Issue Date:

04/09/2009

Review Date:

04/09/2012

Open Government Status:

Fully Open

Approved By:

A N Hall

1 Purpose and scope

1.1 The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has the responsibility for regulating the safety of nuclear installations in Great Britain. The Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) for Nuclear Facilities [2MB] provide a framework to guide regulatory decision-making in the nuclear permissioning process. They are supported by Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs) which further aid the decision-making process.

1.2  This TAG provides guidance to help Inspectors assess the suitability of the approaches that the licensee takes to maintaining its in-house capability and to its use and oversight of contractors whose work has the potential to impact upon nuclear safety. It considers the following:

1. The licensee’s identification of the core competencies and resources that it needs to understand its safety case and deliver nuclear safety
2. The licensee’s approach to use of contractors to perform functions that have the potential to impact on nuclear safety
3. The oversight and management of contractors by licensees to ensure nuclear safety and sustain an ‘Intelligent Customer’ capability.

1.3 In this guidance the word “Contractor” means any organisation or individual person that provides a contracted service for the licensee but is not in the licensee’s direct employment.  This definition therefore includes people employed by a licensee’s parent company.  The guidance may also be used to inform NII assessment of the procurement of safety critical equipment that is constructed to the specification of the licensee or others acting on its behalf.

1.4  This definition excludes contractors that are fully embedded to the point that they are employees for health and safety law purposes, and ‘secondees’ from other organisations such as ‘Parent Body Organisations’. Annex 1 gives further explanation of when these exclusions apply.

1.5 The concept of “Intelligent Customer” (IC) was developed by NII and has gained international acceptance.  IC can be defined as follows, which is compatible with IAEA expectations:

“As an intelligent customer, in the context of nuclear safety, the management of the facility should know what is required, should fully understand the need for a contractor's services, should specify requirements, should supervise the work and should technically review the output before, during and after implementation. The concept of intelligent customer relates to the attributes of an organisation rather than the capabilities of individual post holders.

2 Relationship to nuclear site licence and other relevant legislation

2.1  The legal duties of a client for the safety of work carried out on its behalf by contractors are far reaching, and sometimes complex. The following is simply a summary of a few of the most relevant, not a comprehensive guide:

• The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (1974) sections 3 and 4 give employers general duties to protect the health and safety of people they do not directly employ and those who have access to their premises.
• The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (1999) including Regulation 3 concerning risk assessment of potential health and safety impacts on people other than direct employees, and Regulations 11 and 12 concerning the need for cooperation and coordination between companies working on the same premises, including contractor and client relationships.
• The Construction (Design and management) Regulations (2007) put duties on clients and designers (including engineers), principal contractors etc. of construction projects of greater than a certain duration.
• Of most direct relevance to this TAG is the Nuclear Installations Act (1965) as amended (NIA). This requires HSE to attach conditions to nuclear site licenses as necessary in the interests of safety. Most of the licence conditions attached to nuclear site licenses apply to relevant work by contractors (see Annex 2).

3 Relationship to SAPs, WENRA Reference Levels and IAEA Safety Standards

3.1  Relevant SAPs

Fundamental principles	Responsibility for safety	FP.1
The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organisation responsible for the facilities and activities that give rise to radiation
Fundamental principles	Leadership and management for safety	FP.2
Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in organisations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks.
Leadership and management for safety	Leadership	MS.1
Directors, managers and leaders at all levels should focus the organisation on achieving and sustaining high standards of safety and on delivering the characteristics of a high reliability organisation.
Leadership and management for safety	Capable organisation	MS.2
The organisation should have the capability to secure and maintain the safety of its undertakings.
Engineering principles: human factors	Personnel competence	EHF.8
A systematic approach to the identification and delivery of personnel competence should be applied.
Decommissioning	Decommissioning organisation	DC.7
Organisational arrangements should be established and maintained to ensure safe and effective decommissioning of facilities.

3.2 Relevant WENRA Safety Reference Levels

WENRA Safety Reference Levels that are relevant to the use and management of contractors are summarised in Annex 3.

3.3 IAEA Safety Standards

The guidance is consistent with relevant IAEA publications IAEA publications including GS-R-3 Management System for Facilities and Activities which requires facilities to accept accountability for the activities of contractors, and IAEA TECDOC 1232 Assuring the competence of nuclear powerplant contractor personnel [2.18MB]

4  Advice to Inspectors

4.1  Background

Nuclear licensees need to own and understand their safety case and to ensure that all work with the potential to impact on nuclear safety is carried out safely.  This requires, amongst other factors, the identification and delivery of appropriate human resources to carry out nuclear safety related work.  The majority of this capability is likely to reside within the licensee’s organisation.  However, the licensee may also choose to use contractors to carry out some activities.  The importance of taking appropriate decisions on when to use contractors, and the effective management of their work, has been highlighted in a number of events and near misses across the nuclear and other high hazard industries – for example the Dounreay loss of site power event in 1998 (Outcome of 1998 Safety Audit of Dounreay Nuclear Licensed Site); recent experience in constructing Olkiluoto 3; the Challenger disaster (Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident ); and the Potter’s Bar rail crash (train derailment at potters Bar, 10 May 2002)Train derailment at Potters Bar 10 Mat 200 [2.49MB]).

The aim of this guide is to help inspectors assess whether nuclear licensees have identified the core competencies that they need to deliver in order to manage safety effectively, and whether they retain adequate control of those functions and services that are contracted out.

The guidance is underpinned by a range of legal duties as summarised in Section 2 above. It is not the purpose of the guide to expand further upon the wide range of general duties held by both licensees and contractors, for that refer to HSE published guidance.

4.2  Principles on the Use and Management of Contractors

There are some broad Principles which underpin NII’s expectations of a licensee’s arrangements for the use of contractors and for retaining control of nuclear safety.  These are summarised below and then interpreted in the sections that follow.

1. The licensee shall retain overall responsibility for, and control of, the nuclear and radiological safety and security of all of its business, including work carried out on its behalf by contractors.
2. Licensee choices between sourcing work in-house or from contractors should be informed by a clear policy that takes due account of the nuclear safety implications of those choices.
3. The licensee should maintain an ‘intelligent customer’ capability for all work carried out on its behalf by contractors that may impact upon nuclear safety.
4. The licensee should ensure that it only lets contracts for work with nuclear safety significance to contractors with suitable competence, safety standards and resources.
5. The licensee should ensure that all contractor staff are familiar with the nuclear safety implications of their work and interact in a well coordinated manner with its own staff.
6. The licensee should ensure that contractors’ work is carried out to the required level of safety and quality in practice.

4.2.1  Principle 1

The licensee shall retain overall responsibility for, and control of, the nuclear and radiological safety and security of all of its business, including work carried out on its behalf by contractors.

The Nuclear Installations Act places a duty on the licensee to ensure that the conditions of the licence are complied with.  It is not able to delegate this responsibility to contractors, service providers or others who do work on its behalf (see definition of ‘contractor’ above).  The licensee therefore retains overall responsibility for nuclear and radiological safety at all times, and NII considers that in order to do this it must maintain a suitable level of control and oversight of those who are carrying out work on its behalf.

In order to retain this control and oversight, the licensee needs to identify the potential nuclear safety impact of its activities and bear this in mind when making decisions whether to retain those activities in-house or contract them out.   These decisions should be informed by a clear company policy on the use of contractors (see Principle 2).

Decisions will be affected not only by nuclear safety significance, but also by the nature of the work being considered.  For example, if the licensee is considering contracting out the management of some activities as opposed to performing operations or administrative functions, it may be appropriate to question whether the licensee can remain in control.  Similarly, if the licensee is considering using contractors to deliver functions which are core to the continued safe operation of its facility (see Principle 2), it is reasonable again to seek confidence that the licensee is able to retain the capability to make and enact its own decisions on safety matters.

In each case the overall practical test that should be applied is this: does the licensee, through a combination of its own technical competence and understanding of the work; its management arrangements; its relationship with the contractor; and its assurance of the contractor’s own management arrangements, retain adequate and enduring control in practice of the nuclear safety risks of work carried out on its behalf by the contractor?

The Inspector should consider:

1. Does the licensee have robust, auditable policies and systems in place through which it can show:
   1. That it remains in control of work with nuclear safety implications that is carried out by contractors on the site
   2. That it maintains adequate oversight of work with nuclear safety implications that is carried out by contractors off the site
2. Is there a clear line of sight, and evidence of responsibility being exercised in a proportionate manner from the Board down, for all work in the supply chain with nuclear safety implications

4.2.2  Principle 2

Licensee choices between sourcing work in-house or from contractors should be informed by a clear policy that takes due account of the nuclear safety implications of those choices.

The licensee should set out a clear policy and rationale for making choices between contracting work or functions out, and bringing or retaining them in-house. This policy should take adequate account of the long and short-term nuclear safety implications of using contractors.

Licensee management should be aware of, and be able to justify, the approach that they take to use of contractors.  For new licensees, this should be addressed in the safety management prospectus (see T/AST/072 Function and Content of a Safety Management Prospectus).  The approach should recognise the need for, and demonstrate, the ability of the licensee to retain control of nuclear safety and to deliver an adequate ‘intelligent customer’ capability as set out in 4.2.3. below.  For established licensees, the use of contractors may have grown historically, rather than in accordance with a coherent policy.  In such cases this should be recognised and there should be a plan to review and address this.

Consideration of the licensee’s policy on use of contractors should be evident in its optioneering during management of organisational change (LC36) when choices are made between outsourced or in-house options. Although commercial considerations may influence that choice they should not outweigh or override safety.

One of the key issues that a licensee should consider when making decisions on whether to use contractors is the potential impact on the licensee’s “core competencies”.  These are the competencies that are crucial to the licensee’s effective management of nuclear safety over both the short- and long-term (see  Section 4.2.3).  Safety implications that licensees should consider include the potential for loss of core licensee competence over time if the licensee is considering contracting out major parts of its technical capability (see the Dounreay audit).

Policy and risk assessments should also take account of potential organisational vulnerabilities arising from dependence on contractors. This vulnerability increases with factors such as the scarcity of, and demand for, the services that the contractor provides, the degree of site specific knowledge required for the task, and how readily available SQEP replacements are, either in-house or in the market place. Where contracting work will create dependence on singleton or specialised contractors for essential safety related work such as maintenance, NII expects the licensee to have identified this as a vulnerability; be able to justify the decision; and to explain what the contingency and succession arrangements would be should the contract terminate.

Where contractorisation proposals may weaken the control of the licensee or introduce ambiguities over the legal positions of the parties involved, for example new functional contractorisation or partnership proposals, it may be appropriate to seek the advice of the ND Leadership and Management for Safety Nuclear Topic Lead.

The Inspector should consider:

1. Does the licensee have a clear policy and rationale for use of contractors?
2. Is licensee management able to explain and justify the extent of its current reliance on contractors?
3. Where a licensee has contracted out functions, or is proposing to do so, can it show that the risks of doing so have been adequately assessed and managed. This includes considering:
   1. Whether contracting out the task could compromise the licensee’s retention of core competence (see Section 4.2.3).
   2. Whether contracting out the work introduces any potential for additional challenges to nuclear safety and, where this may be so,  showing how these risks are managed.
   3. Whether the licensee will be able to maintain sufficient IC capability to ensure continued safety, including adequate arrangements and resources for authorisation, oversight and assurance of contractors’ work.
   4. Whether the licensee has considered potential vulnerabilities to loss of services of contractors with key nuclear safety related capabilities and, where appropriate, identified contingency arrangements.  For example - has the licensee considered whether knowledge required for the task is scarce or more generally available in the market place; whether there are sufficient competent staff in-house to provide effective care and maintenance until replacement contract support  can be found etc?

4.2.3  Principle 3

The licensee should maintain an ‘intelligent customer’ capability for all work carried out on its behalf by contractors that may impact upon nuclear safety.

As noted above, the licensee should identify the core competencies that it needs to maintain effective management of nuclear safety.  These competencies will include technical (eg design authority, safety case capability), operational and managerial elements, and together they combine to ensure that the safety case for the installation is understood and maintained, and that the plant is operated in accordance with the safety case and the conditions of the nuclear site licence.  The most secure source of core competencies is generally direct employment of SQEP staff.  The licensee may choose, however, to contract out work which has the potential to impact upon nuclear safety.  In these circumstances, the licensee should be able to demonstrate that it has all of its core competencies securely and readily available to it, and actively employed as necessary to ensure safety.

Where contractors are used, ND considers that a nuclear licensee should retain suitable and sufficient capability in house to understand where and when work is needed; specify requirements to carry out that work; understand and set suitable standards; supervise the work of the contractor; and be able to review, evaluate and act upon the work carried out on its behalf.   This capability has been termed “Intelligent Customer (IC)” – and see the definition in Section 1.5.

The licensee should be able to demonstrate that it understands the need to retain an IC capability and that it has put in place arrangements to determine the range of functions for which it requires IC capability and make informed judgements about the depth of knowledge and level of SQEP resource it will require to maintain this capability in each case.  It should be noted that IC is a function of the licensee as a whole, and the IC capability to manage contracted work may not be vested in a single individual.

The licensee’s approach to identifying and managing its core competencies and sustaining an intelligent customer capability should initially be set out in the safety management prospectus, and the continued suitability of this approach periodically reviewed and kept live.  Roles with a potential nuclear safety impact, including those with IC responsibilities, should be identified in the licensee’s Nuclear Baseline (see T/AST/065 Function and Content of the Nuclear Baseline).  As part of this process, the Inspector should expect the licensee to show how it has put in place suitable succession planning for IC posts.

The inspector should seek assurance that the licensee is delivering in practice its claimed IC capability. This can be accomplished by examining a number of contracted functions/tasks and confirming that the licensee is able to show how the responsibilities set out above are being discharged.  If, for example, contractors are used to prepare a safety case, the licensee must be competent to ensure that the contractor is suitably qualified and experienced, follows an appropriate methodology, and uses the correct data and assumptions. The licensee should have sufficient knowledge to understand the limitations and implications of the analysis to its safety case; to question and challenge the contractor’s work; and to show that it has applied an appropriate degree of oversight in practice. The licensee should be able to lead the presentation of the safety case arguments. However the licensee need not necessarily have the depth of knowledge required to undertake the detailed analysis itself.

The Inspector should consider:

1. The licensee should be able to show that it has arrangements in place to identify and secure the core competencies needed to conduct its business safely through:
   1. Putting in place and implementing a process to identify all core competencies it requires, as set out in the safety management prospectus and captured in the Nuclear Baseline;
   2. Where work is contracted out, identifying a suitable intelligent customer capability;
   3. Showing how it selects and appoints individuals to deliver this capability;
   4. Providing up-to-date information and justification of the extent of its IC capability in the nuclear baseline (see Function and Content of the Nuclear Baseline - T/AST/065);
   5. Demonstrating that it has risk analyses and contingency plans for loss of staff or absences in vulnerable areas where the intelligent customer numbers are scare or are singletons;
   6. Putting in place succession planning and training and/or recruitment plans where necessary in recognition of potential future requirements e.g. changes in site activity or plant.
2. The licensee should be able to demonstrate the application of Intelligent Customer capability to selected activities through:
   1. Explaining how it is able to judge when external expertise is required;
   2. Showing that it understands the relevance of any given work carried out by contractors to the safety case;
   3. Explaining how the specification for contracted work was derived,
   4. Showing how it assessed the technical quality of tenders and proposals;
   5. Explaining why the contractor selected was suitable for the specific task;
   6. Showing that it monitored the nuclear safety of work being by contractors, and judged if this was adequate;
   7. Explaining how it has evaluated the product and/or work produced and decided that it was of the appropriate quality;
   8. Being able to lead the presentation of safety case arguments to the regulator.
3. Where the inspector finds, or is aware of, unsafe or poor quality work by contractors, can the licensee show that it has identified the problem and has suitable plans to learn from experience?
4. Is there a process though which the licensee’s senior management seek assurance that the licensee retains a suitable core competence and intelligent customer capability and that this is effective and robust in ensuring the safe performance of contractors?

4.2.4  Principle 4

The licensee should ensure that it only lets contracts for work with nuclear safety significance to contractors with suitable competence, safety standards and resources.

The licensee’s safety management system should include a contractor approval process that examines a contractor’s overall ability and capacity to deliver the goods and services required; price may be a factor but it should not override safety and technical capability. The process should also ensure that once ‘approved’ the contractor is only given tasks for which it has been assessed and deemed to be suitable.

The licensee should be aiming for an Intelligent Customer and ‘Intelligent Contractor’ relationship where both deploy suitably qualified and experienced personnel who understand the requirements and are able to communicate them effectively.

The licensee should be able to show that it has made, and implemented, appropriate arrangements to satisfy itself that its contractors’ competencies are adequate.  There should be a clear auditable trail that demonstrates that contractor staff are as ‘SQEP’ as licensee staff would be expected to be for the same role (see T/AST 027 Assessment of licensees' arrangements for training and assuring personnel competence).  For key contract staff whose services are needed regularly it can be appropriate to include them within the licensee’s own competence assurance system.   Where this is not the case, the licensee should show how it has satisfied itself as to the adequacy of the contractors’ own arrangements for competence assurance.  In any event, the licensee should ensure that contractors are suitably inducted onto the site and that licensee expectations on behaviours as well as technical job performance are effectively communicated and understood (see Section 4.2.5).

The Inspector should note that these expectations apply to relevant work by contractors both on the licensed site and at other locations. For example, the licensee should take suitable steps to ensure that contractors’ work on a safety case, or on the construction of nuclear safety-related plant which is later to be used on site is carried out by SQEP people wherever in the world they happen to be located.  NII has developed guidance on its expectations of the licensee’s procurement process and management of the supply chain (T/AST/077).

The contractor appraisal and approval system should be a ‘live’ system, such that the licensee actively monitors its contractors’ safety management arrangements and performance and that any deficiencies are reviewed and acted on as appropriate.

The Inspector should consider:

1. Does the licensee maintain a contractor approval system that ensures each contractor and subcontractor used:
   1. Has suitable and robust safety and quality management systems
   2. Has the competence, individually and collectively, to carry out the specific types of work contracted to required safety and quality standards
   3. Has the resources, including manpower and equipment, to carry out the work safely
   4. Has a safety and quality record that meets criteria of acceptability
   5. Is suitably inducted onto the site and is aware of the behaviours expected to support the licensee’s safety culture
   6. Is only given tasks for which it is suitable, and for which all of the above apply
2. Can the licensee show that it has assured the adequacy of tenders and proposals from contractors, including clear identification of any particular or unusual hazards that their activities will introduce?
3. Is it evident at all relevant stages of contract preparation and contractor selection that potential immediate or latent nuclear safety risks that could arise from the quality or conduct of the work have been identified and considered as necessary?
4. Is there evidence that effective action is taken where contractor performance is less than adequate?
5. Do the licensee’s procurement procedures address communication and interfaces in the supply chain?
6. Does the licensee actively monitor and gain assurance as to the continued suitability of its contractors’ arrangements for delivering suitable work by competent personnel?
7. Do the procurement procedures include the need for technical and safety Suitably Qualified and Experience Persons (SQEPs) to be involved and nominated as Intelligent Customers?

4.2.5   Principle 5

The licensee should ensure that all contractor staff are familiar with the nuclear safety implications of their work and interact in a well coordinated manner with its own staff

Contractor staff should have sufficient information and instruction to know how to work safely and what the limits are of what they can do.  Their appreciation of the hazards should not be confined to the specifics of the task but should include their entire working environment when they are on the licensed site (see nuclear site licence conditions 9 and 24). It is important for contractors to be aware that they share legal accountability for the safety of their operations on the licensed site.

Licensees should be able to demonstrate that this applies throughout the supply chain where necessary.  In other words, it is not sufficient to gain assurance that the main contractor understands the nuclear safety implications of its work; the licensee should seek assurance that sub-contractors have the same understanding.

Where contractors have a continuing relationship with the licensee, the licensee should be working to ensure that they are inculcated with the licensee’s safety culture and expectations of behaviour.   This means, for example, including contractors as well as licensee employees in safety briefs, working groups, behavioural safety initiatives, audits etc.

The licensee must ensure that there are clear arrangements understood by all parties for coordination, communication and authorisation of work between the licensee’s own staff, contractors, and subcontractors.  This can become difficult in practice where there is an extended supply chain.  In such a case the potential exists at each interface for dilution and misunderstanding of customer requirements. Therefore it is good practice for the licensee procurement process to consider the potential number of sub-contract layers when letting contracts and avoid unnecessarily long supply chains. The licensee should also ensure that there is effective communication and interface between each link so that the licensee’s requirements are clearly understood and effectively cascaded to all involved.

The Inspector should consider:

1. Is it evident that, at all relevant stages of a contract, the following have been identified and appropriate measures agreed and communicated as necessary to all contractor and sub-contractor staff working on the licensed site and their understanding verified?:
   1. Immediate or latent nuclear safety risks from inadequate quality of work or errors by contractors or subcontractors
   2. Radiological risks to contractor staff from the licensee’s plant and processes
   3. Rules and instructions including, but not confined to, emergency arrangements
   4. What the arrangements are for authorising and managing work
   5. Arrangements for communication between all parties
   6. The overall process for quality management
2. Is adequate information provided to licensee staff and others who may come into contact with the contractor concerning the nature, extent and control of the contractor’s work?
3. Are contractor staff with a frequent or permanent presence on the site included in the licensee’s normal two-way safety communications and other safety activities, as licensee’s staff will be?

4.2.6  Principle 6

The licensee should ensure that contractors’ work is carried out to the required level of safety and quality in practice.

The licensee’s arrangements and behaviour in supervising contractors should be active and rigorous, in proportion to the risks of the work, and the capabilities and track record of the contractor. Contracting out work does not lessen a licensee’s legal accountability for the work done on its behalf and the degree of supervision and assurance should reflect that.

Licensees can of course make allowances for the contractor’s own safety management and quality assurance systems, but this must be based on evidence of their effectiveness. The licensee should be able to demonstrate that it is aware, and in control of, the standards of work throughout the supply chain, proportionate to nuclear safety implications. Where technical expert input is required to ensure safety, the inspector should consider the degree to which the licensee’s IC capability is applied in practice.

The Inspector should consider:

1. Can the licensee show that it monitors contractor, and where appropriate sub-contractor, performance to a degree that takes account of the risks and hazards of the task and the capabilities and previous performance of the contractor?
2. Is it evident from the performance of contractor and subcontractor staff on site that these arrangements are effective?
3. Can the licensee show where appropriate that the devices that the contractor uses to ensure quality such as quality targets and plans are effective?
4. Are those undertaking the work throughout the supply chain following up to date and approved specifications?
5. Does the licensee ensure that, on completion of the contractors’ work:

1. there are clear preparations for communication and continuity on hand-back either to the licensee or further contractor
2. there is contingency to deal with early termination (for example through inadequate performance or bankruptcy)
3. the safety performance of the contractor is reviewed and recorded for future reference

Annex 1: Treatment of seconded and agency staff

Seconded or agency staff may in some circumstances be considered as ‘employees’ under health and safety law as opposed to ‘contractors’ as discussed in this guidance (Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) (s53(1)).

There is no single indicator of an individual’s employment status, rather it is a matter of looking at a number of factors and deciding whether on balance there is a contract of employment. Factors which need to be considered include:

1. Whether the Licensee has the power to select and appoint the individuals doing the work.
2. Whether the Licensee has the power to dismiss or suspend the worker.
3. Whether it is the Licensee which fixes the times and place of work.
4. Whether personal service is provided. A person will not normally be an employee if they are entitled to delegate the entire performance of the work to another person.
5. Whether they are formally appointed to a position within the licensee’s organisation
6. Whether they report via the management chain to the licensee and are accountable to the licensee via established management arrangements such as appraisal and development processes

However, there are still clear implications to their status that should be given due consideration by the licensee when the role of seconded or agency staff is safety related. This includes the extra potential for sudden or en bloc departure, which can be dealt with for example through careful drafting of contract terms and development of robust succession plans as appropriate to the case. In some cases seconded or agency may be paid incentive payments or otherwise rewarded by their ‘other’ employer. Care should be taken that such reward schemes do not conflict with the interests of nuclear safety at the licensed site.

If the licensee can demonstrate that the contractor is embedded to the extent that he/she is in effect an employee of the licensee, as set out above, then NII considers that the contractor need not be subject to control and oversight different from a normal employee.

Further guidance on contractor legal status available in the HSE Enforcement Guide.

Annex 2: Relevant Nuclear Site Licence Conditions

The following are examples of how the nuclear site licence can apply to the work of contractors:

1. LC6 and 25 – The licensee should ensure that contractors and vendors supply relevant documents as necessary, for example on completion of work.
2. LC7 – The licensee should ensure that contractors are aware of and engaged in arrangements to report incidents;
3. LC9 – Contractors on site must be given adequate instructions about hazards and emergency arrangements.
4. LC10 and 12 – The licensee must ensure that anyone carrying out work that may affect nuclear safety on the site must be suitably qualified and experienced persons. This will include all of the supply chain on site and where appropriate off-site work by contractors and vendors, wherever in the world they happen to be.
5. LC 11 – where contractors bring significant new hazards to the site this should be considered where necessary in the emergency plan.
6. LC17 – The licensee’s quality assurance arrangements should robustly encompass all work carried out for the site by contractors whether on site or as a vendor of goods and services.
7. LC 18 – Requires radiological protection of all workers on site.
8. LC 19 to 22 – Required arrangements to control construction, modification, commissioning etc. of plant will generally need to include arrangements for appropriate control and oversight of work by contractors.
9. LC 26 – All operations that may affect safety must be ‘under the control and supervision’ of persons who are formally appointed as SQEP by the licensee. This strengthens the general requirements of HSWA s3 and s4 by specifying the need to ensure competence of supervisors and the duty to ‘control’ the work.

NIA Inspectors should seek advice where there is uncertainty about legal status.

Annex 3 – Relevant WENRA Safety Reference Levels

WENRA is a non-governmental organisation comprised of the Heads and senior staff members of Nuclear Regulatory Authorities of European countries with nuclear power plants (wenra.org). The excerpts here are taken from WENRA Reactor Safety Reference Levels January 2008.

Issue A – Safety Policy

(Para 1.5) Key elements of the safety policy shall be communicated to contractors, in such a way that licensee’s expectations and requirements are understood and applied in their activities.

Issue B - Organisation

(Para 2.6) The licensee shall ensure that plant activities and processes are controlled through a documented management system covering all activities, including relevant activities of vendors and contractors, which may affect the safe operation of the plant.

(Para 1.1) The organisational structure for safe and reliable operation of the plant, and for ensuring an appropriate response in emergencies, shall be justified and documented.

(Para 3.5) The licensee shall always have in house, sufficient, and competent staff and resources to understand the licensing basis of the plant (e.g. Safety Analysis Report or Safety Case and other documents based thereon), as well as to understand the actual design and operation of the plant in all plant states.

(Para 3.6) The licensee shall maintain, in house, sufficient and competent staff and resources to specify, set standards manage and evaluate safety work carried out by contractors.

Issue C – Management system

(Para 5.5) The control of processes, or work performed within a process, contracted to external organizations shall be identified within the management system. The licensee shall retain overall responsibility when contracting any processes or work performed within a process.

(Para 5.6) Suppliers of products and services shall be selected on the basis of specified criteria and their performance shall be evaluated

Issue D: Training and Authorisation of NPP staff (jobs with safety importance)

(Para 2.1) Only qualified persons that have the necessary knowledge, skills, and safety attitudes shall be allowed to carry out tasks important to safety. The licensee shall ensure that all personnel performing safety-related duties including contractors have been adequately trained and qualified.

(Para 3.2) All technical staff including on-site contractors shall have a basic understanding of nuclear safety, radiation safety, fire safety, the on-site emergency arrangements and industrial safety.

(Para 3.6) Maintenance and technical support staff including contractors shall have practical training on the required safety critical activities.

(Para 4.3) Work carried out by contractor personnel on structures, systems, or components that are important to safety shall be approved and monitored by a suitably competent member of licensee’s staff.