| Question raised by NGO | Answer to question raised |
|---|---|
| 1. Under section 17, is there provision for a Judicial Inquiry on the Justification process? |
Section 17 of Justification regulations gives the Justifying Authority the power to hold an enquiry or other hearing if he thinks it expedient to the process. We will consider whether such an enquiry or other hearing would be necessary as the process continues. |
| 2. What involvement has the nuclear industry had in the justification process? |
The industry has made an application for justification of radioactive practices involved in new nuclear build. We are considering this and will hold a public consultation on the application. |
| 3. How far are ethical needs taken into account in justification? |
Justification assesses whether the social, economic and other benefits of a practice outweigh any associated health detriment. Ethical issues were also taken into account during the public consultation on nuclear power in 2007. |
| 4. Is BERR competent to take justification issues forward on behalf of the devolved administrations? | Nuclear energy is a reserved matter. The responsibility for reaching a Justification decision rests with the Secretary of State for BERR (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform) who is the sole Justifying Authority in the UK. The Devolved Administration (Welsh Assembly, Scottish Executive and Northern Irish Assembly) have already confirmed that they do not wish to participate as Justifying Authorities. We are keeping them informed about the process. |
| 5. Are assumptions in justification case, about what wastes the new power stations are going to produce, valid? | The justification case identifies generically the wastes that we would expect new power stations to produce together with the detriments associated with those wastes. The justification process is concerned with weighing benefits and detriments of a practice and we would advise Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) if we consider that the detriments are not properly identified. |
| 6. W What systems are in place to check the regulators? Should Parliament have a role in this? |
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (which includes the Nuclear Directorate (ND) and the Environment Agency:
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| 7. GDA v. site assessment process - what is different and how can people have their voices heard? | Generic Design Assessment (GDA) is a new process and we have invited the public to send us comments as part of that. The nuclear site licensing phase will follow existing licensing procedures. At present, the opportunity for public comment on this is via the planning permission route. The Environment Agency will carry out a public consultation during both GDA and any site-specific authorisation phase. |
| 8. How far will GDA take spent fuel issue into account? | In accordance with government statements in the Nuclear White Paper our approach for GDA is that spent fuel will be stored until it can be disposed of into a geological disposal facility. We therefore expect requesting parties to satisfy the regulatorsthat they have made adequate provisions to ensure that fuel can be safely managed during this period and that, in due course, it can be disposed of be provisions to ensure adequate oversight of the fuel during storage and manage any damaged (e.g. leaking) fuel assemblies. |
| 9. Who is responsible for emergency response systems? | The responsibility for onsite engineered systems and procedural controls for emergency response rests with the licensee. Should an emergency occur then the roles and responsibilities of all organisations involved is covered in BERR document: Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group: Consolidated Guidance Chapter 4 of the above document provides a detailed description of the roles and responsibilities of all organisations involved should a nuclear emergency be declared. |
| 10. If chance of aircraft hitting reactor is 1 in 1, how does this fit in with the normal risk standards applied to a nuclear accident? | Consideration of the risk of accidental impact of aircraft onto nuclear facilities is undertaken using established procedures and processes. These take account of recent statistics on air crash rates, proximity to airfield operations, airways and military tactical training areas. For such considerations, the normal risk standards can be applied readily. For non accidental aircraft impact, the use of statistical data is much less suitable, given the inherent uncertainties present. Each of the requesting parties has given clear assurances that their designs can accommodate the direct and indirect threats posed by impact from modern commercial airliners. As part of the assessment under GDA, NII will examine these claims and reach a view on their validity, and ensure that the residual risks posed are as low as reasonably practicable. |
| 11. Who in Government is providing a challenge function on terrorism? | The Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) is the regulator of the civil nuclear industry. It works closely across government not just within JTAC but with others who are looking at security for other areas. The interaction within OCNS's peer groups and more widely with other countries ensures that best practices are adopted in the UK. |
| 12. How can these issues be discussed in public (trust issue)? | The Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) is the regulator for the civil nuclear industry and is responsible to Government for the standards of security applied at civil nuclear sites. The activities of OCNS are reported in its annual report to the Secretary of State for BERRthin this the Director of OCNS makes a statement about the adequacy of the arrangements in place. The report is publicly available. A document entitled 'Finding a Balance' is also available which describes the reasons why much of the information relating to security issues at these sites is not publicly available. OCNS's involvement in the GDA process is described in 'Guidance Document For Generic Design Assessment Activities'. Whilst OCNS is happy to expand on the content of these publications, as explained in Finding a Balance, it is not appropriate to discuss any details of these proposed arrangements for any potential new build. |
| 13. Protection of spent fuel stores - who considers this - NII or OCNS? | This is considered by both NII and OCNS jointly. OCNS regulate the security of civil nuclear sites. Any stores of this nature that may be built would be subject to such regulation. OCNS specify the potential threats (e.g. from terrorists) and look at the security plans that will be used to provide protection. NII look at safety aspects, including potential hazards such as terrorist attack, and will look to ensure that the facility is robustly engineered against such hazards. |
| 14. What does ‘unmanageable legacy' mean (quote from Dave Bennett, EA on waste)? | This is shorthand for stating that, as regulators, we don't want to see wastes created that cannot be managed through to their final disposal. |
| 15. What criteria are being used to judge disposability? | We:
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| 16. What impact (on GDA) would late submission of information to the regulators have, and what would happen if one RP falls behind the others? | Late supply of information could delay the GDA process. We already have received a significant amount of information and the Requesting parties have given us programmes to supply more. If one RP was to fall behind the others then its GDA programme would have to be adjusted, the other RPs would not be delayed because of this. |
| 17. Waste at new sites - if kept next door - how would it be transported? How safe would that transport be? | All transports of waste that leave a nuclear licensed site by road or rail must be undertaken in compliance with transport regulations. The requirements for the safe transport of radioactive material by road and rail stem from international agreements and European Directives. These requirements have been implemented in UK legislation setting out what types of transport package are allowed, how much radioactivity they are allowed to contain, and how they should perform against specified tests. Approval from the transport regulator is required for certain package designs and shipments (Type B, Special Arrangement shipments and all packages that contain fissile material). The transport regulator responsible for granting approvals is the Department for Transport (DfT), and enforcement powers are allocated between DfT and HSE. |
| 18. How do regulators work with industry to get information into the public domain? | The GDA process is being carried out under agreements made between the Health and Safety Executive, Environment Agency and the Requesting Parties (RPs). As part of the agreements, the RPs undertook to prepare a public version of their submissions (i.e. the information required for the GDA process) and to publish that information on their web site. They also undertook to update the public version of their submissions when a significant update is made to the information submitted to the regulators. Although not specifically part of the legal agreement, the RPs also agreed to respond to any comment made by a member of the public on the design information they supply. They also agreed to publicise these arrangements by means of paid public announcements in a series of national papers.The independent Process Review Board carried out a review of HSE's processes, practises and procedures at the end of Step 2 of GDA (initial assessment). The Board recommended that the way in which information was made available to the public by the RPs on their web sites could be improved. The regulators carried out a review of this public involvement process, following the completion of their initial assessment (Step 2) in March 2008. As a result of the review (and in the light of the Board's recommendations) the RPs were asked to redesign their GDA web pages, and in particular to provide a comprehensive summary and a ‘road map' to their design information. They have agreed to rewrite this web material in time for the public involvement process to be re-launched next year. |
| 19. Could a standardised table of data be made available? | Answer included in response to question 32. |
| 20. The absence of an agreed long-term disposal plan for waste led the NGOs to question the wisdom of proceeding with other elements of the new build programme including GDA | This is a national policy matter that is addressed by Government in the Nuclear White Paper. Government has asked regulators to participate in the GDA process.During GDA we will examine:
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| 21. Spent Fuel - Regulators confirmed that storage of spent fuel would be included in GDA consideration. The NGOs felt that the long term nature of spent fuel/waste storage should be made clear to the public. | This expectation of interim stores is set out in the Nuclear White Paper. In our interactions with stakeholders we note that this is the case. Developers of any new nuclear power stations will have to set out their proposals as part of planning and regulatory permitting - we expect that there will significant publicity and interest in these proposals.. |
| 22. Justification Process - The role of the regulators in BERR's justification process was not fully understood by NGOs | We are statutory consultees under the justification regulations. If there are claims in the Justification Application which relate to assessments carried out by overseas regulators, BERR might ask if the UK regulators are aware of such assessments through their international contacts, or have any relevant information relating to the claims that are made. The UK regulators would not expect to be asked on other matters such as the general quality of the Justification Application or the overall merits of any of the designs that may be referred to in the application. |
| 23. Relationship with BERR - NGOs requested that the way the regulators interface with BERR should be made more transparent, and that the dialogue with BERR should be made public. NGOs had the impression that the regulators were not demonstrating sufficient independence from BERR; they suggested that if regulators were truly independent they would be more challenging e.g. asking questions about the appropriateness of BERR being the overseer of the Justification process. At present, BERR appears to be both judge and jury. | As public authorities with a key interest in nuclear matters, HSE and the Environment Agency are frequently called upon by BERR (and other Government departments and agencies) to advise or comment on matters relating to developing government policy and to provide information and advice relating to our regulatory functions. It is generally accepted that information relating to development of government policy should not be made public. Prior to the Justification regulations coming into force, the Environment Agency undertook Justification considerations as part of its RSA work. Whilst BERR are now the lead Department for the justification of practices involving nuclear power, the process is consultative and the decision will be given effect through a Statutory Instrument which will have to be approved by Parliament. |
| 24. Independence of Regulators - NGOs considered that, by virtue of their background and culture, the regulators were ‘too close to industry'. To restore public confidence, some independent expert scrutiny or peer review of regulators assessments would be required e.g. adopt system currently used in Sweden | NII have had an independent peer review recently. This was done by the IAEA in 2006. A second review by IAEA is planned for late 2009. In addition, for GDA, we have set-up an independent process review board, staffed by senior individuals who have no nuclear industry connection. Both the IAEA and process Review Board reports have been published. |
| 25. Oversight of Regulators - NGOs considered that there was a need for funding to be provided to allow the commissioning of independent expert review of the regulator's assessment | The regulators have no objection in principle to their processes and regulatory decisions being seen by others - including independent experts. The creation of the public involvement process and the increased transparency of GDA processes and decision making were designed to assist this. On the specific question as to whether public money should be provided, we consider that it would be inappropriate for the regulators to comment, as the issue is for others to determine. We would emphasise that:
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| 26. Openness/Transparency - NGOs were concerned that security would be used to prevent legitimate release of information to the public during GDA - more should be done to explain the approach and what type of information cannot be released. NGOs thought regulators should go further on openness, e.g. publishing all correspondence | We accept that there will always be a potential conflict between security and openness. However, in interpreting the duties of Requesting Parties not to disclose sensitive nuclear information, (and in considering requests about commercially sensitive information) the regulators will strive to achieve a reasonable balance point, which enables information to be made available to the public unless it should be withheld. The regulators are currently in discussion with the RPs to ensure that such a balance is achieved with respect to the publication of design information during Step 3 of GDA. Guidance on the management of sensitive nuclear information during GDA The regulators are currently carrying out a review of the GDA openness policy, with a view towards publishing more information. |
| 27. Terrorism - NGOs had concerns about risks to plants from terrorism and the likely effectiveness of planned mitigation measures. Any failure to demonstrate that these had been properly considered during GDA would undermine public confidence in the process | The Site Security Plans that would be put in place at any new nuclear power station or spent fuel stores will be initially assessed by OCNS and if approved would be subject to regular OCNS review to take account of any changes to the threat assumptions. Site Security Plans and Threat Assumptions are protectively marked documents and not publicly available. The rationale for the non disclosure of such information is set out in the OCNS document ‘Finding a Balance' dated April 2005 Issue 2. |
| 28. What risk assumptions are being made about terrorist attack (e.g. chance of aircraft hitting nuclear reactor)? Where does that evidence come from? | The threat assessments used as the input to the development of the Site Security Plans are subject to regular review by various government agencies and co-ordinated by JTAC (the Joint Terrorist Assessment Centre).. JTAC has access to information generated by different governments around the world. |
| 29. CORWM - NGOs were concerned that Government were not taking forward all CORWM recommendations | We are pleased that government is taking forward its Managing Radioactive Waste Safely Programme. Whether or not any new nuclear power stations are built and operated, we must deal with Legacy Wastes. |
| 30. Costs of disposal: NGOs believed that the assumptions being made by the Government on costs of spent fuel disposal (and decommissioning) and the operators' ability to generate sufficient funds to cover this were unrealistic. They considered that there would be a hidden subsidy for the industry - with the Government underwriting their costs | Government has been very clear that industry will have to cover the full costs of decommissioning and their full share of waste management costs and that we will put in place a robust financing framework to ensure this happens. The framework set out in the Energy Bill has clauses that requires operators of new nuclear power stations to put in place and follow an approved plan for managing and financing waste and decommissioning activities. We are continuing to consult with stakeholders on the detail of the process. |
| 31. The public should be informed about any potential adverse health effects from new nuclear reactors | The Environment Agency's consultation documents (both GDA & site-specific) will:
(Considerations for Radioactive Substances Regulation under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 at Nuclear Sites in England and Wales, Environment Agency 2005) |
| 32. RPs design information should be rewritten in standard format | We consider that each of the RPs must take full ownership for their submissions. The approach taken by each RP towards the preparation of its submission covering safety, security and environment protection reflects the RP's own approach towards document structure, an approach which has evolved as a result of its past operating background, management structure and organisation, and the regulatory background against which it is already operating in. When the UK's GDA process was set up, guidance was given to the RPs about what information should be included in their design submissions. Provided their submission include that information, the formatting of their reports has been left to the company's discretion. The submissions are significant documents (several thousand pages long) and therefore the regulators considered that it would be unreasonable to require the RPs to rewrite the entire documents to prepare a UK version. However to assist the regulators and the public, the RPs have been asked to prepare UK specific web sites, design summaries and document ‘roadmaps' - see 18 above. |
| 33. A map showing how all new build processes fit together (Regulators and Government) would be helpful | The regulators accept that this would be a useful step, and work has started with the aim of publishing an overall timeline. |
| 34. Stakeholders could be represented on the Regulators' project boards |
The Project Boards set up by the regulators under GDA are part of the governance arrangements for ensuring that the project is carried out correctly. As such they are part of the GDA process itself and not independent of its management. We do not considerate appropriate for independent parties to be part of these management arrangements. The advice, such as that given by the Process Review Board, is independent of the management of the project and is very helpful to any regulators. We are currently considering how we might improve our interaction with stakeholder groups on nuclear issues. |
| 35. Why has HSE/NII agreed to the industry request to commence GDA? | In 2007, the regulators decided to commence the GDA process after receiving a request from the Government and from four design companies. It was for the regulators to ultimately determine whether this was an appropriate use of their resources - not for Government or industry. In deciding to commit to the GDA programme, we determined that this could be done without jeopardising other elements of our activities including regulation of existing sites. In deciding to commence GDA, the regulators were influenced by the following considerations:
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| 36. What would be the regulators ‘fall-back' position in the event of a deep repository not being available in 50 years time? | The Government have decided that new nuclear power stations should proceed on the basis that waste and spent fuel power should be disposed of in a geological disposal facility. We expect RPs GDA design submissions to include their proposed arrangements for the safe interim storage of waste and spent fuel until a disposal facility becomes available. If a disposal facility was not available at the end of the lifetime of the interim storage facility then, assuming that no other options were available by that time, replacement or refurbishment of the facility would be required so that safety and environment protection continue to be assured. |
| 37. How would the position of the Welsh and Scottish devolved administrations be respected in the GDA process? | Health, safety and security are reserved subjects, are not included in the devolution process. Therefore, nuclear safety and security legislation are enforced and administered by the Health and Safety Executive (through NII and OCNS) for England Scotland and Wales. Therefore, in the GDA process HSE is assessing the safety and security of the new nuclear power station designs for the UK as a whole.Environment matter are devolved and therefore the Environment Agency is carrying out its work on behalf of England and Wales, but not Scotland. Responsibility for enforcing and administering environment issues in Scotland falls to the Scottish Environment Agency (SEPA) who are not participating directly in the assessment process. HSE and the Environment Agency regard SEPA as an important stakeholder in GDA. |
