Issue date:

2009/03/02

Review date:

2013/03/02

Open Government Status:

Fully Open

Approved by:

R Gray

1  Purpose and scope

1.1  INS/008 sets out ND’s expectations for the development and delivery of off and on-site planned regulatory interventions. Its aim is to ensure that ND is making the best use of its resources by incorporating into ND practice the principles developed in 2007/8 by the Operational Strategy Disciplined Delivery (OSDD) project. The guidance in G/INS/008 provides more detail of OSDD principles and associated developments that are expected to be taken into account when carrying out interventions.

1.2  The OSDD principles are concerned broadly with:

• Programme working – aligning ND teams to licensee programmes.
• Allocation of resources to target activity at areas of greatest concern.
• Management of activity to make and control our impact and deliver outcomes.
• Use of management metrics to inform decisions on delivery.

2  Policy

2.1  Programme management. All regulatory intervention plans should be subject to the associated  programme strategy and programme management oversight.  Programme management is a new approach to the delivery of interventions in ND. It allocates responsibility for development and oversight of interventions to Intervention Management Groups (IMGs) led by programme managers who are tasked to ensure that the activity of all Inspectors are integrated and co-ordinated in a proportionate and targeted way. It moves away from previous practice where compliance and permissioning inspection were separately managed. Effective programme management is the key to the success of the new approach developed in the OSDD project. ND nuclear safety regulation is presently organised in eight major programmes.

2.2  Alignment with Intervention Plans. The regulatory activity of all Inspectors should align with the relevant Intervention Plan. Intervention Plans should include more than proposed compliance inspection programme. Ideally they should provide a snapshot of the regulatory issues that ND intends to address (including compliance) in the year to which they relate, what ND is seeking to achieve and how it intends to achieve its objectives for the year. They are expected to be guided and conditioned by programme management frameworks and Integrated Intervention Strategies. Every Inspector should be able to establish where and how his intervention activity fits into the relevant intervention plan. If this not the case then it is possible that either the proposed intervention is outwith programme intentions, or that intervention planning and programme oversight are insufficiently developed. Active participation of Inspectors in programme management, and two-way communications between Inspectors and programme management teams are key to the development of effective Intervention Plans.  

2.3  Resource allocation. Divisions and Programme Managers are expected to ensure that resources are allocated to optimum effect and to support this the authorities of key staff are set out is some detail in Annex A. Decisions on resource allocation will be informed by established Directorate prioritisation tools. The two main tools in recent use are the Attention Model (developed by Mark Bassett in 2003) and the Resource Prioritisation Tool (developed by Andy Lindley and Mark Gabbott under OSDD project auspices in 2008). The Attention Model has not yet been completed and formalised into ND business processes but has been used extensively in Division 3, who will be able to advise. It will be incorporated into future issues of G/INS/008. The Resource Prioritisation Tool has been endorsed by the Head of Divisions and is available on TRIM folder 1.1.2.233 documents 2009/16875 and 16884.

2.4  Feedback has suggested that there is scope for greater clarity on ND’s overall approach to the regulation of nuclear safety to ensure that approaches adopted on the ‘frontline’ match organisational expectation. In November 2008, the ND Heads of Division therefore agreed a statement of regulatory philosophy. This is repeated below together with amplifying notes not included in INS/008.

• Adopt a persuasive and influencing approach in the first instance to the remedy of compliance deficiencies, using powers under the licence and HASAW as appropriate in accordance with the Enforcement Policy Statement. 

NB: this recognises that necessary improvements are more likely to be achieved when licensees themselves understand and are persuaded of their necessity, and that ND’s continual enforcement presence on nuclear licensed sites is such as to allow this persuasive effort to take place. This is unlike sites that are visited rarely where a more robust and direct approach may be appropriate in the first instance. At the same time, it does not preclude the use of such an approach when circumstances dictate. 

• Develop and sustain an open and effective dialogue with licensees and other stakeholders.

NB: this underpins the previous point. An open and effective dialogue is a pre-requisite to ensuring that licensees and others understand ND’s concerns and also that ND concentrates its attention on the right issues. Under the UK health and safety system it is the licensee who is expected to understand and control the risks on site and ND’s understanding is likely to be incomplete if it does not tap into this through an effective and open dialogue. In addition, extensive licensee survey work in 2004/5 revealed that such a dialogue is the main determinant of regulatory consistency.

• Adopt a positive and enabling approach to the permissioning of activity when legal requirements have been met or the risk/compliance gap is such that it would be disproportionate not to grant a permission.

NB: the HSC/E permissioning policy is to grant a permission as an ‘acceptance of the duty-holder’s approach to identifying and meeting health and safety needs, as demonstrated through the health and safety documentation’. The key to receiving a permission will normally be a description and demonstration of how duty holders manage their risks. Granting permissions requires balanced judgments on the nature of the proposed activity, always made on the basis of sampling inspections. This is extremely difficult to do, and a sampling approach will never lead to certainty of view. It is relatively easy to err on the side of caution and recommend the disallowing of a permission when deficiencies are found in safety submissions, or insist that significant effort is devoted to making improvements to safety submissions before the permission is granted. This statement of philosophy suggests that permissions should not be disallowed simply because  the safety submission is deficient, or a particular issue  is not ALARP. Instead it suggests that this line should be taken in a proportionate way  when the risk/compliance gap warrants it. This approach is set out in the Enforcement Management Model.

• Act in a way that supports and strengthens licensees’ self-regulatory processes rather than provides a substitute for them.

NB: licensees’ internal safety assessment, peer review, nuclear safety committee and compliance monitoring processes are all intended to ensure that proposed activity is properly judged before it is put to ND. If ND does not take sufficient cognisance of these, or criticises them without seeking improvements, or otherwise undermines them, they will become less effective. The end result is likely to be that ND ends up in the position of effectively carrying out these roles itself, the ‘unpaid consultant’, clearly undesirable for a number of reasons. Apart from this, the development and support of effective internal regulatory processes maintenance represents a significant  gearing and leverage benefit.  

• Adopt an approach to making and implementing regulatory decisions and intervention strategies that values all relevant Inspector inputs and ensures that agreed lines are followed by all once decisions are made. 

NB: the business of determining regulatory priorities is far from straightforward. The proactive commitment of all Inspectors’ views and experience to this task will be an important element of the work that programme managers have to do to ensure that interventions are proportionate and targeted. At the same time, once plans have been developed, all Inspectors will need to follow these (subject to review) to remain proportionate and targeted.

• Concentrate on prevention of major nuclear accidents whilst at the same time regulating risks to workers.

NB: the NII was set up to ensure that the safety of UK civil reactors would be properly regulated and the public protected from their hazards. Regulatory duties subsequently extended to other nuclear activities. NII Inspectors are responsible for enforcing all the relevant statutory provisions relevant to the nuclear hazard. This statement highlights the emphasis on the avoidance of a major nuclear accident that could affect the public and society in general whilst at the same time including the challenges to the safety of workers and employers, which challenges could also include precursors to wider events.

3 Responsibilities

In view of the changed emphasis on the management of interventions, the way in which accountabilities have changed is set out in some detail in Annex A. Putting this in simple terms, these seek to move ND from a culture where individual Inspectors are the main determinant of intervention approaches to one where intervention is determined in an integrated and coherent basis across the whole Directorate under programme management guidance. 

4  Definitions

4.1  Intervention. Any interaction by Inspectors and other ND staff to influence licensees/duty-holders, industry representatives, partners and stakeholders to achieve an outcome to secure safety. This includes both planned and reactive interventions. The key is the identification of the desired outcomes. Once these have been established (and an intervention may be necessary to be clear on this), the Inspector and programme managers involved determine what interventions need to be planned to secure the outcomes. This may include interventions on site and off site, at different levels in the licensee organization and with non-licensee stakeholders, for example fund holders. Progress may need to be secured over long periods and require a project approach. 

4.2  Programme. A framework for achieving change and identified outcomes over the long term, consisting of activities and projects managed as a whole over a prolonged period by a programme management team. The definition is not precise as it has to balance ND’s need to have a management control point on which to target influence and the needs of the duty holder to meet their own expectations.  Programmes are unlikely to change in the short term. The main ND nuclear safety regulatory programmes at present are:

Division 1:	British Energy
	Magnox
Division 2:	Nuclear Fuel Cycle Operations
	Nuclear Fuel Cycle Remediation
	Waste management and De-commissioning
	Cross-cutting
Division 2:	Weapons programme
	Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme

4.3  Project. A particular way of managing activities to deliver specific outputs over a specified time and within cost, quality and resource constraints. It is up to programme managers to determine whether particular activities within programme intentions need to be managed on a project basis. Such an approach is more likely to be appropriate when the input of several people is required and work is linked to a specific need and timescale.

4.4  Regulatory review. A process, carried out at regulatory review meetings (RRMs), to check progress with Integrated Intervention Strategies (IISs) and associated Intervention Plans (IPs) and make adjustments to plans and resources as necessary. They are carried out at Programme and Divisional  level, with Directorate review being in the form of the annual ND Management Board mid-year planning steer and prioritization discussions. Other RRMs are carried out more frequently. Each level takes into account information provided by RRMs at the level below. Programme RRMs consider information from compliance inspection findings, permissioning inspection, OEF (this includes information from reactive inspection), and experience of corporate interactions, to determine the most appropriate interventions to be carried out in the forthcoming period within the programme. Details are in Annex B. 

4.5  Intervention Management Group (IMG). A generic term to cover the various management groups (ISGs, IPGs, RRMs) that exercise oversight over the development and delivery of the various intervention plans established under programmes and projects. IMGs are the main agents for determining and securing the delivery of outcomes. They are encouraged to consider new approaches to achieving results and programme managers have deliberately been given authority to underpin this. Details are in Annex C. 

4.6  Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS). This is both a general and a specific term. In a general, Directorate, sense it is the process for incorporating information from various sources (compliance inspection, permissioning inspection, OEF and corporate interventions) to determine appropriate future co-ordinated regulatory interventions. At an operational level it is the output of the programme level regulatory review process (as modified by Divisional and Directorate RRMs), used to inform and guide the development of Intervention Plans. The IIS should provide a clear idea of longer term regulatory priorities and intentions from which in-year plans can be derived. Any Inspector joining a programme should be able to turn to the IIS for that programme, or the relevant part of that programme, and establish how best to contribute to it. The difference between the IIS and the Intervention Plan is that the IIS will probably map out expectations for some years whereas the IIP only covers in-year deliver against the IIS.

4.7  Leverage model. A conceptual aid to the selection of interventions to maximise influence and the likelihood that outcomes will be achieved, see Annex D. Use of the leverage model to guide the formulation of interventions may also increase the likelihood of gearing effects to achieve more from what will always  be limited Inspector resources.

4.8  Intervention Plans (IPs). This is a generic term to describe the in-year delivery plans that embody and give effect to the IIS. Most will be site oriented, some may be in the form of projects to address specific issues. The key to the IIS is that IPs are developed under the control of the IMG and that individual inspection activity should derive from them. IPs should make clear to stake-holders what Inspectors intend to do and why. Details are given in Annex E.

4.9  Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes and Milestones are key steps determined by Divisions that indicate satisfactory progress towards Directorate objectives. Experience to date suggests that there is a degree of confusion over the meaning of these terms, not helped by the fact that in some cases an activity can actuall fall under two categories. It is helpful to first establish the desired outcome. Once that is clear, it should be possible to identify a number of things that have to happen to maximize the likelihood of realising the outcome. These are the outputs. They have to be kept under review because the impact of an output may change as circumstance change. For example, an agreement to fund a replacement facility (output) may mean nothing if preliminary design studies have shown that the cots has increased by 100%. Once outputs have been identified, it should then be possible to establish what activities ND has to manger (inputs) to deliver those outputs. Milestones are simply a convenient way of tracking progress towards delivery of inputs, outputs and outcomes. They may be completion of an actual input or output, but are more likely to be significant progress steps towards them. Annex F gives examples.

4.10  Integrate/integration means assembling parts into a coherent whole, bringing together and blending several things into one. The IIS aims to integrate multiple information sources in strategy making and to integrate activity of Inspectors in delivery to achieve maximum impact. To make this work in practice will also require a pre-disposition to work in certain ways (team working, valuing people, achieving results etc) and behaviours will be as important to IIS as delivery and performance.

4.11  Reactive work. The guidance in this document relates primarily to planned activity. It is therefore appropriate to define what constitutes reactive activity so that it is clear what is within the scope of this guidance. It is also important to rank potential reactive interventions against planned interventions to avoid unduly unbalancing regulatory attention. Reactive work is defined in Corporate Procedures (OPIP) as those activities carried out in response to an incident or a complaint to:

• gather and establish the facts
• identify immediate and underlying causes and the lessons to be learned
• prevent recurrence
• detect breaches of legislation for which HSE is the enforcing authority
• take appropriate action, including formal enforcement.

(NB: incidents are selected for investigation in accordance with guidance in ‘Investigation - Stage 2: Decide whether to investigate - Additional Guidance’.)

4.12  Cornerstone inspections. These are those licence compliance inspections considered necessary by the IMG to provide assurance of adequate control of nuclear safety by the licensee. The number of cornerstone licence compliance inspections carried out may vary from site to site, but these inspections are mandatory. Cornerstone inspection should be informed by a knowledge of key hazard controls as identified in the safety case. They are proactive, in-depth examinations of compliance against a benchmarked internal ND standard. It is for the IMG to determine what is to be the subject of cornerstone inspections and how they are to be carried out. It may be feasible for the workload involved in completing these to be reduced by working with internal licensee regulators with, for example, ND leading and guiding the inspection but internal regulators carrying out the detailed inspection. 

4.13  Regulatory Nuclear Interface Protocol (RNIP). This is a protocol agreed amongst licensee CEO’s and senior regulators in 2008 that seeks to underpin effective working between regulator and regulated. At its core is single set of shared and agreed values and behaviours, which underpin the delivery of the joint licensee/regulator agreed RNIP Vision. It applies to all ND Inspectors and includes the way in which routine and period meetings between the two are conducted. The values and behaviours are compatible with the HSE core competences. More detail is given in G/INS/008 Annex H. 

5  Operational Strategy Disciplined Delivery (OSDD) principles

5.1  The OSDD project was originally developed to combine a number of strands of work that emerged from the Strategy Review carried out in ND in 2006. These were all focused on improving the way in which ND developed and delivered its regulatory intentions. They included regulatory methods and delivery processes, the OEF project, the SPI project and management metrics. This guidance is associated with delivery and management. At the same time work was initiated to improve the way in which ND informed its long term direction, and a new directorate strategy development process was established. ‘Strategy development’ and ‘operational strategy’ have different meanings. Strategy relates to the identification of Directorate Objectives intended to secure achievement of ND Aims and, aspirationally, the associated Vision. Operational Strategy relates to the options determined by programmes for the delivery of their regulatory intentions. Strategy Development is determined by the Management Board, Operational Strategy by Divisions. The two are linked, as shown on the flowchart at Figure 1. This also emphasises the developing importance of effective performance management by the ND Management Board and how top-level Directorate Objectives are reflected into operational planning. The OSDD principles, which INS/008 seeks to implement, are amplified in the next section.

5.2  Programme working. ND has identified a number of programmes (see 4.2) within which regulatory interventions are determined and guided. Current programmes were identified with the development of the 2008/9 joint strategic programme and plan. Each programme is managed by an SI lead or co-lead, utilising Divisional expertise as appropriate (Intervention Management Group). The key aim of programme working is to ensure that individual intervention plans are targeted and proportionate both in relation to the activity that they cover and in relation to each other; also that all Inspectors align their activity to them; and that the necessary longer term outcomes are clear. Programme management is the main delivery vehicle for regulatory intervention and Programme Managers are accountable to their Heads of Division for progress within programmes. One of the main reasons for adopting a programme approach was to ensure that all ND Inspectors worked to the same overall goals.

5.3  Allocation of resources. ND practice with regard to resource allocation is given effect through the CDRG process and any subsequent in-year adjustments. At present there is not a single pan-Directorate approach to the determination of resource needs. A start has been made with the Resource Allocation Tool and further work is planned. In advance of this, and complementing any future developments, programme managers have been given authority to adjust resources as considered necessary within Divisional boundaries. This is intended to encourage a more flexible approach to the use of Inspectors and moves forward the idea that Inspectors are all regulators first and carry out more specialised functions second.  

5.4  Delivery of outcomes. ND adopts an outcome focused approach to regulation rather than a process focused approach, ie it assumes that there are always deficiencies to be remedied and seeks to use its scarce staff resource to make the necessary improvements in a targeted and proportionate way. The increasing emphasis on performance management means that NGDBs are in any case increasingly obliged to work in this way. The language of Outcomes, Outputs, Inputs and Milestones is an inherent element of this as are the discipline and management skills necessary to secure delivery and, ultimately, value for money for the many stakeholders to which ND is duty bound. It will be apparent that this all represents a significant cultural development.

5.5  Management metrics. Appropriate metrics are an essential tool in the delivery process. These are presently under development and will be included with subsequent issues of this document. Current attention is focused on two areas. Firstly a new set of key performance indicators is being developed to replace the existing 42 OPMs. These will be for use at Management Board level. Secondly, a Directorate Objective is being formulated to harmonise the different uses of IIS data across Divisions. In the meantime, Inspectors should ensure  that they follow Divisional processes for the collection and collation of IIS data. See details in Annex G.  

6  Accountabilities

It has been recognised that the new approaches embodied in this guidance represent a significant development of previous practice. In the past, site inspection teams had tended to establish priorities in relation to site interventions but without necessarily having the authority to control all aspects of intervention in practice. This authority is now vested in IMGs and programme managers, who are intended to control all aspects of intervention in a co-ordinated and integrated way. The converse of this is that all Inspectors who are involved in intervention activity should align their activity with programme priorities. A side effect of this is that individual site inspection and assessment Units are now constituted primarily for staff management purposes. These are significant changes and for this reason the accountabilities and other management aspects are mapped out in some detail in Annex A.

7  Associated documents

• INS/008 Intervention Planning

Figure 1 - Strategic Direction and Operational Strategy

• Figure 1: Strategic Direction and Operational Strategy [37.2KB]

Annex A – Management Arrangements

1  This annex sets out the management arrangements outlined in paper MB08/37 put to NDMB on 24 July 2008.

Head of Division

Duties:

2  Ensure that programmes are defined within the area of responsibility and adequate management arrangements are in place to deliver associated interventions.

3  Ensure that programme managers allocate resource to best effect using Directorate prioritization tools to inform decisions eg the Lindley/Gabbott model.

4  Set up and manage systems to monitor and report progress on a routine basis, using Directorate management metrics.

Accountabilities:

5  To Chief Inspector for programme management.

6  To MB (usually via CDRG) for identification of programme resource requirements using the Directorate resourcing model. 

Authority:

7  Allocate resources to other Divisions as agreed between Division Heads to address emergent changes to in-year programme priorities if appropriate.

8  Change the programme structure within Division as required in light of operational experience.

9  Change intervention ‘focus’ within a programme as required to achieve necessary progress.

Programme Managers (Band 1)

 

Duties:

10  Ensure that integrated intervention strategies, plans, projects and resource requirements developed under programme vision and strategy  reflect the instructions in this document.

11  Oversee delivery of intervention plans and take action when progress is adversely affected, including re-allocation of resource as necessary and as informed by Directorate prioritisation models. 

12  Set up and manage systems to monitor and report progress on a routine basis, using Directorate and Divisional management metrics as appropriate, adjusting priorities using the regulatory review process.

13  Incorporate and take into consideration any relevant ND imperatives (for example Directorate Objectives, mandatory cornerstones).

Accountabilities:

14  To Head of Division for ensuring that adequate progress is made with planned interventions (where programmes are jointly led then each lead may be held to account for progress of the whole group).

Authority:

15  Band 1 leads may exercise regulatory authorities defined in BMM Annex 2 (for example signing of licence instruments).

16  Allocate resources to other programmes within the Division as agreed between programme leads at the IMG to address emergent changes to in-year programme priorities if appropriate.

17  Change intervention ‘focus’ (see note above) within intervention strategies and plans as required to achieve necessary progress.

Nominated/Lead Site Inspector

Duties:

18  Act as the interface with the site for the purposes of enforcement (in the broadest sense) and communication on regulatory issues.

19  Establish the Site Intervention Plan Note 6 to cover priorities agreed by the IMG.

20  Co-ordinate progress with delivery of the plan by providing input to monitoring and corrective actions to ensure IMG priorities are delivered.

21  Organise and deliver responses to unplanned events in liaison with the IMG and following ND investigation criteria.

6  The Site Intervention Plan is expected to include all planned interventions, including specialist inspections, team inspections, known permissioning activity and PSR work. It may also refer to interventions that take place elsewhere but are nevertheless relevant to the site in question, for example supply chain interventions.

Accountabilities:

22  To the IMG for development of the agreed site intervention plan in liaison with line manager.

23  To IMG for co-ordination of delivery of the site intervention plan.

24  To line manager for quality of that element of intervention falling to NSI.

Authority:

25  To co-ordinate timely delivery of agreed action by individual Inspectors designated under the site Intervention Plan.

26  To highlight to the IMG any developing interventions that are necessary but outwith the agreed Intervention Plan.

Nuclear Safety Inspectors

Duties:

27  Carry out interventions in accordance with Interventions Plans and projects agreed by the IMG and HSE/ND policies and procedures.

Accountabilities:

28  To IMG for delivery of agreed interventions.

29  Functionally to Nominated Site Inspector/Lead Inspector for co-ordination of interventions with those identified in the Site Intervention Plan Note 7.

30  To Line Manager for quality of interventions falling to the Inspector.

7  This is intended to make it possible for the Nominated/Lead Site Inspector to carry out the duty of co-ordinating delivery of the site Intervention Plan, for example by ensuring that inspections are carried out in a logical order or in a mutually complementary way. It does NOT give the Nominated/Lead Site Inspector ANY authority over the quality or delivery of the work of individual inspectors. This lies with the relevant line manager/IMG.

Authority:

31  To interact as required with duty-holders to deliver agreed interventions. 

Annex B – The Regulatory Review Process

1  Regulatory review is an important element of the delivery process. Its purpose is to determine whether sufficient progress is being made against appropriate targets and to make any adjustments to plans that appear to be necessary, together with associated resourcing changes. The review process is a fundamental element of Directorate performance management.

2  Reviews are carried out at different management levels but the process is generally the same at each level and involves :

• Use of appropriate internally and externally sourced information relating to:
  • compliance inspection
  • permissioning inspection
  • OEF (including progress against ND’s DSO targets)
  • corporate interventions
  • stakeholder intelligence
  • SPI trends
  • Directorate Objectives
• Identification of the current status of the duty-holder - where are they now, strengths and weaknesses.
• Assessment of progress with extant delivery plans, and confirmation or otherwise of the relevance of current aims and objectives.
• Use of information on effectiveness of interventions and identification of alternative approaches where the need for this is indicated. This can include seeking explanations for better or worse than expected performance. Successful and unsuccessful interventions can both usefully inform future strategy.
• Agreement to overall priorities and objectives for the forthcoming planning period and the interventions intended to realize objectives, including those with duty-holders and stakeholders other than site licensees. 
• Identification of any need for resourcing adjustments, including between programmes.

Annex C - Terms of Reference for Intervention Management Group

1  The term Intervention Management Group (IMG) is a generic term used to describe the activities of those groups within Divisions that have been set up to ensure that Intervention Plans reflect agreed Integrated Intervention Strategies. At programme management level the IMG will develop a framework to control and inform the development of all the Integrated Intervention Strategies and Intervention Plans within that programme.

2  At Intervention Plan level, the IMG will ensure that the Intervention Plan aligns with the associated Integrated Intervention Strategy and overall programme expectations. The hierarchy is:

• Programme Strategy
• Integrated Intervention Strategy
• Integrated Intervention Plan

3 IMGs ensure that:

• Programme vision, strategy and outcomes are established and reflected in the priorities and intended outcomes for Intervention Strategies and Plans.
• Planning takes into account relevant information from previous interventions, corporate activity, SPI/OEF data (including outcomes from investigations), requirements of Directorate Objectives and determines appropriate interventions using the leverage model to inform intentions.
• Proportionate resources are allocated to achieve outcomes, and re-allocated as necessary using agreed Directorate prioritisation and attention models.
• Intervention plans are developed and agreed 1 April each year for securing progress towards outcomes (agreement is by IMG lead SI).
• Regular review of plans and programmes is carried out and action taken as necessary to ensure effectiveness and timely delivery of progress towards outcomes (noting that outcomes may have to be changed if experience suggests that resources could be better used on other contributions to nuclear safety).
• Lessons learned from success and failure are fed into the OEF process and so into the next planning cycle.
• New staff are advised of the IMG process, together with the detail and current strategies and plans and the need to align with them.

Annex D - Leverage

• Annex D – IIS Reg Review 'Principles' Intervention Leverage Model - Strategic Options [25.5KB]

1  The Leverage Model should be used to inform choices on interventions with a view to maximising influence. The vertical axis describes the level at which it is best to intervene. The horizontal axis describes objectives that could form the focus of an intervention regardless of the level at which interest is applied.  The further from the origin, the greater the leverage on the point at issue.

2  On each axis there are opposing pressures between the need for public reassurance and compliance on the one hand and the need to maximise impact on the other. The need for public re-assurance and compliance tend to drive attention towards the origin. In some cases, interventions are supported by legal requirements, in other cases there are no legal requirements and ND relies on its persuasive skills.

3  Options on each scale are not mutually exclusive and it may be appropriate to intervene at different points on each scale at the same time.

4  Whenever intervention plans are being developed, those responsible should use the leverage model to help determine the most appropriate position(s) on the model at which to engage.

Annex E - Intervention Plans

1  Details of expectations for intervention plans are set out in INS/008 Annex A and are repeated below for convenience. Although this guidance is aimed principally at Intervention Plans relating for the regulation of site licensees, much of it is equally applicable to any interventions aimed at other duty-holders or stakeholders. 

• Set out detail of the agreed minimum level of planned cornerstone inspections to be included in site intervention plans.
• Use opportunities for partnering wherever appropriate (eg with other regulators, internal licensee regulators, stakeholders).
• Use the Leverage Model to identify appropriate interventions.
• Be developed in consultation with duty-holders and stakeholders through open and effective dialogue so that there is a clear and understood rationale for the planned interventions.
• Identify longer term outcomes and the inputs, outputs and milestones that indicate adequate progress towards outcomes – ie what it is intended to do to make progress towards ND’s aims.
• Identify who will lead the intervention.
• Take due account of Directorate interests identified through Divisional planning by programme managers.
• Include permissioning, periodic safety review and licensing/re-licensing/activity where known.
• Establish an appropriate balance of attention in three areas:
  • improvement areas identified by Safety Performance Indicators and OEF when available.
  • assurance, gained through compliance and permissioning inspection (and re-licensing/re-structuring controls). A minimum  level of cornerstone inspection should be agreed by the  programme lead(s) within this.
  • ALARP improvements in compliance arrangements, implementation of compliance arrangements, safety management and culture, plant/facility hardware.
• Integrate intelligence and information from compliance inspection, permissioning inspection, OEF and corporate/other interventions.
• Ensure that intervention attention is informed by knowledge of the key hazard controls identified in safety cases.
• Be formally approved by programme managers by 1 April each year.

2  The Nominated Site Inspector (or Lead Inspector for multi-Inspector sites) has responsibility for establishing the Intervention Plan for sites and then co-ordinating activity relating to its delivery, as advised by the IMG. This is a difficult task and will require a deal of co-operation by all those involved. Assigning this role as described in Annex A is not intended to put the Nominated Inspector/Lead Inspector in a controlling but simply reflects the fact that someone has to do this job, that the Nominated Inspector/Lead Inspector is the best placed person to do it, and that sites expect and benefit from being able to refer to a single point of contact on site interventions.

3  Intervention Plans should be informed by and link to any strategies or guidance developed by IMGs and programme managers and ideally will also be informed by longer term strategies set out for the site in question, see Annex C para 2. This guidance is not prescriptive in this area other than to suggest that all intervention plans should be informed by and link to a longer term strategy. The Intervention Plan only gives a snapshot of intentions for the planned year, it does not give the longer term explanation of what those plans are intended to achieve. It may be appropriate to combine a Site Interventipon Plan with a description of longer term strategic intent.

4  Subsequent issues of this guidance will include examples of Intervention Plans.

Annex F - Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes

1  A key principle of the OSDD approach is to define activity in relation to intended outcomes. It is a government expectation that government departments, non-departmental government bodies and executive agencies manage their activity on this basis.

2  Experience suggests that a useful way to identify inputs, outputs and outcomes is to start with the outcome and then work back to establish what has to happen to achieve that outcome. A degree of flexibility is required because in nuclear regulation, the regulator is often not fully in control of events. IMGs therefore need to be alert to the need to change and adapt with experience.

3  This Annex gives examples of inputs, outputs and outcomes.

Outcome

4  An outcome is something that is brought about that removes or reduces challenges to nuclear safety or security, or secures improvements where these are justified. In selecting intended outcomes, due regard should be taken of the regulatory gap and the likelihood of success. It will also be useful to identify potential outcomes against the overall SPI framework of:

• Sustained excellence of operations
• Control of hazards
• Positive safety culture  

Examples:

1  Construction of modern standard facilities to replace ageing ones that are no longer considered safe enough.

2  Reduction in numbers of precursor events against an agreed baseline.

3  Reduction in worker dose.

4  Reduction in site/facility risk by improvements in physical safety margins or defence in depth provisions.

5  Reduction in risk achieved other than by physical improvements (for example, better safe operating envelope, adoption of better working practices).

6  Completion of improvements against an agreed improvement plan.

7  Implementation of improved compliance arrangements with obvious benefits.

8  Granting regulatory permission (this is included on the basis that if it is given it has confirmed that safety is likely to be adequate for a potential challenge to nuclear safety or security, thus averting a challenge; or on the basis that if it is refused when the judgment is otherwise, then again the challenge is averted).

9  Reduction in quantities of unremediated waste at a licensed site.

Outputs

5  An output is a change that needs to take place to help secure an outcome. It will usually be associated with the licensee, or duty-holder/stakeholder but may also be an internal change. In process terms, one group’s output could be another group’s input.

10  Establishment of agreed forward programme of work, for example as a result of a safety case assessment (not considered an outcome because nothing will have actually happened ‘on the ground’ until the programme is delivered).

11  Change to licensee arrangements, or development of new arrangements (not counted as an outcome because change on the ground will only happen when any new arrangements are implemented).

12  Positive licensee response to the issue of a licence instrument (or Improvement Notice) that has the effect of obliging the licensee to make improvements. The issue could be regarded as an input since nothing has actually happened at the issue stage.

13  Improvement to safety management arrangements eg better operating rules, revised safety mechanisms, tighter maintenance regime (will only be an outcome when these improvements have been shown to achieve actual improvements).

14  Establishment of agreed baseline for future improvements.

15  Issue of new/revised safety case or Periodic Safety Report (not considered an outcome because the safety case of itself does not make a plant safe).

16  Withdrawal of safety case or Periodic Safety Review (ie acceptance that it needs to be re-worked).

17  Establishment of new industry standard, code of practice or other good practice document.

18  Implementation of remedial training programme by duty-holder (not counted as outcome since the effect will be evidenced in other indicators and will take some time).

Inputs

6  An input is activity that has to be carried out to secure an output. Usually, given that Integrated Intervention Strategies are intended to deliver regulatory outcomes, inputs will be NII activity.

Examples:

19  Completion of a programme of compliance, permissioning or reactive inspection that identifies and leads to the justification of a forward programme of improvement.

20  NII report that leads to identification of the need for a forward programme of improvements.

21  Letter to licensee that initiates improvements (improvement programme would be output).

22  Development of agree NII line on topic of interest prior to putting this to the licensee.

23  Presentation(s) to licensee, or other forms of advice, as part of intervention aimed at making improvements.

24  NII contribution to development of industry code or standard.

25  Presentation of cleared paper that establishes NII line in specific area of regulation.

26  Clarification and agreement of legal obligation of licensee in area of contention.

27  Safety case/submission assessment report.

7  The example in the table gives an idea of the relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes.

NB:

(i)  One output may require several inputs and one outcome may require several outputs.

(ii)  In reality, it is unlikely that it will be possible to define inputs and outputs without an open dialogue with the licensee/duty-holder because only this will reveal what is possible and likely to be effective.

Outcome	Output	Input
Measurable reductions in missed/outstanding maintenance over a one year period through more rigorous implementation of improvement LC28 arrangements.	LC 28 improvement programme established.	Establish risk/compliance gap and justification of NII intervention. Carry out benchmarking inspection(s) of other licensees to establish good practice. Complete LC 28 inspection of target licensee. Arrange and deliver presentation of NII findings to responsible managers. Arrange and participate in NII/licensee workshop to establish remediation programme.
	Revised LC 28 arrangements issued.	Not defined.
	LC28 training complete.	Not defined.
	Internal licensee LC28 audit complete.	Not defined.

Milestones

8  Milestones are a convenient way to monitor progress towards an outcome. Depending on circumstances, milestones may be the actual inputs, outputs or outcomes but, especially if these are likely to take some time to deliver, it may be appropriate to break these down into key stages. For example, if the benchmarking inspections in the table take six months to complete, Divisional monitoring arrangements may be such as to require the identification of in-quarter milestones. 

9  Milestones should be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound) and represent the completion of a major deliverable that represents satisfactory overall progress. 

Annex G - IIS Data

Introduction

1  The collection and processing of IIS related data is an important part of ND regulatory activity and is key to making management decisions on priorities, planning, resources etc.  An ND Admin Strategic Project Group was convened in Summer 2007 to review the way IIS data is collected and presented.  The recommendations from this group were captured and have been addressed within the following guidance which also includes developments from experience to date and the outputs of the OSDD strategic project.  Further developments within the area of IIS data management area are anticipated with the embedding of the programme and project working approach across ND.

Data presentation

2  Site Inspection Reports. A common Site Inspection Report template is in use across ND (Ref: INS/003 ) and should be used for the purpose of collating the Site Inspector’s ratings from compliance inspection activities.  The criteria for making the judgement to define the IIS rating is included within this annex (Table 1). In all cases the report should clearly state whether the intervention was a planned or reactive activity.

3  Contact Reports. A common Contact Report template is in use across ND (INS/003 ) and  should be used for the purpose of collating the outcome of any intervention activity not covered by compliance inspection arrangements within a Site Inspection Report.  At present the interventions recorded within a contact report should only be rated if the discussions relate to licence condition compliance. For other interventions a descriptor should be offered from one of the following:

• Guidance
• Influencing
• Information Gathering

4  In all cases the report should clearly state whether the intervention was a planned or reactive activity.  It should be noted that the development of metrics to assist in capturing useful specialist inspection assessment management data via contact reports is currently being completed.

Review of Intervention Plans

5  Intervention Plans are to be defined for the planning year and are expected to be effective from 1 April in any given planning cycle.  The plans are living documents and as such are subject to ongoing IMG review.  It is therefore acceptable for plans to change during the planning year to suit regulatory priorities. Changes must be endorsed by the relevant programme IMG.

6  One of the most common perturbations of planned intervention is the emergence of a need for reactive work. Given that a significant proportion of planned intervention will have resulted from previous reactive imperatives, it is important to weigh potential new interventions carefully against existing ones. This is especially the case in ND’s work where interventions can take many years to come to fruition. For this reason, diversion of resource and plans should be referred to the IMG (clearly this will not be the case where urgent action is required to deal with an important safety issue).

Management Information

7  Management Data. Management Data should be collated for each programme or sub programme. The use of management data is currently subject to ongoing development within the various Divisions but in any case should be presented within the two broad areas of:

• Efficiency
• Effectiveness
• Milestones

8  The primary purpose for collecting and presenting the data is to allow meaningful management review and decisions to be taken at:

• IMG Meetings (Monthly to Bimonthly)
• Divisional Planning Meetings (typically Quarterly)
• Divisional Regulatory Review Meetings (typically Annual)
• Directorate Regulatory Resource and Planning Meetings (Annual)

9  The following represents early guidance on the presentation and use of management data:

10  Efficiency. Efficiency data is to be used to test whether we are delivering against the expectation of the programme IMG.  It is essentially a measure of intervention activity achieved against the planned activity agreed by the IMG.  The data to monitor efficiency is:

• Planned Activity Achieved against Planned Activity (%)

11  It should be noted that the definitions of planned and reactive activity are defined earlier in this guidance.  It is also instructive under efficiency to monitor the level of reactive activity. The reactive activity is to be calculated as:

• Reactive Activity Completed against Total Reactive and Planned Activity (%)

12  To present this information it is necessary for the intervention plan to define activities (compliance inspections) for each month and for inspectors to provide a result as to the planned and reactive intervention activity that was completed.  The efficiency test will be the percentage of planned activities that have been completed  at the end of the planning year.  IMG’s will also monitor performance during the year to whether interventions are being completed to plan or going late such that action can be taken if necessary to correct an adverse trend.  This data will be complemented by monitoring the level of reactive activity which will provide IMG’s with a further insight into both ND’s planning processes and Licensee performance.  Data should be presented in the two groups of Cornerstone Licence Condition Inspections and all other Licence Condition Inspections

13  Effectiveness. Effectiveness data is to be used to test whether our intervention activity is being successful in demonstrating an acceptable or improving level of Licensee/Duty Holder nuclear safety performance or compliance.  The data required to test effectiveness is as follows:

• Compliance Inspection Ratings
• Safety Assessment Ratings
• Safety Performance Indicators
• Operational Experience Feedback 

14  The compliance inspection ratings should be presented for the two groups of Cornerstone Licence Condition Inspections and all other Licence Condition Inspections. The Safety Performance Indicator information is being made available by Licensees and is collected and presented by the Div 4 OPEX team. The programme IMG’s should utilise the data to judge effectiveness and as such review and prioritise our regulatory strategies and intervention plans. Similarly the programme IMG’s should use Operational Experience Feedback (Events and Incidents) data to review and prioritise our regulatory strategies and intervention plans.

15  Milestones. Milestones should be identified for each programme of work as defined within Annex F.  Progress against identified milestones for each programme should be collated and presented as management information on a quarterly basis. Each milestone should have a status allocated from the following:

• Completed
• On target
• Delayed
• Work not Started
• Deleted

16  A short progress statement should be made for each milestone on a quarterly basis.

• Table 1 – IIS Ratings [43KB]

Annex H – Regulatory Nuclear Interface Protocol (RNIP)

1  In all the UK nuclear programmes, both civil and defence, there has always been a very strong focus on safety – safety behaviours, safety performance and safety analysis – indeed safety and security are widely recognised to be critical enabling functions to delivery.

2  Safety and security are the responsibility of those responsible for delivering the nuclear programmes: the nuclear Licensees, defence Authorisees and other dutyholders.  But the nuclear safety and security regulators – the Nuclear Directorate of the Health and Safety Executive and the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, working closely with many other bodies – also have significant responsibility for the appropriate regulation of nuclear safety and security.  There is therefore considerable dialogue, both formal and informal, between dutyholders and nuclear safety regulators.  For many dutyholders, there is a structured framework of Level 1 – 4 meetings with the regulators.

3  The safety directors of the principal dutyholders in the nuclear programmes meet together regularly in the Safety Directors Forum – the SDF. Recently the SDF has expressed concern that while there is considerable dialogue with individual dutyholders, there has been less opportunity for strategic dialogue, across all dutyholders and programmes, on the major cross-cutting issues.  When Mike Weightman, the Director of the HSE’s Nuclear Directorate met with the SDF in early 2006, it was agreed that there should be regular strategic dialogue between the SDF and the nuclear safety regulators, and that this should be underpinned by what is now known as the Regulatory Nuclear Interface Protocol, the RNIP.  This is not an entirely new idea or unique to the UK or the nuclear sector.  Experience from other countries with nuclear programmes is that such a protocol is useful in clarifying the way in which regulators and dutyholders work for the benefit of people and society

4  The RNIP is an agreement between the nuclear dutyholders and the nuclear safety regulators.  It was developed by a small working group of safety directors and senior regulators, and has been improved and endorsed at a meeting between the SDF, the heads of division of the HSE Nuclear Directorate and the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator.  It has been signed by the Chief Executives or Chairmen of most of the nuclear licensees, by the Director of HSE’s Nuclear Directorate and by equivalent senior Ministry of Defence officials.  It thus has wide senior agreement and support across all the nuclear programmes.

5  Effective safety regulation requires a robust relationship between the regulators and the regulated, in which there will often need to be a degree of tension; the organisations have distinct Missions and objectives but can unify around the RNIP’s vision statement:

to enable the safe, secure, effective use and control of nuclear technology and material for the overall benefit of society.

6  The protocol provides the basis for this robust relationship, clearly setting out a shared vision and the ways of working – the values, behaviours and interactions – that everyone has agreed to adopt to deliver this vision.  But at this level people could easily interpret its meaning differently.  So it is underpinned by 3 pillars which illustrate 3 of the key words or phrases in the vision statement.

7  The “use and control of nuclear material” pillar illustrates the wide range of nuclear material whose use must be controlled to ensure safety and security throughout their life-cycle: manufacture, operations, decommissioning and storage.

8  The “benefit” pillar embraces the wide variety of benefits to society as a whole of having effective arrangements in place to allow the safe and secure use and control of nuclear technology and material.  It reflects both immediate personal and societal safety and security impacts and longer term socio-economic considerations, such as sustainable energy supplies and the need for industry to contribute to wealth creation for the benefit of the whole United Kingdom.

9  The most detailed pillar is the one which seeks to understand what is meant by “effective”.  This concentrates on the vital importance of an effective relationship between the regulators and the regulated.  These roles are complementary to one another, but to be effective they must be based on undertaking activities with each other, not for each other.  It must always involve sharing information early, so that there are no surprises, and that where possible plans can be aligned.  Sharing expectations to ensure common understanding is crucial in agreeing clear objectives for regulatory engagement.  The relationship between regulators and regulated should be based on a shared set of values and behaviours.  None of these are new – they are all drawn from values and behaviours documented by many of the dutyholders and the regulators.  But what is new is that there is a single set of shared and agreed values and behaviours for all parties.  And this provides the opportunity for either party, or indeed for other stakeholders, to challenge anyone who does not appear to be “living the values”.  Naturally, from time to time, people will fall short of these agreed behaviours: the important thing will be to learn from this, to see things from the other parties’ perspective, and improve behaviour for future similar engagements, a process of continuous improvement.

10  The values and behaviours are intended to influence all regulatory engagement, including routine formal engagement typically at Level 1 to Level 3 regulatory meetings, and for significant other interactions, such as major modifications or consent for start-up.  The values are unlikely to truly drive behaviour in regulatory interactions unless there is some form of measurement of compliance against them.  So there is a need for both dutyholders and regulators to provide feedback from all such engagement.  There are many ways in which this could be done, but all organisations are encouraged (for consistency) to use the Feedback Form which is published with the protocol.  It is intended that this form is completed separately by each party involved in the engagement, recording the agreed objective for the engagement (which must be agreed at the start of the engagement) and whether it was met, as well as a subjective numerical assessment of how their own, and separately the other party’s, behaviours scored against the desired values.  It will be for each organisation to develop a process to collate feedback using this form or another method.

11  As stated at the beginning, the objective of the RNIP was to provide a framework for senior level discussion of the strategic issues affecting the nuclear programmes between dutyholders safety directors and regulators.  Every 6 months, at one of the routine meetings of the SDF, there will be a special session attended by all the HSE Nuclear Directorate Heads of Division (Deputy Chief Inspectors) and the Director of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator.  Each meeting will provide an opportunity for discussion of a small number of specific strategic issues identified in advance by the SDF or the regulators.  Each meeting also provides an opportunity to review the consolidated feedback of compliance with the RNIP values and behaviours.  And, as reporting against the Safety Performance Indicator framework starts to mature in all sectors of the nuclear programmes, it also provides an opportunity to discuss the strategic issues that emerge from this reporting.  Taken  together, this will allow dutyholders and regulators together to consider whether we are delivering against the vision statement – whether we are indeed enabling the safe, secure, effective use and control of nuclear technology and material for the overall benefit of society – and even more importantly, what we can do together to enable it better.

12  This is a new initiative, and no doubt with experience will need some further development.  There are of course several other safety and environmental regulators associated with the UK programmes.  They are being kept informed of this initiative and in future consideration may be given to widening the attendance at the 6-monthly meetings, although there is a risk of the meeting becoming less effective if attendance is too large.  In some ways this new meeting will complement the well-established EA/SEPA Nuclear Industry Liaison Group.

13  What is required of everyone working in the regulation of the nuclear programmes, both the regulators and the regulated, is to consider the values and behaviours, to assess where you are not living up to them, and to think about what you should do to improve your effectiveness.

14  RNIP feedback form and behaviours [49KB] are attached.