Petrol filling stations - Road tanker deliveries - Additional guidance to the Approved Code of Practice and Guidance [L133] Unloading petrol from road tankers

To: Health and Safety Enforcing Authorities - Unitary and Island Councils; County Councils in England and Fire and Rescue Authorities

For the attention of: Local Authority Health and Safety Enforcement Managers, Health and Safety Regulators, Environmental Services / Trading Standards / Fire and Rescue Authorities and provides advice to Petroleum Enforcement Inspectors

The additional advice given in this circular is intended to supplement the guidance published in the Approved Code of Practice and Guidance (L133) for the purpose of assisting the relevant duty-holders in complying with their statutory obligations under the Dangerous Substances & Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (DSEAR).

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1 Introduction

1.1 At the Petroleum Enforcement Liaison Group (PELG) meeting on 3 October 2007, a ‘start and finish’ working group was set-up to look into aspects of the guidance element of the Approved Code of Practise (ACoP) that have been overtaken by new technology and innovations, computerised wetstock monitoring/delivery notes and the design of road tankers.

1.2 In particular, the working group were asked to consider the relevance and adequacy of the current guidance in respect of: -

1. The certification procedure for ‘driver unassisted deliveries’ at sites that are either unmanned, closed or the staff take no part in the delivery procedure. [Paragraphs 29 to 33].
2. Clarification on the term ‘readily available’ as used in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the ACoP where the site is open and ‘driver unassisted deliveries’ take place; ie the accessibility/availability of a telephone and an emergency petrol pump isolation switch in the kiosk or on the (external) wall of the shop. (The Management of Health and Safety at Regulations 1999 and DSEAR) to notify the site operator where there is a change in the design or operation of a road tanker that will affect the (site’s) hazardous area classification (Paragraph 52).
3. The practicality of the tanker driver ensuring that the site operator has provided an effective means to prevent an overfill at sites where the means provided is an overfill prevention device. Paragraph 67e (Paragraph 58).

1.3 The following sections of this circular set out the conclusions of the working group by way of additional (ACoP) guidance together with the rationale supporting the new and amended guidance.

2 Certification Procedure

Commentary

2.1 The linchpin of the unloading procedure (recognised to be the most potentially hazardous operation on the forecourt) is, without doubt, the provision by the site operator [or his agent] of accurate information on the ullage of each tank into which petrol is to be delivered. For this procedure to be credible, the ullage figure given to the tanker driver should always be a quantity that the tank can safely receive. Any system that predicts the ullage of a tank against the journey time of the road tanker will need inbuilt safeguards to prevent the driver unloading into the tank if unforeseen circumstances have resulted in insufficient ullage when the tanker arrives on site; ie a dispenser being out of action or a temporary power failure in the area.

2.2 Whilst a predictive ullage presents no particular problem if the actual ullage is greater than the quantity to be delivered at the time the certificate is given to the driver, the same cannot be said where the ullage is less than the quantity to be delivered. The latter begs the question, “Why provide the driver with erroneous and irrelevant information”?

2.3 Paragraph 32 states that ‘there should be a means for the driver to verify the ullage’. The intention behind this clause, if read in conjunction with paragraph 30, must be a safeguard [against overfilling] should the site operator have made a mistake in his/her reading of the contents gauge or when writing the figure on the certificate.

2.4 Another, but far less likely example, would be the reduction in the ullage through water ingress should the tank have developed a leak. Paragraph 32 was drafted so as to carry forward the principles of the DCD procedure in Schedule 12 [now revoked] of CDG 1996 which did not envisage or make provision for the driver to amend that part of the certificate completed by the licensee; ie the driver’s responsibility was solely to check that the ullage reading was greater than the quantity to be delivered.

2.5 Paragraph 32 was written as a goal setting measure to allow greater flexibility for the site operators in meeting the objectives of ensuring there is adequate ullage for a proposed delivery. It did not, however, take into account a delivery system that anticipates ullage against throughput over a given period of time. In fact it was written on the understanding that the certificate would be hand written by a ‘competent person’ at the filling station.

2.6 Since the ACoP was published, unmanned sites have been introduced and responsibility for wetstock control and fuel ordering at many filling stations has been taken away from the manager to be carried out remotely. In recognition of the changes in site operation and the new technology available, the working group recommends that the guidance in paragraph 32 be expounded as follows:

2.7 Additional ACoP Guidance (New paragraphs 32a, 32b, 32c & 32d)

32a Where a ‘driver unassisted delivery’ takes place at a site which is unmanned, closed or the site staff have no responsibility for providing the driver with details of the ullage of the tanks, the site operator’s responsibility to provide the driver with accurate and recorded details of the ullage space available in each relevant tank, at or just before the delivery, can be achieved by a computerised system that will print out a form [as referred to in paragraph 33] or display the information on a computer screen in the cab of the tanker. The information can be stored electronically provided it is done so in a retrievable manner that is readily accessible to the site operator and inspectors of the petroleum licensing authority.

32b The details and quantity figures in columns 1 to 6 of the delivery form must be inserted by the recording system so that it is only necessary for the driver to check that the ullage figure [in column 2] is greater than the quantity to be delivered figure [printed in column 3]. As this system records the ullage when the tanker arrives on site, it will not be necessary to provide the driver with a means of physically checking the ullage.

As deliveries may take place during the hours of darkness and in inclement weather, it is important that the form is of a size where the print can be read in a lighting level of 100 lux.

32c The printer can be located in a building or an external cabinet on the site or in the cab of the road tanker.

32d It is acceptable for the information [as referred to in paragraph 33] to be provided to the driver when he/she leaves the terminal, provided that the ‘ullage figure’ is the actual ullage and is always greater than the ‘quantity to be delivered.

3 Clarification of the Term ‘Readily Available’:

Commentary

3.1 The term ‘readily available’ and ‘readily accessible’ are intended to allow for some leeway in the positioning of the telephone and the isolation switch for the petrol pumps. It is also envisaged that there should be no need to provide an additional telephone or isolation switch where the existing equipment is available to the driver.

3.2 As these two items of equipment are [during a road tanker delivery] provided/available for the use of the driver should an emergency arise, their locations should be in a safe place. In this respect, the tanker driver should be stood well clear of a fire involving the road tanker and the wetted area of any spillage when using the telephone or operating the isolation switch.

3.3 Additional ACoP Guidance (New paragraphs 44a, 44b & 44c)

44a It is difficult to apply any minimum or maximum distances for the positioning of the telephone and isolation switch as these can only be determined on a site specific basis after carrying out an assessment. However, the minimum distance will be governed by ‘what is a safe place’ and the maximum by the constraints of the site boundary; bearing in mind that the equipment must be ‘on the site’

44b For the typical design of filling station where there is a telephone in the shop/kiosk and an isolation switch mounted on the shop wall [at a reachable height], this should suffice.

44c In all cases it is the driver’s responsibility to familiarize himself with the location of this equipment and to ensure that the telephone is operational before making the delivery.

4 Hazardous Area Classification [Road Tanker Operator’s Obligations]:

Commentary

4.1 Regulation 11 of DSEAR [and Regulation 11 of the HSWA Management Regulations] impose a duty of co-ordination where more than one employer shares a workplace [whether on a temporary or permanent basis]. In the case of most typical filling stations, the licensee will be the main [and permanent] employer and the haulage contractor will be the temporary employer. The implications of these regulations are that the measures to determine and to control hazardous areas during the unloading process are a shared duty on the licensee and the road tanker operator [haulage contractor].

4.2 The sections of the ACoP detailing the responsibilities of the road tanker operator [paragraphs 19 to 21] and the responsibilities of the site operator [paragraphs 52 and 53], need additional guidance to emphasize the requirement for coordination between different employers who are contributing to the overall site risk from two separate but linked hazardous installations. One is the fixed installation, ie the tanks and vapour recovery/ventilation system and the other is the mobile installation, ie the road tanker.

4.3 It must also be recognised that the static and portable systems are interconnected for the unloading process which is now [more often that not] under the control of the haulier's employee.

4.4 Whilst the fixed installation will remain unchanged year after year, the same cannot be said of the road tanker where technical innovations result in changes to the design and operation. This raises the question “how many hauliers approach the site operators to review the hazardous area classification when their fleet of tankers are of a new design or have undergone improvements to the vapour recovery system”? There is recent and reliable evidence that road tanker operators are not complying with this duty.

4.5 Additional ACoP Guidance (New paragraphs following-on from paragraph 21)

21a Road tanker operators must co-operate with the site operator in his duties to carry out a hazardous area classification for the road tanker unloading process.

21b Road tanker operators must provide the site operator with adequate information of any changes to the design and operation of any road tanker delivering to the site which would effect the hazardous area classification.

21c The site operator should review the hazardous area classification if informed by the road tanker operator of a change in the design or operation of the road tanker making deliveries to the site.

5 Driver Unassisted Deliveries - Driver Ensuring an OPD is Fitted:

Commentary

5.1 The wording of the ACoP material in 67(e) clearly states that before unloading the tanker driver should ensure the site operator has provided an effective means for preventing an overfill [58 ACoP material]. The fact that this responsibility is listed in a number of other checks and actions at the commencement of a delivery infers that some kind of physical check is expected of the driver. This may be a hangover from the DCD [Schedule 12] duty to check the high level alarm. However, where a site is fitted with OPDs2, this duty is clearly impracticable for the driver to comply with!

5.2 This would appear to be another instance of where the employers’ [site operator and road tanker operator] duties of co-ordination under regulation 11 of DSEAR [and regulation 11 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations1999] have not been addressed in the ACoP.

5.3 As paragraph 58 of the ACoP places a duty on the site operator to provide a ‘suitable and effective means of preventing an overfill’, there should be an equivalent duty on the road tanker operator to ensure that the site operator has provided some system or mechanism to prevent overfills when agreeing to deliver petrol to the site on a ‘driver unassisted delivery’ basis.

6.4 Additional ACoP material (new paragraph following-on from 21 etc and a new paragraph 61(c))

21d Where petrol is to be delivered to a site on a ‘driver unassisted’ basis, the road tanker operator must ensure that the site operator has provided all the storage tanks with a suitable and effective means of preventing an overfill.

61(c) The site operator should ensure that the means for preventing an overfill for the tank or tanks is in full working order.

6 Working Group Members:

6.1 The WG comprised the following representatives of the Health and Safety Executive, Petroleum Licensing Authorities and the relevant trade associations.

• John Hazeldean (PELG (HSE))
• Phil Monger (PELG (PRA))
• Ray Blake (PELG (London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority))
• Robert Harris (Amber Engineering Consultancy Ltd (Chairman of the Energy Institute’s Road Tanker Panel))
• Richard Deeley (BP Oil UK Ltd (UKPIA))
• Mike Harding (UKPIA)
• Ahmed Mulla (Wm Morrison Supermarkets Plc (AUKOI))
• Roger Marris (PELG (West Yorkshire Fire & Rescue Service))

30 May 2008