GS(M)R Regulations 7(4) and 7(10) when investigating gas escapes involving deferred repairs to public reported escapes (PREs)

Author unit / section:

HID SI3D

Target audience:

HID SI3 Inspectors

Summary

This guidance has been developed to supplement the existing Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996 (GS(M)R) guidance document L80. It helps to clarify the legal and operational issues relating to incidents where a gas Distribution Network Operator (DNO) has taken longer than 12 hours to prevent a gas escape following a Public Reported Escape (PRE). In particular this guidance addresses the concept of reasonable practicability as it applies to Regulation 7(4) and 7(10) of the GS(M)R by considering some of the circumstances where it may not have been reasonably practicable to prevent a gas escape within 12 hours of receipt of the PRE.

This guidance will be used by HSE Inspectors during investigations of gas escapes from gas distribution pipelines.

Purpose

This guidance has been developed to supplement the existing Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996 (GS(M)R) guidance document L80. It helps to clarify the legal and operational issues relating to incidents where a gas Distribution Network Operator (DNO) has taken longer than 12 hours to prevent a gas escape following a Public Reported Escape (PRE). In particular this guidance addresses the concept of reasonable practicability as it applies to Regulation 7(4) and 7(10) of the GS(M)R by considering some of the circumstances where it may not have been reasonably practicable to prevent a gas escape within 12 hours of receipt of the PRE.

This guidance will be used by HSE Inspectors during investigations of gas escapes from gas distribution pipelines.

Background

1  The Gas & Pipelines Unit’s Safety Performance Indicator reports for 2005/06 and 2006/07 contain data provided by the DNOs on their current PRE response performance. In  these two reports DNOs were unable to measure their own compliance with GS(M)R in preventing gas escapes within 12 hours since they did not record temporary repairs (one where the repair is sufficient to prevent the escape of gas but will require further work to make permanent). Since then the DNOs have committed themselves to a process of recording GS(M)R Regulation 7(4) compliant temporary repairs. In addition it was agreed that the most representative way of measuring PRE performance by each DNO was to compare the number of PRE deferrals against the number of actual repairs (referred to by the DNOs as “actioned repairs”) undertaken in response to genuine gas escapes. This removes any uncertainty related to no-trace and multiple calls.

Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996

2  Natural gas conveyors are required by GS(M)R to respond to PREs as soon as is reasonably practicable and to prevent the escape of gas within 12 hours of receipt. If the gas escape is not prevented within 12 hours then the gas conveyor may offer the defence that it was not reasonably practicable to have done so and that they did in fact prevent the escape as soon as was reasonably practicable after 12 hours.

3  Regulation 7(4) of GS(M)R states: 

‘Where any gas escapes from a network the person conveying the gas in the part of the network from which the gas escapes shall, as soon as is reasonably practicable after being so informed of the escape, attend the place where the gas is escaping, and within 12 hours of being so informed of the escape, he shall prevent the gas escaping’.

4  Regulation 7(10) GS(M)R states:

‘In any proceedings against a person for an offence consisting of a contravention of paragraphs (4) or (5) above [i.e. regulation 7(4) or regulation 7(5)] it shall, in so far as the contravention is not preventing the escape of gas within the period of 12 hours referred to in those paragraphs, be a defence for the person to prove that it was not reasonably practicable for him effectually to prevent the gas escaping within that period, and that he did effectually prevent the escape of gas as soon as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so.’

5  The prevention of a gas escape by a DNO can be accomplished by ceasing the flow of gas to the escape or repairing the escape (either permanently or temporarily).

Enforcement Considerations

6  Regulations 7(4) and 7(10) of GS(M)R should only be applied to specific incidents where an escape of gas has occurred.

7  There are two clear parts to Regulation 7(4) of GS(M)R:

1. To attend the escape as soon as is reasonably practicable after receipt      of the PRE, and
2. To prevent the gas escape in 12 hours or less (this is an absolute duty and not subject to reasonable practicability).

8  If a specific gas escape is not prevented within 12 hours then the gas conveyor is in breach of Regulation 7(4). Regulation 7(10) offers a defence to this breach and has two parts:

1. The gas conveyor has to prove that it was not reasonably practicable to prevent a specific gas escape within 12 hours and,
2. The escape was, in any case, prevented as soon as was reasonably practicable after the 12-hour limit had expired.

9  In considering any defence under Regulation 7(10) both parts must be considered. It is not sufficient to rely on the fact that a gas escape was prevented as soon as was reasonably practicable after 12 hours.

Decision Making: Use of the Deferral Tool

10  Where a DNO has made a decision, based on reasonably practicability, not to prevent a gas escape within 12 hours of receipt of a PRE this is known as either a “deferred” or “programmed” gas escape.

11  The decision making process used by the DNO by which the repair of a gas escape is deferred or programmed is currently known as the “deferral tool”.

12  Where Regulation 7(4) has been breached the application of the deferral tool can be used to provide a defence under Regulation 7(10) in three parts:

1. The deferral tool was adequate to deliver the prevention of the gas escape within 12 hours unless it was not reasonably practicable, and
2. The training, competence assurance, supervision and monitoring of the individuals who decided not to prevent the gas escape within 12 hours was sufficient to ensure that they applied the deferral tool correctly, and
3. The deferral tool was followed correctly by the individuals who decided not to prevent the gas escape within 12 hours.

Circumstances where a DNO has not prevented a gas escape within 12 hours

13  Circumstances where it may not be reasonably practicable for a DNO to prevent a gas escape within 12 hours of receipt of a specific PRE and where the gas escape was prevented as soon as was reasonably practicable afterwards are given below:

• Genuine problems were encountered when attempting to locate the escape.
• Difficulties were experienced in gaining access to the location of the escape, either by geography or by other risks such as fire, explosion, building instability, roads and traffic etc.
• The size and/or complexity of the escape meant that it could not be completed within 12 hours.
• There was unforeseen demand on FCOs and ELR teams at the time of the gas escape in question
• ELR resources were diverted to other more serious and immediate risks that arose at the same time as the gas escape in question.

Conversely, instances where it may have been reasonably practicable to prevent the gas escape in 12 hours include:

• ELR teams were redeployed on routine 24-hour re-checks on other gas escapes that had already been deferred or were already deployed on lower priority work
• Local practices had evolved where ELR teams deferred gas escapes for their convenience.

14  It is possible that the repair of a gas escape which was started within 12 hours of receipt of the PRE may, during the course of the repair, be reassessed using the DNO's  deferral tool. If the repair of the gas escape is subsequently deferred the DNO will be in breach of Regulation 7(4). In this case the DNO will have available the same Regulation 7(10) defence as with an immediate repair deferral. 

DNO Resources and Prioritisation

15  The duty described in GS(M)R Regulation 7(4) and the defence provided in Regulation 7(10) make it clear that the intention of the legislation is one of preventing an escape in response to a specific incident and not one of limiting risk across a DNO’s undertaking as a whole.

16  However the provision of sufficient numbers of operatives by a DNO to prevent gas escapes within 12 hours will have a bearing on its response to a specific PRE and how it meets its Regulation 7(4) duty.

17  The DNO should interpret Regulation 7(4) so that it provides and prioritises the use of its resources to comply with the arrangements made in its GS(M)R safety case. Any investigation of how the DNO complies with its safety case by making available sufficient resources across the DNO as a whole is subject to Regulation 5 of GS(M)R.