Issue No: 

001

Approved by: 

A N Hall

Issue date:

21/07/2008

Review date:

21/07/2011

1. Purpose and scope

1.1 The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has the responsibility for regulating the safety of nuclear installations in Great Britain. The Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) for Nuclear Facilities provide a framework to guide regulatory decision-making in the nuclear permissioning process. They are supported by Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs) which further aid the decision-making process.  

1.2 This TAG gives guidance to help inspectors assess the licensee’s "Nuclear Baseline (NB)". The NB is the means by which the licensee demonstrates that its organisational structure, staffing and competencies are, and remain, suitable and sufficient to manage nuclear safety throughout the full range of the licensee’s business. It also provides the foundation from which organisational changes can be assessed in accordance with the licensee’s arrangements made under Licence Condition 36, which is the subject of T/AST/048 and T/INS/036 (closed)

1.3  The term ‘nuclear safety’ as used in this document includes both nuclear and radiological safety.

2  Relationship to licence and other relevant legislation

2.1 Nuclear Site Licence Conditions: Licence Condition 36: Control of Organisational Change

"(1) The licensee shall make and implement adequate arrangements to control any change to its organisational structure or resources which may affect safety.

(2) The licensee shall submit to the Executive for approval such part or parts of the aforesaid arrangements as the Executive may specify.

(3) The licensee shall ensure that once approved no alteration or amendment is made to the approved arrangements unless the Executive has approved such alteration or amendment.

(4) The aforesaid arrangements shall provide for the classification of changes to the organisational structure or resources according to their safety significance. The arrangements shall include a requirement for the provision of adequate documentation to justify the safety of any proposed change and shall where appropriate provide for the submission of such documentation to the Executive.

(5) The licensee shall if so directed by the Executive halt the change to its organisational structure or staffing levels and the licensee shall not recommence such change without the consent of the Executive.”

2.2 Nuclear Site Licence Condition 12: Duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons

(1)The licensee shall make and implement adequate arrangements to ensure that only suitably qualified and experienced persons perform any duties which may affect the safety of operations on the site or any duties assigned by or under these conditions or any arrangements required under these conditions.

T/TAST 048 addresses Licence Condition 36 Arrangements.

The Nuclear Baseline and Safety Management Prospectus together provide the demonstration that the licensee has an adequate management structure, capability and staffing levels to discharge the obligations and liabilities connected with holding the Nuclear Site Licence (see (8)).

2.3 The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999

These regulations describe employer’s responsibilities, addressing the requirements for control and co-operation with outside undertakings, together with appropriate arrangements for effective planning, organisation, control and monitoring and review. In particular, Regulation 13 requires employers to take into account capabilities for safety in entrusting tasks to employees.

3  Relationship to SAPs, WENRA reference levels and IAEA safety standards

3.1.1 Relevant SAPs

Fundamental principles	Responsibility for safety	FP.1
The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organisation responsible for the facilities and activities that give rise to radiation

Fundamental principles	Leadership and management for safety	FP.2
Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in organisations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks.

Leadership and management for safety	Capable organisation	MS.2
The organisation should have the capability to secure and maintain the safety of its undertakings.

(para 52) An organisation needs adequate human resources, which means having the necessary competences and knowledge in such numbers so as to maintain the capability to manage safety reliably at all times, including during steady state conditions, periods of change and emergency situations.

(para 53) The organisation structure and baseline staffing levels of both new and existing licensees should reflect appropriate organisational design principles. Human resources baseline provisions should be established, controlled and regularly reviewed through robust, auditable processes. Changes to the organisation (e.g. structure, staffing, competences), need systematic evaluation to ensure that they do not adversely affect nuclear safety management capabilities. This should include succession planning (especially where there is limited or singleton expertise). Succession planning should take into account expected changes (e.g. retirements) along with contingencies for the unexpected (e.g. resignations).

(para 54) The organisational structure, roles and responsibilities should secure effective co-ordination and collaboration between all those involved, including contractors. Roles, responsibilities, accountabilities and performance standards for safety at all levels should be clear and avoid conflict with other business roles, responsibilities, accountabilities and objectives. All those with responsibilities for safety should have authority and access to staffing levels sufficient to discharge those responsibilities effectively. This should ensure that proportionate control and supervision of safety at all levels is achieved. The design of jobs, processes, and procedures should take account of those factors that affect reliable performance of the organisation.

(Para 56) An ‘intelligent customer’ capability should be maintained to ensure that the use of contractors in any part of the business does not adversely affect the ability to manage safety. A capable organisation requires the retention and use of knowledge to understand nuclear safety requirements and to control safety risks throughout all activities, including those undertaken by contractors.

3.1.2  WENRA

This TAG is consistent with the January 2007 publication of Reactor Safety Reference Levels; Issue B (4) deals with organisational issues and the following paragraphs are key WENRA points which the Nuclear Baseline addresses:

Para 1.1 addresses a justified organisation "The organisational structure for safe and reliable operation of the plant, and for ensuring an appropriate response in emergencies, shall be justified and documented."

Para 1.2 requires management of change: "The adequacy of the organisational structure, for its purposes according to 1.1, shall be assessed when organisational changes are made which might be significant for safety."

Para 3.1 states that resource assessment for the organisational structure is needed. "The required number of staff for safe operation, and their competence, shall be analysed in a systematic and documented way".

Para 3.5 addresses employee/contractor resource balance: "The licensee shall always have in house, sufficient competent staff to understand the licensing basis of the plant (e.g. Safety Analysis Report or Safety Case and other documents based thereon), as well as to understand the actual design and operation of the plant in all plant states".

Para 3.6 addresses the intelligent customer role: "The licensee shall maintain, in house, sufficient and competent staff and resources to specify, set standards manage and evaluate safety work carried out by contractors".

3.1.3 IAEA safety standards

IAEA Fundamental Safety Principle (5) Number 1 states:

Principle 1: Responsibility for safety

The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

This Principle cites the responsibility of the Licensee for safety throughout the lifecycle of a facility or activity. It affirms the Licensee’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining the right skills and competences.

In addition IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-2.4 "The Operating Organization for Nuclear Power Plants" includes some elements that are embodied in the Nuclear Baseline or Management Prospectus as a means of justifying and describing the organisation.

4  Advice to inspectors

4.1  Purpose of a Nuclear Baseline

The principal purpose of the Nuclear Baseline is to provide a demonstration that the licensee has suitable and sufficient organisational structures, staffing and competences in place to effectively and reliably carry out those activities which could impact on nuclear safety. 

The licensee needs to show that it is able to maintain nuclear safety, remain in control of activities that could impact on nuclear safety under all foreseeable circumstances throughout the life cycle of the facility, and remain legally compliant.  This should not be a significant additional burden to the licensee, inasmuch as any organisation needs to know what resources, competencies and processes it needs to have in place to operate its business.

A second, important purpose is to provide a clear description of the currently intended staffing levels as a reference point or ‘baseline’ against which the licensee can assess the potential impact upon nuclear safety of proposed organisational changes.

In preparing its NB, the licensee should therefore consider all activities which have the potential to impact upon nuclear safety, i.e. those activities which, if inadequately conceived or executed, could lead to an immediate or latent (direct but not immediate) detriment to nuclear safety. This includes, for example, the governance of nuclear safety, Intelligent Customer functions and drafting of safety related documents, as well as frontline work.

The licensee should show that it understands the nuclear safety roles that need to be delivered, and that these roles are carried out by suitable and sufficient competent resource.  In other words it is not enough just to show that all roles are ‘covered’, but that those individuals in post can realistically carry these role out to the required standard and capacity.

Licensees may derive their NBs in different ways, but there are some broad Principles which underpin NII’s expectations of a licensee’s NB.  These are summarised in the following pages and then interpreted in the sections that follow.

4.1.1  Nuclear Baseline principles

The following principles are expanded upon in the remainder of this TAG.

1  The NB should consider the delivery and oversight of all activities which, if inadequately conceived or executed, could lead to an immediate or latent detriment to nuclear safety.

2  The NB should address the requirements of steady state conditions, periods of change and potential emergency situations at the current phase of the licensed facility’s life cycle.

3  The NB should demonstrate that the licensee’s organisation has sufficient staff and competencies to discharge its responsibilities for delivery and oversight of nuclear safety under the nuclear site licence.

4  The licensee must demonstrate that it remains in control of nuclear safety.  The governance of nuclear safety and Intelligent Customer functions are an intrinsic part of this demonstration.

5  Contract staff should appear as part of the NB resource when they are embedded within the licensee’s organisation or meet the criteria for holding Intelligent Customer roles on behalf of the licensee (and see (7))

6  The licensee should have arrangements in place to manage contract staff who do not meet the criteria for inclusion in the NB, and in these cases the NB should include those employees who discharge the associated Intelligent Customer functions. 

7  Licensees should develop a set of Nuclear Baseline Indicators that provide evidence that the Nuclear Baseline has the right organisation, staffing levels and competences and that it is being managed effectively.

8  The Licensee should have in place a process through which the NB is derived and managed.

9  The NB should be maintained as a living document and provide an accurate, current reference point against which nuclear safety implications of proposed modifications to staffing levels/structures, workloads, and changed competence requirements can be assessed, in accordance with the licensee’s arrangements made under LC36.

4.2  Nuclear Baseline methodology

4.2.1  Nuclear Baseline scope

The NB should consider the delivery and oversight of all activities which, if inadequately conceived or executed, could lead to an immediate or latent detriment to nuclear safety.

The NB should address the requirements of steady state conditions, periods of change and potential emergency situations at the current phase of the licensed facility’s life cycle.

The NB should be an evidence-based demonstration that the licensee has an organisational structure, staffing levels and competencies in place that enable it to maintain, and remain in control of, nuclear safety throughout the full range of activities for which it is licensed.  This includes all activities which, if inadequately conceived or executed, could lead to an immediate or latent (direct but not immediate) detriment to nuclear safety, including showing that all the safety related roles set out in the Management Prospectus are adequately populated. 

It follows, therefore, that the Nuclear Baseline should not be restricted to those roles set out in the site’s minimum staffing arrangements nor those which the licensee has identified as being necessary to maintain the facility in a quiescent shutdown state.  Rather, the Nuclear Baseline should reflect the roles needed to carry out the full range of activities for which the site is licensed, including normal operations, decommissioning projects, maintenance, examination and testing, emergency response etc.  The governance of nuclear safety and Intelligent Customer functions are an intrinsic part of this demonstration.

The licensee should therefore put in place processes through which it identifies the roles that should be included in the Nuclear Baseline.  These processes should be such that they provide for the identification of roles which are related to nuclear safety and licence condition compliance: for example, they should include roles which involve:

• Carrying out or supporting Operations as defined in the Nuclear Site Licence (LC1)
• The design and manufacture of nuclear safety related plant and equipment
• The management, control and supervision of processes and people which maintain licence compliance
• contributing to the preparation of the nuclear safety case and advising on modern safety standards, including Design Authority responsibilities
• responding to nuclear incidents and emergencies

Roles that should be included in the Nuclear Baseline are not hierarchically determined - i.e. they are not purely a reflection of their responsibilities for making managerial or supervisory decisions; the Nuclear Baseline should include all those roles which have the potential to impact upon nuclear safety.  It is not appropriate simply to take a managerial position, such as supervisors, as the cut off point beneath which others do not appear in the baseline.  People beneath this managerial level carry out work which has the potential to impact on nuclear safety - e.g. control room staff, craftsmen working on systems/components important to nuclear safety, maintainers of nuclear plant, safety case authors, independent peer assessors etc.  The Nuclear Baseline should include roles carried out off-site, such as at corporate headquarters, as well as those on the licensed site. 

Consequently, the Nuclear Baseline should identify the licensee’s organisation down to the level where further re-description does not add value.  Drilling down through the organisation until the point at which no further differences in nuclear safety roles are evident means the Nuclear Baseline will have the right depth.  For example, Maintenance staff may include those working in different areas including electrical, mechanical, C&I etc.  The Nuclear Baseline should identify the staffing levels and competencies needed in each of these areas, but need not further distinguish between groups of individuals who carry out the same roles.

Although the licensee may also extend the concept of the Nuclear Baseline to manage other parts of its business such as its environmental, conventional safety and commercial activities, these are out with the scope of the Nuclear Baseline for NII’s nuclear regulatory purposes.

The Inspector should consider:

• Has the licensee defined the criteria used to identify roles that should be included in the Nuclear Baseline?
• Do these criteria include all roles that involve the discharge of duties which, if inadequately conceived or executed, could lead to an immediate or latent detriment to nuclear safety, including the delivery and oversight of the full range of activities, projects or operations that have this potential, whether directly or indirectly?
• Is it clear to whom the responsibilities of the Nuclear Site Licence, and other key nuclear safety requirements including legal issues such as the IRRs, are allocated? This could include responsibility matrices, organisational charts, role profiles etc. and/or explicit links to the Management Prospectus.
• Does the Nuclear Baseline reflect the organisational structure detailed in the Management Prospectus?
• Does the Nuclear Baseline consider relevant off-site activities, including corporate functions, as well as on-site activities?
• Does the Nuclear Baseline break down the organisation into nuclear safety roles to a point at which further re-description does not add value?

4.2.2  Nuclear Baseline resource level

The Nuclear Baseline should demonstrate that the licensee’s organisation has sufficient staffing levels and competencies to discharge its responsibilities for delivery and oversight of nuclear safety.

The Nuclear Baseline should include either a description, with rationale, of the staffing levels that the licensee needs to carry out roles that have the potential to impact on nuclear safety, and how this compares to actual staff in post which may be higher, or a description of the levels of staff currently in post with an explanation as to how this is known be adequate.

For existing, well established organisations this may be simple evidence of adequate operational and safety performance at the stated staffing levels, but should not merely be a statement of the status quo presented without suitable evidence as to why this is considered adequate. Nor should the Baseline be just the level of resource to maintain the licensed site in a non-operational state, unless that is the licensee’s purpose.

The licensee should set out the number of individuals which it needs within its organisation to discharge the nuclear safety roles discussed above in Section 4.2.1.  It should be noted that one post-holder may carry out a number of roles, so there is unlikely to be a one-to-one relationship between roles and posts.   The licensee should then set out the number of individuals which it has in place to carry out these roles.  The licensee should be able to show that the roles are all covered and that the post holder(s) has sufficient resource available to meet the demands of these roles (see Section 4.2.4. – Justification).

If actual resource levels fall beneath those identified as necessary in the Nuclear Baseline – in other words, there are gaps between the numbers needed and the numbers in post, nuclear safety may be affected.  The licensee should be able to show that it understands where such gaps exist and that, in any case, it has contingency measures in place to address the potential consequences of any shortfall, and plans to fill the gaps.  These plans may involve recruitment or redeployment of staff, reducing or delaying work, or the use of contract resource.

Equally, there can be risks to nuclear safety if demands increase without an adequate increase in staffing. There should be arrangements in place to identify and deal with this potential too.

Where contract support is used, this must be overseen by a competent Intelligent Customer capability. (See section 4.2.6.  Contractors and the Nuclear Baseline). The alternative option of addressing resource gaps through reprioritisation of the work programme on the basis of nuclear safety should also be explicitly defined.

The Inspector should consider:

• Has the licensee defined, and given a clear rationale for, the number of individuals required for each Nuclear Baseline post/role? (e.g. does the rationale reflect the full breadth of the licensee’s activities? Does it take consideration of the licensee’s work programmes?)
• Does the licensee have processes in place to monitor the adequacy of its resource levels (and see 4.2.3. below)?
• Is the licensee able to demonstrate that it understands where and why its staffing levels fall short of the levels identified as being necessary to maintain nuclear safety, and can it justify carrying out its activities during with such a shortfall in place?
• Has the licensee put in place measures to address any shortfalls in resource levels?
• Does the Licensee’s Management of Change Arrangements include a consideration of the impact on changes in resource levels or levels of demand on staff as part of the assessment?
• Does the licensee have in place contingency plans to deal with resource shortfalls?

4.2.3  Competence and the Nuclear Baseline

The Nuclear Baseline should demonstrate that the licensee’s organisation has sufficient competencies to discharge its nuclear safety responsibilities.

Licence Condition 12 requires each person who carries out activities which may affect the safety of operations on a nuclear site to be a suitably qualified and experienced person (SQEP).  This extends to and includes Director/Board level.  For some roles it may also be necessary to designate persons who control and supervise operations which may affect safety as Duly Authorised Persons (DAPs).  The licensee should have a competence framework to control, develop and maintain competence, and T/AST/027[5] sets out NII’s expectations concerning the licensee’s arrangements for training and assuring personnel competence. 

In as much as the NB should demonstrate that the licensee understands its competence needs, and that its staff are competent to discharge roles that impact upon nuclear safety, it is expected that reference will be made to the licensee’s competence management system to support the NB.  The licensee should be able to extract information which provides it with corporate assurance that its staff are competent to fulfil the nuclear safety roles that they take on.

It should be noted that the responsibilities of the roles that a person undertakes determine whether the role is part of the Nuclear Baseline, not the attributes of the post/role holder him/herself. Therefore whilst the Baseline should have explicit links to the licensee’s competence assurance records, for example a ‘SQEP register’ or similar, it does not have to replicate them.

The licensee should ensure that there is an audit trail for competence requirements for NB roles and evidence that individuals in Nuclear Baseline roles meet the required standard.

The vulnerability assessment of the Nuclear Baseline should address competence aspects (see 4.2.6.2).

The Inspector should consider:

• Does the Nuclear Baseline (either directly or through reference to related documentation) provide evidence that the competence needs of Nuclear Baseline roles are identified?
• Does the Nuclear Baseline (either directly or through reference to related documentation) provide evidence that persons carrying out Nuclear Baseline roles meet the competence requirements to hold those roles?

• Does the licensee have a mechanism for addressing gaps in competence in existing the Nuclear Baseline organisation and future needs in succession planning?

4.2.4  Nuclear safety governance and Intelligent customer capability

The licensee must demonstrate that it remains in control of nuclear safety including the governance of nuclear safety where the Intelligent Customer and Nuclear Safety Governance functions are an intrinsic part of this demonstration.

Under UK legislation the holder of a nuclear site licence is responsible for nuclear safety on the Licensed Site.  Additionally, under Sections 2 and 3 of the HSWA, the employer is responsible for the health & safety of its employees and others who may be affected by its activities. This overarching requirement is built into the SAPs in FP1:

“The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organisation responsible for the facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.”

Nuclear safety governance relates to the competence, arrangements and practices that determine whether the organisation is in control of the nuclear safety of its business in a clear line down from the corporate body that holds the licence.  Both the Management Prospectus and the Nuclear Baseline have roles to play in demonstrating the organisation’s NSG capability.

The Management Prospectus should describe the process in place to ensure that the organisation has the capability to be in control of day to day operations and governance of the licensed site. The NB should refer to the statements made in the MP and demonstrate that relevant roles are properly identified, and resourced with competent persons. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and the Management of Health and Safety Regs also require adequate organisational arrangement for implementing policy and preventive and protective measures.

Where a licensee draws on contract staff to supplement its core capability it must ensure that the balance of employees and contract staff does not impede the licensee’s ability to discharge its governance responsibilities.

The Inspector should consider:

• Are those roles which have Nuclear Safety Governance responsibilities clearly identified in the NB?
• Are there mechanisms for determining those roles contributing to nuclear safety governance that may be held by contract staff?
• Does the succession planning and resource strategy take account of the nuclear safety governance functions?
• Does the NB and supporting documentation demonstrate that there are enough direct employees of the Licensee to retain the nuclear safety governance capability at the right level without degradation as described in the Management Prospectus?

The Licensee is responsible for demonstrating, through the Nuclear Baseline, that it has enough people with the right competences to discharge its legal duties. Where this involves the support of others outside its own organisation then the licensee must demonstrate that it is and remains an Intelligent Customer (IC) for these skills and services. IAEA Draft Safety Guide DS349 (2006:29) defines Intelligent Customer as:

‘The capability of the organisation to have a clear understanding and knowledge of the product or service being supplied’

Licensees should assess the roles in the NB which undertake an Intelligent Customer function in line with their policy for IC and staffing as described in the MP. TAST/049 (7)defines the characteristics and breadth of the IC concept and should be referred to in assessing whether the licensee has an effective IC organisation. 

The licensee should ensure that the breadth and depth of Nuclear Baseline assessment includes identification of IC roles providing oversight of contract staff.

The Licensee should ensure that the process for the management of change includes an assessment of implications for delivery of the IC capability.

The Inspector should consider:

• Does the Nuclear Baseline identify the IC capability across the breadth of the organisation’s business?
• Do the IC roles identified match the interfaces described in the MP?
• Are the IC roles included in the succession planning arrangements?
• Does the Nuclear Baseline and supporting documentation demonstrate that there are enough direct employees of the Licensee to retain the IC capability at the right level without degradation?

4.2.5  The Nuclear Baseline and contract staff

Licensees may choose to call upon the support of staff outside their own organisation for a number of reasons including:

• To supplement their own organisational capability in response to planned changes in workload
• To carry out specific projects
• Through partnership arrangements
• To supplement in-house capability for scarce skills.

Guidance on the use of contractors is presented in (9). In determining whether it is appropriate to utilise contractor resource, licensees should ensure the decision making process includes a review of the impact on the Nuclear Baseline.  This should include the effect on core capability to deliver licence condition compliance.  It should also address the potential for creating an organisation where the balance of roles held by employees and contract staff places an unacceptable risk on the licensee’s ability to discharge its Intelligent Customer responsibilities and maintain nuclear safety governance.

Nonetheless, where contractors are used, and inasmuch as contractors’ activities have the potential to impact on nuclear safety, they should be considered as part of the NB process.  However, NII recognises that including all such contractors within the NB would make the NB difficult to manage and maintain.  This would compromise its effectiveness, and result in nugatory work for the licensee.  NII therefore adopts a pragmatic approach to the treatment of contractors with regard to the NB.  This position is set out in the following two sections.

4.2.5.1  Contract staff within the scope of the Nuclear Baseline

Contract staff may appear as part of the Nuclear Baseline resource when they are embedded within the licensee’s organisation and carry out a role necessary for nuclear safety on behalf of the licensee, particularly when there would otherwise be inadequate provision for that role.

Contract staff should, for example, appear as part of the NB resource when the conditions of their employment are such that they meet the criteria set out in T/AST/049 (7) for working as an Intelligent Customer on the licensee’s behalf.  Such contractors will have continuing roles within the licensee’s organisational structure and, for practical purposes, can be regarded as part of the licensee’s staff cadre.  The licensee should therefore be able to demonstrate that these individuals are subject to the licensee’s processes for competence assurance, line management, discipline, succession planning etc – see (7).The NB should identify where NB roles are held by contractors in order for it to show that it understands where it is vulnerable to loss of contract resource, and to demonstrate that the balance of staff-contractors is suitable.

The Inspector should consider:

• Does the licensee include within its NB those contractors who are embedded within its organisation and who carry out necessary functions of the licensees’ behalf?
• Does the Nuclear Baseline identify which nuclear safety roles are held by such contractors?
• Is the number of baseline roles held by non licensee staff kept under review and managed so that the profile is acceptable?
• Has the licensee included succession planning and vulnerability analysis for Nuclear Baseline roles held by contract staff?

4.2.5.2  Contract staff outside the scope of the Nuclear Baseline

The licensee should have arrangements in place to manage contract staff who do not meet the criteria for inclusion in the NB, and in these cases the NB should include those employees who discharge the associated Intelligent Customer functions.

In many cases, the licensee will make use of contractors who do not meet the criteria for inclusion within the NB.  Indeed, this is likely to be the case for most contractors.  In such cases, it is expected that the contracts will be managed in accordance with robust project management arrangements through which the licensee ensures that the work of the contractors is properly specified, that arrangements to manage the contract are in place, that the contractor uses sufficient numbers of competent people to carry out the work, and that the contractors’ work is subject to appropriate levels and forms of scrutiny and supervision.  In other words, the project management arrangements, and their application, should provide a demonstration that work which could impact upon nuclear safety is properly organised and resourced by competent persons, as per the expectations of NB roles.

In such circumstances, the NB should include those roles which are in place to manage the contractors and to provide the licensee’s Intelligent Customer oversight functions.  The licensee should make reference to the activities that are carried out by contractors outwith the NB, and to the project management arrangements that ensure that the expectations of the NB are met.

The Inspector should consider:

• Has the licensee identified those activities performed by contractors outwith the criteria for inclusion in the NB which have the potential to impact upon nuclear safety?
• Are there project management arrangements in place for such contracts which demonstrate that the key principles of the NB are met – i.e., that work is adequately organised, resourced and controlled by competent people?
• Does the NB include those intelligent customer roles which provide the oversight of contractors carrying out work which has the potential to impact on nuclear safety?
• Can the licensee demonstrate that the range of intelligent customer roles is suitable and sufficient to cover the breadth of the contractors’ activities?
  

4.2.6 Justification of the Nuclear Baseline

4.2.6.1 Nuclear Baseline indicators

The Nuclear Baseline should demonstrate that the licensee’s organisation and its staffing levels and competencies enable it to discharge its nuclear safety responsibilities.

NII does not expect detailed task analysis to underpin the resource/competence allocation for all activities within the scope of the Nuclear Baseline because this would not be practicable (although task analysis may be expected to understand and support some actions claimed within the safety case).  Instead, NII places greater emphasis on the use of meaningful performance indicators to monitor the health of the licensee’s organisation, staffing levels and competence.

Performance indicators should provide reassurance that nuclear safety roles are being delivered effectively. The indicators should include leading measures of performance prior to potential failure. They should address aspects such as quality and timeliness of work activities that could impact on nuclear safety.  It is acceptable for the licensee to use some lagging measures as retrospective learning tools but these should be in addition to leading indicators.

In determining appropriate Nuclear Baseline Indicators, licensees should consider the likely outcomes of both positive and inadequate delivery of nuclear safety functions.  Whilst the exact nature of the indicators and the types of data available will vary from licensee to licensee the broad areas for performance measurement are likely to remain the same. For example measures of:

• Backlog of work, including maintenance activities,
• Excessive hours
• Quality of work output.

It is likely that this sort of information will already be gathered by the licensee in order that it can understand how well its business activities are being delivered.  In such circumstances, the NB may therefore provide a draw upon the way in which the information is collected and used to provide confidence that nuclear safety activities are adequately organised and resourced with competent people.

The licensee’s indicators should address the following aspects:

• Complement – to show that the organisation has enough resource, at the right time and that the Nuclear Baseline resource level is in line with programme need, for example demonstration that individuals are not overloaded
• Competence – to show that it has the right skills and competences to match the need
• Nuclear Safety Achievement – to show that the Nuclear Baseline achieves the goal of maintaining nuclear safety

The Inspector should consider:

• Is the adequacy of the NB demonstrably supported by evidence rather than an assumption that the current organisation is adequate?
• Has the licensee established a set of indicators that demonstrate the adequacy of its organisation, resource and competence to carry out those activities which have the potential to impact on nuclear safety?
• Are these indicators being used to inform judgements on the organisation’s capability?
• Is there an appropriate emphasis on leading measures of performance?
• Do the indicators provide a basis for confidence that the licensee’s organisation, staffing levels and competencies are suitable and sufficient to effectively deliver nuclear safety?

4.2.6.2  Vulnerability analysis

Licensees should undertake some form of analysis to assess the vulnerability of its resource and competence profile. This should identify where the licensee is vulnerable due to, for example, shortage of competent resource such as singleton roles, where staff hold multiple and potentially conflicting roles or where NB roles are held by contractors etc.  It would be expected that the licensee takes account of its demographics in this assessment, such that the implications of impending retirements are considered.

The licensee should be able to show that, where vulnerabilities are identified, it has succession plans and, where appropriate, contingency arrangements, in place

The Inspector should consider:

• Has the licensee undertaken some form of vulnerability analysis of the resource profile?
• Has this identified where the licensee is vulnerable to loss of role-holders with nuclear safety responsibilities, such as singletons?
• Where vulnerabilities have been identified are succession plans and, where appropriate, contingency arrangements in place?

4.2.7  The Nuclear Baseline process

The Licensee should have in place a process through which the NB is derived and managed.

• The licensee should be able clearly to demonstrate that it has arrangements in place to derive and maintain an organisation, staffing levels and competences which enable it to understand, deliver and oversee activities which have the potential to impact on nuclear safety.  The arrangements should show:
• how the licensee determines the nuclear safety functions that it needs to discharge
• how the licensee identifies the staffing levels and competencies required to deliver these nuclear safety functions
• that the licensee’s organisation, staffing levels and competencies are adequate to meet these needs. This should include sufficient resource to work safely and to deliver an appropriate work programme
• that the licensee maintains effective Intelligent Customer and supervisory capabilities to oversee the work of contractors
• that an appropriate vulnerability analysis is carried out which highlights where the licensee is vulnerable to loss of resource or capability – for example, where it relies upon singleton expertise or a limited pool of in-house or contract resource.
• that succession plans are put in place where appropriate.

In as much as the Nuclear Baseline addresses the above elements, it is likely to draw upon current processes within the wider business management system such as competence management, project management and resource planning.  The NB may therefore not exist as a single stand-alone document.  It is likely to include statements setting out the elements of the NB and showing how these elements are addressed.  This might include references to the application of a number of business processes which can be drawn upon to demonstrate how the expectations of the NB are being delivered.  In such circumstances, the licensee’s NB should draw together the findings of these processes in order that an overview of the licensee’s organisational adequacy can be established. This should include plans to address gaps and weaknesses where they are identified. 

It is expected that the licensee’s HR, project planning and other processes should explicitly identify NB roles in order that they are clearly understood and that proposals to change them are flagged up for consideration as part of the licensee’s LC36 arrangements.

NII expects that the licensee will have in place corporate processes to make its senior management aware of the status of the NB in order that they are able to take steps to ensure that the organisation is suitably structured and resourced to deliver continued nuclear safety.

Where a Licensee has projects and programmes which require changing staffing levels, competencies and organisational structures, NII recognises that a single, fixed, NB may not be suitable.  In such circumstances, NII would expect the licensee to acknowledge the need to link its work programme with its staffing levels and competence needs at each stage such that a valid NB is available to underpin its work at any time. 

For example, prior to starting a new phase in the work programme it may be appropriate to have ‘hold points’ to confirm that suitable and sufficient skills and competences are in place for the tasks ahead.  This could be achieved through an overall Nuclear Baseline assessment for all stages, linked to any project manpower plans, or through a series of phased NB’s reflecting changes to structures, resources and competencies managed through the licensee’s LC36 arrangements. This type of logic could be applied as part of the work approval arrangements to instances where there is a potential change in the Nuclear Baseline organisation, resource or competence needs.

The Inspector should consider:

• Does the Licensee have adequate arrangements for defining, producing and maintaining a NB?
• Does the NB clearly describe the philosophy and methodology for how it is constructed and how assessments as to the need for nuclear safety roles, and the adequacy of their delivery, are carried out?
• Does the NB give a ‘route map’ showing those parts of the Business Management System which are referenced by the Nuclear Baseline?
• Does the NB enable conclusions to be drawn from the referenced business management processes as to the state and adequacy of the elements identified in this TAG?
• Does the licensee have in place processes to ensure that the licensee’s senior management are aware of the status of the NB in order that they can continue to ensure that the organisation is suitably structured and resourced to deliver continued nuclear safety
• Are NB roles explicitly identified so that they are clearly understood, and that proposals to change NB roles are considered under the licensee’s LC36 arrangements?
• Is there evidence that the Nuclear Baseline has been integrated into the business management system?

4.2.8  A living baseline

The NB should be maintained as a living document and provide a reference point for modifications to staffing levels/structures and to changed competence requirements in accordance with the licensee’s arrangements made under LC36.

The Nuclear Baseline should be updated as changes are made to the organisational structure, staffing levels and competence requirements using the licensee’s arrangements for management of change under LC36 (and see (8)). Where the licensee uses a database as part of its position management system, changes to the NB may be made concurrent with organisational changes such that the NB remains live.  In other circumstances, the licensee should put in place a process periodically to review and consolidate changes to the NB – for example, on an annual basis, and generally no less than that unless the company has seen very few or no changes.  In this way, the NB continues to reflect the state of the licensee’s organisation. 

Licensees should ensure that their management systems ensure that the Baseline is referred to and if necessary reviewed when considering changes brought about by factors such as:

• Applications for a new licence or change in parent body organisation
• Step changes in project requirements as projects move from one part of the programme to the next
• Proposed staffing change, for example the use of contract support in Nuclear Baseline roles previously held by licensee employees
• Changes in the scope of work
• Changes in the competence of baseline post holders or training and competence needs of the role
• Cumulative effects of low category changes.

It should be noted that replacing one post holder with another post holder who meets the competence criteria need not constitute a trigger for the application of LC36 arrangements, and consequent NB review except in the case where the replacement is a contractor.  Direct like-for-like replacement should be addressed though the arrangements made under LC12.

Licensees should ensure that Nuclear Baseline improvement actions are included in work plans to address gaps in capability and deliver the Nuclear Baseline to meet future needs.

The Inspector should consider:

• Does the licensee have a process in place to assure the continued currency, and periodic review, of the Nuclear Baseline?
• Is there evidence that the Nuclear Baseline is maintained and up to date reflecting the current organisation?
• Are the triggers for Nuclear Baseline review part of the licensee’s management of change process?
• Does the licensee have arrangements to confirm that the Nuclear Baseline needs are met prior to starting a new phase with differing Nuclear Baseline requirements?
• Does the NB provide an appropriate reference point for the licensee’s management of change arrangements made under LC36?

5  References

1. Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities. HSE, 2006
2. T/AST/048: Licence Condition 36 Arrangements
3. Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999
4. Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association.  WENRA Reactor Safety Reference Levels.  January 2007
5. IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles No. SF-1
6. TAST/027 Assessment of Licensees’ Arrangements for Training and Assuring Personnel Competence
7. TAST/049 Principles for the Assessment of a Licensees’ “Intelligent Customer Capability” (Licensee's Technical and Engineering Capability)
8. The Licensing of Nuclear Installations.  HSE 2007
9. T/AST/052  Contractorisation (Superceded by T/AST/49)
10. T/INS/036  Control of Organisational Change (Closed)