This guidance sets out HSE’s role in civil contingency work and in the central government emergency planning process.
The Government’s aim is to reduce the risk from emergencies so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence. Emergency responders support this by taking decisions and actions in line with objectives that, at the highest level, will be to:
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 establishes a framework for emergency planning and response from local to national level, including the provision of temporary emergency regulations and HSE has a role to play in this process.
For more information on CCA see Appendix 1.
Staff who are involved in responding to a civil contingency event or who contribute to civil contingency planning should be aware of HSE’s role as a category 2 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and of the cross government emergency planning arrangements.
HSE’s main role is set out in the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) i.e. to act as the regulator to ensure that health and safety risks from work activities are correctly assessed and managed. HSE has a duty to provide advice on how the Act may be complied with.
In addition to this HSE has a duty as a Category 2 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005, with a duty to provide relevant technical or specialist advice, including information on the nature of any potential hazards of the site/organisation. For more information see Appendix 1.
HSE’s Hazardous Installations Directorate, in particular, regulates the Control of Major Accident Regulations 2015 (COMAH) and the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 (PSR) which cover a particular set of risks excluded from consideration under civil protection legislation and have their own legislative requirements relating to emergency arrangements including preparation of external plans
HSE will be required to respond to certain types of major incidents or emergencies. These can be related to an industrial incident, such as the explosions and fire at the Buncefield Oil depot in 2005, or to Civil Contingency Events which are incidents where the scale or complexity of the emergency is such that some degree of central government support or coordination is necessary, for example the UK response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.
It is important that when required to do so, HSE responds appropriately and proportionately to emergencies. HSE has arrangements in place, in accordance with its regulatory responsibilities under HSWA and its duties as a Category 2 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act, to prepare for and respond effectively to emergencies
HSE's response or Concept of Operations (ConOps) in the case of an industrial related incident (or if COBR is called and HSE is required to attend), can be found in the HSE Response to a major incident or civil contingency event.
HSE works with government departments and others to play their part in central government work to plan for emergencies and to coordinate response to major disruptive challenges. For more information see Appendix 3.
This section provides information to operational staff on how to respond on behalf of HSE to requests from Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) for:
FOD Divisional Directors (DDs) represent the whole of HSE within their geographical region and are the Lead HSE representative (unless delegated to other staff along with the authority to commit HSE resource). They manage the delivery of HSE assistance in resilience planning work and may attend strategic- or multi- LRF meetings as required.
For practical purposes where agreed in the Division, HID staff may act as lead representatives and attend LRFs or its subgroups:
The Lead HSE Representative, in liaison with HID Heads of Unit where relevant, appoints HSE staff for the coordination of input from HSE to LRF sub groups or working groups and provides the focal point for resolving issues raised. Resilience meetings may reflect a multi area/ capability approach and attendance may span HSE divisions.
Although HID provide the routine contact with LRFs, FOD may need to be involved if there are FOD relevant matters. For instance, if HSE are invited to attend incident debriefs involving FOD sites (e.g. following a fire) cross directorate liaison will be needed.
Where issues raised by HSE at LRFs have not been resolved, the Lead HSE representative should consider seeking advice from EPU/ Civil Contingencies Coordinator.
HSE's involvement at LRF meetings is not mandatory, however if specifically invited on an area of interest to HSE and there is a need for HSE input, we should make all reasonable efforts to attend.
For more information on working with LRFs see Appendix 4 and the HID delivery guide 8a.
EPU works with others across HSE to ensure that arrangements are in place to support the delivery of HSE’s response to Major incidents and civil contingency events. This includes:
Cabinet Office has created a lexicon (or glossary) to establish common, agreed definitions for terms used in the non-statutory guidance Emergency Response and Recovery.
Emergency Planning Unit, Redgrave Court, Bootle
The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 sets the framework for emergency planning and response from local to national level, including the provision of temporary emergency regulations.
The CCA defines an emergency as:
The CCA combines previous civil contingencies legislation under a single legislative framework, however, some civil contingencies legislation remains outside the Act because to bring it within the Act would duplicate existing requirements. This legislation includes elements of:
For further information see “The fit with other legislation”
CCA imposes duties on a number of bodies as Category 1 and Category 2 Responders.
Category 1 Responder duties: role includes the duty to assess the risk of an emergency occurring and to maintain plans for the purposes of responding to an emergency.
The main Category 1 responders (general) are:
Category 2 Responder duties: role includes the duty to cooperate with and provide information to category 1 responders in relation to their civil protection duties. They are less likely to be involved in planning work outside their sector of interest.
Category 2 responders should not generally be asked or expected to provide information which they do not hold, i.e. they should not be expected to undertake special research or investigations. Additionally, HSE would not have to provide information already held by a Category 1 responder (e.g. information on cooling towers for legionella purposes)
The main Category 2 responders (general) are:
Under s 9 of the CCA, Ministers of the Crown (and Scottish Ministers) may require Category 1 or Category 2 responders to:
As a Category 2 responder under CCA, HSE is required to cooperate with Category 1 responders, in connection with the performance by them with any of their following duties
HSE is required to provide information (either on request or in other specified circumstances) to Category 1 responders, in connection with the performance by Category 1 responders of any of their duties listed above. When the information is covered by a security or commercially sensitive marking, CCA states that responders should not share risk assessments in the LRF in full if the responder has reason to believe that to do so would compromise the information.
For HSE this co-operation will mainly take place through a Local Resilience Forum (LRF), (or Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) in Scotland) or a sub-group of the LRF or SCG.
The guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act is:
The police will normally take the lead in coordinating the local response where a crime has been committed, or if there is a threat to public safety. The local multi agency response is coordinated through a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) located in the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC). The chair of the group is known as the Strategic Coordinating Group Chair or the Gold Commander. The Strategic/Tactical/Operational Command structure (sometimes known as Gold/Silver/Bronze) is a key feature of emergency response in the UK. The multi-agency co-ordination at the Tactical (Silver) level is undertaken by the Tactical Coordinating Group. The Strategic Coordinating Group, the multi-agency strategic coordinating body, may still be referred to colloquially as the Gold Group, or Gold.
The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)’s Resilience and Emergencies Division is responsible for managing a national network of resilience advisors to support local and multi-area planning and response.
The Resilience and Emergencies Division has four English hubs, located in Leeds, Birmingham, Bristol and London. The Division provides:
Most emergencies are dealt with by local responders at a local level. However, in exceptional circumstances, for example in the event of the use of Emergency Powers, there may be a requirement for a body to oversee activity in a geographic area in support of the nominated co-ordinator. This group will build on the existing structures of Strategic and Recovery Co-ordinating Groups and Multi-LRF SCG/RCG groups - the name and composition of any such body will be agreed at the time.
The Lead HSE Representative should attend the regional group on behalf of HSE if required.
In some instances, the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of central government support or co-ordination becomes necessary. Central government will not duplicate the role of local responders who remain the basic building block of the response to an emergency. A designated Lead Government Department (LGD) or, where appropriate, a devolved administration, will be made responsible for the overall management of the central government response. For serious industrial accidents, the Civil Contingencies secretariat (CCS) is responsible for confirming the LGD in good time to support the response to the incident. For more information see Appendix 3.
In Scotland the management for devolved functions would fall to the Scottish Government which will initiate the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR), provide advice on lead allocation and where appropriate make a recommendation to Scottish Government Ministers and the Permanent Secretary.
In Wales the Human Resources (Facilities and Emergencies Division) of the Welsh Government will determine lead if the main focus of attention is a devolved matter.
HSE works with a number of lead government departments in planning for emergencies.
The National Security Council (NSC) is the main forum for collective discussion of the government’s objectives for national security and about how best to deliver them.
The forum for discussion and approval is the National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) Committee or NSC (THRC). HSE is represented on NSC (THRC) (R) (O) for officials.
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat sits within the Cabinet Office at the heart of central government. It works in partnership with Lead Government Departments (LGD), and key stakeholders to enhance the UK's ability to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies. These organisations are engaged in the policy making process, and represent a range of interests at all levels, who take lead responsibility for planning in relation to their own functions and responsibilities, with the Cabinet Office providing co-ordination.
The Government maintains dedicated crisis management facilities (COBR) and supporting arrangements to manage the government response.
The Prime Minister or Minister for the lead government department will normally chair meetings involving ministers and officials from relevant departments, as appropriate. Key external stakeholders (e.g. the Association of Chief Police Officers - ACPO) may be invited to attend depending on the nature of the emergency. Meetings will cover all the strategic aspects of the response and recovery effort. Officials in COBR will identify options and propose advice on the issues on which Ministers will need to focus.
The CCS in consultation with the LGD will decide whether departments need to be represented at COBR.
Within COBR, the NSC oversees the government’s response, supported, as necessary, by a number of separate cells and teams. The “situation cell” is responsible for ensuring that there is a single, immediate, authoritative overview of the current situation.
HSE has attended COBR at the request of the LGD in respect of several emergencies, including the Foot and Mouth outbreak of 2007, the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 and the severe weather incidents of 2009 and 2010.
When emergencies occur in Scotland or Wales the devolved administrations take on some of the Lead Government Department responsibilities which are carried out by UK government departments in England, and some of the regional co-ordination responsibilities which fall to the DCLG Resilience and Emergency Division (RED) Teams in England.
The balance of activity and interaction between the devolved authorities and the UK government in relation to emergencies will depend on the nature of the incident and the devolution settlement, i.e. is the relevant legislation devolved or not. However, the principles of emergency response are the same throughout the United Kingdom.
The government has a coordinated cross government exercise programme covering a comprehensive range of domestic disruptive challenges, including accidents, natural disasters and acts of terrorism.
The programme is designed to rigorously test the concept of operations from the coordinated central response through the range of Lead Government Department responsibilities and the involvement of the Devolved Administrations, to the regional tier and local responders.
HSE may take part in these exercises when they offer the opportunity for learning in major incident management across HSE, testing and reviewing HSE's own plans and procedures; and informing and refining wider policy development.
The Home Office is responsible for keeping the UK safe from the threat posed by terrorism.
The UK counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST focuses on the most significant security threat to the people of the UK today – the threat from international and home grown terrorism. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism and CONTEST programmes are organised into four work streams:
Within CONTEST, HSE contributes to PREPARE and PROTECT, working alongside Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and others.
The government monitors the most significant emergencies that the United Kingdom and its citizens could face over the next five years through the National Risk Assessment (NRA).
The NRA is a biannual process carried out by the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS). It looks at national risks and the basis of their plausibility or likelihood as well as their impact. These risks are either malicious threats to the security of the UK (e.g. terrorist attacks) or risks such as those which HSE own i.e. non-malicious hazards that will cause disruption on a national level. There are over 50 hazard categories for which Government Departments are responsible.
The results of the NRA are supplied to LRFs via the CCS produced National Risk Register (NRR) to inform the locally produced Community Risk Register (CRR). The NRA is classified secret. However, the National Risk Register (NRR) allows the risks identified to be shared widely without compromising security.
HSE owns risks within the NRA and ensures that these are adequately assessed, developed and submitted, in accordance with Cabinet Office procedures and planning assumptions.
HSE is the lead for assessing the likelihood for the hazard categories below:
The LRF’s specific objectives are to:
LRF areas are defined by the boundaries of Police areas across England and Wales. There is a single Local resilience partnership for London which is supported by the London Resilience Team.
Resilience is a devolved matter:
Sites subject to Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH), Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR), and the Pipelines Safety Regulations (PSR) are exempt from the CCA 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 (Regulation 12) requirement on Category 1 responders to undertake risk assessments or emergency plans (to avoid unnecessary duplication and confusion), but it should be appreciated that:
HSE should provide the information for COMAH hazards, since the risk assessments for these high hazard COMAH areas will cover the more moderate sub-COMAH situations. Some LRFs may not understand the exemptions under the CCA and that the COMAH information provided is to assist them to plan for the sub COMAH situations. They may seek to involve themselves in COMAH internal (on-site) safety plans or verifying the presence of preventative or control measures relating to COMAH/REPPIR or PSR. Where such confusion arises HSE should explain the situation to the chair of the LRF.
Care should be taken not to deal with issues best answered by other responders. For example questions relating to external (off- site) emergency plans under COMAH should be referred to the Local Authority emergency planners as the appropriate owners of such information.
Civil Contingency plans are for large scale incidents that will be at the upper limit of those that may be covered by a COMAH external (off site) emergency plan. It is also unlikely that an emergency plan drawn up under Civil Contingency requirements would fully meet COMAH requirements. However, there may be no problems with LRFs producing civil contingency plans with site specific appendices that fully meet the COMAH requirements.
Following the major incident at the Buncefield Oil Storage depot in 2005, a series of recommendations were made by the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) with the aim that that the arrangements for emergency preparedness and response to meet the COMAH requirements are fully integrated with those established under the CCA and are not produced in isolation, nor duplicate work done in meeting the requirements under CCA and supporting Regulations
For more information see the “Fit with other legislation”
In response to this guidance and the MIIB recommendations, the COMAH Competent Authority working with industry, emergency planners and other external organisations, produced COMAH specific guidance to assist in the integration of COMAH and other emergency planning requirements.
Local risk assessments are prepared by the RAWG of the LRF and local HSE operational staff (usually HID) may attend the RAWG on request if resources are available.
Cabinet Office provides generic local risk assessment guidance to local responders (via Resilience Direct) and this should be amended by the RAWG to reflect the hazards in an area:
The end product of the LRF risk assessment sub-working group is the ‘Community Risk Register’, or CRR. This is published taking into account the security marking of various contributions. Further information can be found online in respective LRF Community Risk Registers.
HSE should not supply any contextual information within an assessment to avoid any possible charge of omission with regard to local establishments to which specific reference has not been made. Local Authorities are likely to have better and more up-to-date information regarding the location of the more vulnerable type of establishments and such questions should be referred to them. If some contextual information is deemed essential from HSE, then any specific reference should always be covered by a careful caveat e.g. this specific reference does not preclude the fact that there may be other local vulnerable sites that should be considered.