity of metal components and structures SAPs. The assessment considers the integrity of metal pressure boundary components and their supports. The scope of this assessment covers the reactor coolant loop pressure boundaries. Pressure boundary components include pressure vessels, piping, tubes, pump and valve bodies.
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