



**European Commission  
Questionnaire on  
Directive 96/82/EC on  
the Control of Major  
Accident Hazards  
Involving Dangerous  
Substances (SEVESO II)  
2006 – 2008:  
United Kingdom  
Response**

## Introduction

Article 19, Paragraph 4 of the Seveso II Directive (Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances) requires each Member State to provide to the European Commission a three yearly report giving details of how the Directive has been implemented within the Member State. The reports are made in accordance with the procedure laid down in Council directive 91/692/EEC of 3 December 1991 standardising and rationalising reports on the implementation of certain Directives relating to the environment for establishments covered by Articles 6 and 9 of the Seveso II Directive.

The reports are sent to the European Commission on behalf of the COMAH Competent Authority, which comprises HSE and the Environment Agency in England and Wales and HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency in Scotland. This report is for the years 2006 to 2008. Any queries about the report should be addressed in the first instance to Mr Tim Beals (timothy.beals@hse.gsi.gov.uk, tel 0151 951 4885). This report will also be available at the European Commission Seveso II web-site (<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/implementation.htm>) in due course, as will be the reports from the other Member States.

### 1 General Information

a. Who are the main competent authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Seveso II Directive and what are their main tasks?

The majority of the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are implemented in Great Britain through the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH), as amended. A Competent Authority (CA) comprising the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA) in England and Wales, and HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in Scotland enforces COMAH. There is corresponding legislation in Northern Ireland and Gibraltar enforced by the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland together with the Northern Ireland Environment Agency and the Gibraltar Environmental Agency respectively.

The CA is responsible for assessment of safety reports and inspection, investigation and enforcement activities at COMAH sites. The land use planning requirements contained in Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive are implemented in the UK by separate legislation which is the responsibility of the Department of Communities and Local Government (in England), the Scottish Government, the Welsh Assembly, the Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland and the Gibraltar authorities. Local planning authorities, based on advice mainly provided by the health and safety authorities, make decisions about land use planning.

	2006	2007	2008
(b)(i) Number of lower tier establishments	788	782	755

(b)(ii) Number of upper tier establishments	396	389	409
(b)(iii) <sup>1</sup> Non Seveso establishments that joined the lower tier category due to amendments to the Directive or to the classification scheme of dangerous substances	33	31	25
(b)(iv) <sup>1</sup> Non Seveso establishments that joined the upper tier category due to amendments to the Directive or to the classification scheme of dangerous substances	8	13	22
(b)(v) <sup>1</sup> Lower tier establishments that joined the upper tier category due to amendments to the Directive or to the classification scheme of dangerous substances	9	2	9
(b)(vi) <sup>1</sup> Lower tier establishments that are no longer Seveso establishments due to amendments to the Directive or to the classification scheme of dangerous substances	33	45	45
(b)(vii) <sup>1</sup> Upper tier establishments that have become lower tier due to amendments to the Directive or to the classification scheme of dangerous substances	4	10	3
(b)(viii) Upper tier establishments that are no longer Seveso establishments due to amendments to the Directive or to the classification scheme of dangerous substances	6	12	7
<p>Note</p> <p><sup>1</sup> Because of the way in which data is recorded, in the answers to questions (b)(iii) to (b)(viii) it is not possible to differentiate between those sites which changed Seveso status because of amendments to the Directive or changes to the classification scheme for dangerous substances and those sites which changed Seveso status for other reasons.</p>			

## 2 Safety Reports

	2006	2007	2008
(a) Total number of establishments falling within the scope of Article 9 and which have not yet submitted any safety report at the end of each of the years covered by the reporting period	8 <sup>1</sup>	6 <sup>2</sup>	20 <sup>3</sup>
(b) On 31 December 2008 for how many			

upper tier establishments was it the case its safety report was last updated: <sup>4</sup>	
i) before 2006	28
ii) during 2006	58
iii) during 2007	109
iv) during 2008	91
v) unknown	0
<p>Notes</p> <p><sup>1</sup> All eight sites attained upper tier status during 2006 and under the timescales permitted by legislation were not required to submit safety reports during that year.</p> <p><sup>2</sup> All six sites attained upper tier status during 2007 and under the timescales permitted by legislation were not required to submit safety reports during that year.</p> <p><sup>3</sup> 19 sites attained upper tier status during 2008 and under the timescales permitted by legislation were not required to submit safety reports during that year. One site attained upper tier status during 2007 and the safety report was submitted outside the timescale permitted by legislation.</p> <p><sup>4</sup> The figures are for those establishments where a revised version of an existing safety report had been submitted. They do not include resubmissions of safety reports rejected at an early stage of the assessment process.</p>	

(c) What is the mean period of time between the reception of a safety report and the communication of conclusions to the operator?

The mean period of time between the receipt of a safety report and the communication of conclusions to the operator is 339 days. This figure is based on the assessment of those safety reports where assessment was begun and completed during the period 2006 to 2008.

### 3 Emergency Plans

	2006	2007	2008
(1) How many upper tier establishments do not have an internal emergency plan as required under Article 11.1(a) of the Directive? <sup>1</sup>	8	6	20
(2) How many upper tier establishments have an internal emergency plan as required under Article 11.1(a) of the Directive?	379	374	379
(3) For how many upper tier establishments is the situation under assessment with regard to the existence of an internal emergency plan. <sup>2</sup>	9	9	10

<p>Notes</p> <p><sup>1</sup> The safety report must demonstrate that an internal emergency plan has been drawn up. In assessing safety reports the Competent Authority (CA) undertakes a first reading of the safety report. At this stage a check is made to ensure that the safety report contains evidence that an internal emergency plan exists. The figures in answer to (1), above, reflect those establishments that had not yet submitted a safety report at the time.</p> <p><sup>2</sup> The figure in answer to (3) reflects the position regarding those safety reports that were at an early stage of assessment.</p>			
(4) How many upper tier establishments did not have external emergency plans drawn up by the designated authorities as required by Article 11.1(c) of the Directive?	11 <sup>1,4</sup>	17 <sup>2,4</sup>	20 <sup>3,5</sup>
<p>Notes</p> <p><sup>1</sup> All 11 establishments became upper tier during 2006 and under Article 11(1)(b) 4<sup>th</sup> indent were not required to provide the information necessary for the preparation of an external plan for up to one year after so becoming.</p> <p><sup>2</sup> Nine establishments became upper tier during 2007 and under Article 11(1)(b) 4<sup>th</sup> indent were not required to provide the information necessary for the preparation of an external plan for up to one year after so becoming.</p> <p><sup>3</sup> 10 establishments became upper tier during 2008 and under Article 11(1)(b) 4<sup>th</sup> indent were not required to provide the information necessary for the preparation of an external plan for up to one year after so becoming.</p> <p><sup>4</sup> External plans are in place for all 11 establishments becoming upper tier in 2006 and 17 establishments becoming upper tier during 2007.</p> <p><sup>5</sup> Outstanding external plans for six establishments are due to be completed during 2009.</p>			

#### (5) Testing of External Emergency Plans

Testing an emergency plan may consist of a live exercise or a table-top exercise, supported by the testing of other components (which may be done at separate times) including the communication arrangements, and will usually examine the response during the first few hours.

Testing the principal components of the plan can therefore take a number of forms and might include:

- a) Seminar exercises, facilitating discussion about the different organisations' responses in particular circumstances during an emergency;
- b) Walk-through exercises where the emergency response is 'walked through', including visiting appropriate facilities such as emergency control centres (ECCs);
- c) Table-top exercises based on a suitable scenario or scenarios identified in the safety report, to examine the command and control arrangements and inter-agency liaison during an emergency;

- d) Control post exercises testing the communication arrangements during an emergency, with participating organisations located where they would be during an emergency; and,
- e) Live exercises fully testing some or all aspects of the emergency plan.

Testing should be co-ordinated and agreed locally to give the maximum benefit to local authorities, operators and emergency services. The CA expects the components listed above to be examined at least once in each three-year period and recognises that there will be considerable benefits from carrying out some of the exercises, for example the ‘control post’ communications exercise, every year.

Testing should enable appropriate personnel and resources to be brought together in one place to work through their roles in the event of an emergency in a realistic way and should normally be centred around a simulated event selected from the hazards identified in the safety report. The testing of some of the components should take the form of a live exercise, involving the deployment on the ground of the appropriate resources in a simulation of their actual response to an incident.

The main objectives of testing emergency plans are to give confidence in the following constituent parts of the plan:

- a) The completeness, consistency and accuracy of the emergency plan and other documentation used by organisations responding to an emergency;
- b) The adequacy of the equipment and facilities and their operability, especially under emergency conditions; and,
- c) The competence of staff to carry out the duties identified for them in the plan, and their use of the equipment and facilities.

The plan will be considered to have been fully tested when all the component parts have been individually or collectively tested sufficiently to provide evidence that the main aims and objectives of the plan have, or have not, been met.

	2006	2007	2008
(6) On 31 December 2008, for how many upper tier establishments has the external emergency plan not been tested over the last three years as required by Article 11.4?	11 <sup>1</sup>		
(7)(8)(9) For how many upper tier establishments was the external emergency plan last tested in each of the relevant years?	46	89	116
(10) For how many upper tier establishments is the date of the last test unknown	3 <sup>2</sup>		

<p>(11) In how many cases have the Competent Authorities decided that the requirements to produce an external emergency plan should not apply, Article 11.6 refers?</p>	<p>5<sup>3</sup></p>
<p>Notes</p> <p><sup>1</sup> The data relates to establishments that remain active and retain upper tier status. Establishments for which the external emergency plan has not been tested as required by the Directive have been identified and measures taken to ensure the necessary tests are carried out. At one of the sites the external emergency plan has now been tested (June 2009) and at a further two sites tests have been scheduled for October 2009 and January 2010 respectively. Of the remaining eight sites, six fall within the same petrochemicals complex and are covered by a generic off-site emergency plan that is currently being revised. The revised plan is due to be issued in Autumn 2009, with a full multi-Agency test planned for early 2010. The final 2 sites are also located on a large petrochemicals complex. The last test recorded at each of these sites took place in November 2003 but the Emergency Planning Authority (EPA) concerned advises that staff from both these sites will have taken part in tests of the generic emergency plan at other sites within the complex during 2006 to 2008. The adequacy of these arrangements is to be discussed with the EPA.</p> <p><sup>2</sup> This figure relates to those external plans due to be tested between 2006 and 2008. At two of these sites the date of the last test is known but fell during 2009. Because of the way the data is captured the date of the previous test has not been retained, therefore it is not known whether these plans were also tested between 2006 and 2008. At a fourth site no test date has been recorded. However, this site recently dropped out of the top tier and no-longer requires an external emergency plan, so no further action is required.</p> <p><sup>3</sup> The CA has decided that, based on the information contained in the safety report for each of the five establishments in question, the consequences of a major accident will not extend beyond the site boundary. There is therefore no requirement for an external emergency plan.</p>	

#### 4 Domino Effects

##### (a) General background information

Domino sites are designated by HSE on behalf of the CA. A contour is set around each site. This is known as the Consultation Distance (CD), and is allocated to each establishment for land use planning purposes. The CD is a risk contour for toxic substances (risk of death or serious injury to people), or a hazard contour for flammables and explosives, or a combination of both (where both flammables/explosives and toxics are present). This contour,

where it overlaps with the physical boundaries of other sites, is used as the basis to designate domino groups.

	2006	2007	2008
(b) How many groups of establishments have been identified where the domino effect is relevant?	69	68	64
(c) Average number of establishments per group	3	3	3
(d) Number of establishments in the smallest group	2	2	2
(e) Number of establishments in the biggest group	14	13	12

(f) Strategy for ensuring that suitable information is exchanged

All operators whose sites are designated as domino sites are advised of the fact in writing by the CA. The letter provides them with the names and addresses of other establishments in the domino group with which they should exchange information. The letter may also give advice on the nature of the information that should be exchanged. Members should exchange necessary information in writing, which the CA may check. In some cases the information is exchanged at a meeting of the members of the designated domino group. Such information may be incorporated in an establishment's safety report, in which case compliance can be checked during the safety report assessment process.

The CA's letter may also request operators to provide confirmation to the CA that they have passed appropriate information to other members of the group. Operators receiving such information should review whether they have taken all measures necessary to limit consequences for their site. This can be checked for upper tier sites when operators send in revisions to safety reports (which they are required to do should their site be affected) or by raising the issue with operators where no revision has been submitted. For lower tier sites, such information should be presented in the Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP), which each operator must prepare and maintain and which must be available for inspection by the CA

## **5 Land-use Planning**

General background information on the adopted measures

Article 12 has been implemented by introducing separate regulations. In England and Wales these are the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 1992, as amended, in Scotland the Town and Country Planning (Hazardous Substances) (Scotland) Regulations 1993 as amended and in

Northern Ireland the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1993 as amended.

Administration and enforcement of the above regulations lies with Hazardous Substances Authorities (HSAs). The HSA is usually, but not always, the Local Planning Authority (LPA), and is responsible for granting consent to establishments wishing to keep hazardous substances as defined in the Seveso II Directive. Responsibility also falls to the LPA for granting permission to develop the land in the vicinity of these establishments.

Where new planning consents are concerned, LPAs are required to consult either singly with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) where only health and safety considerations are at issue, or jointly with HSE and the relevant environment counterparts for England and Wales, and Scotland (the Environment Agency (EA) or Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)) respectively where environmental matters also need to be addressed. The Competent Authority (CA) partners can respond individually or jointly depending on the issues being considered. An identical regime operates in Northern Ireland. This ensures all hazardous aspects of new consent applications are properly considered in terms of the possible human and environmental impact arising from a major accident. On behalf of the CA, HSE defines zones around each establishment based on:

- Risk to humans of toxic releases and/or
- Hazard for flammable or explosive effects.

The LPA is also required to consult on most proposed developments within the zoned area. Again, HSE and EA/SEPA will advise on the compatibility of the development with its proposed location.

Appeals Procedures are in place that allow for cases where the developer or any CA partner is dissatisfied with the conclusion reached by the LA.

Most establishments have a defined inner, middle and outer zone - in order of decreasing risk of harm from identified major accident scenarios. In some cases, the inner zone is within the boundary of the establishment itself. HSE has codified developments that are compatible with each zone by considering the:

- Number of people present;
- Duration for which they will be present;
- Ease with which they can be evacuated

The following examples illustrate the application of this policy:  
Inner zone - HSE would not advise against:

- Workplaces for up to 100 people;
- Public car parks

**but would advise against.....**

- Larger workplaces;
- Car parks with leisure amenities;
- Housing

Middle zone - HSE would not advise against:

- Larger workplaces, retail or leisure developments less than 5000 m<sup>2</sup>;
  - Small housing developments
- but would advise against.....**
- Larger retail developments;
  - Larger or high-density housing developments

Outer zone - HSE would not advise against:

- Schools;
  - Some hospitals
- but would still advise against.....**
- Larger hospitals;
  - Accommodation for elderly people;
  - Funfairs;
  - Sports stadia

A review of HSE's policies on land use planning advice around large scale petrol storage sites was undertaken following the incident at the Buncefield depot in December 2005. In 2008, HSE introduced an additional Development Proximity Zone (DPZ) at all sites with large-scale petrol storage tanks. The DPZ extends 150 metres from the boundary of the bund surrounding the large scale petrol storage tanks, with the inner zone beginning where the DPZ ends. Within the DPZ, HSE would advise against all developments other than those which are not normally-occupied, such as:

- parking areas for up to 500 cars;
- storage facilities where no more than 3 workers are present at any one time and the total time for which people are present does not exceed 2 hours in any 24 hour period;
- any access roads associated with the above uses.

## 6 Information on Safety Measures

	2004 - 2008
(1) For how many establishments has information been made available to the public at least once during the period 2004 to 2008 in compliance with Article 13	349 <sup>1</sup>
<p><b>Note</b>  <sup>1</sup> At the end of 2008 there were 409 upper tier establishments. Of these; 30 establishments do not have to inform the public as there is no off-site risk,</p>	

or there is no population within the Public Information Zone identified by the Competent Authority;  
 A further 30 establishments were not yet required to issue information to the public as of 31 December 2008 because UK legislation allows operators a reasonable period of time to prepare the information following preparation of the external emergency plan.

	2003	2004	2005
(2) Number that have made Information available to other Member States	0	0	0
(3) Number that have received Information from other member states	0	0	0
(4) Number of establishments incapable of creating major accident in another MS	0	0	0

(5) Strategy for informing the public

The CA determines the public information zone (PIZ) for each establishment by taking account of both the likelihood and effects of possible major accidents at the establishment. It is set on the basis that people outside it are not at significant immediate risk from major accidents. The extent of the PIZ is notified to the operator by the CA. The operator is then responsible for supplying information to the public.

The way in which the information should be provided is not specified but it could include a durable card giving an illustrated summary of safety instructions. Information provided in writing is expected to be written in straightforward and simple terms, avoiding the use of complicated technical expressions, so as to be readily understood by lay readers. Key messages need to be highlighted, possibly by the use of illustrations, in such a way as to get the message across to children as well as adults. Where necessary, information will be translated into other languages and local authorities (LAs) are normally able to advise operators about the need for this.

When distributing the information, operators are expected to consider everyone who could be in the PIZ when a major accident occurs, including people passing through the area in vehicles and people visiting other premises within the PIZ, such as shops and leisure centres.

Where possible, operators enter into agreements with their LAs to distribute the information within the PIZ on their behalf. Such agreements normally cover everything relevant to the distribution of the information, including the area and method of distribution, and any special arrangements for premises such as workplaces, shops, hotels and leisure centres. The question of the costs that will be incurred by LAs in disseminating the information will also normally be included in agreements, particularly where LAs wish to recover

costs from operators. In cases where agreement cannot be reached, operators will disseminate the information themselves.

The information is distributed to everyone outside the establishment and within the PIZ. Anyone whose presence in the PIZ can be predicted, such as residents and workers at other premises, is sent the information by post or by other means. Where it is more effective, multiple sets of information are sent to some locations, such as workplaces and multi-occupied dwellings, for those in control to pass on. The information may also be displayed alongside other emergency instructions at workplaces or other places to which the public have access. In order to make the information available to the wider public, operators have the option of displaying it at the major hazard establishment (perhaps on external notice boards) or, subject to agreement, in public libraries or town halls. Operators and LAs are encouraged to publicise its availability.

## **7 Prohibition of Use**

(1) What are the different existing coercive instruments that can be used in case of infringement of the legislation?

The main formal enforcement measures used during the period covered by this report were:

- Prosecution. In the most serious cases an operator may be prosecuted for breaching his duties under COMAH. Prosecutions may be preceded by the issue of one or more notices as described below.
- Formal cautions. These may be issued where there is sufficient evidence to prove a breach of legislation and where an operator acknowledges that an offence has been committed but it is judged not in the public interest to prosecute.
- Prohibition notices issued under regulation 18 of COMAH which prohibit the operation or bringing into operation of an establishment or installation or any part thereof in accordance with Article 17 of the Seveso II Directive.
- Prohibition notices issued under the Health & Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 where they identify an immediate risk of serious personal injury, which may involve a breach of COMAH.

Prohibition notices may be “immediate” or “deferred”. A deferred Prohibition Notice may be used in cases where greater potential risk may be result from shutting a process down immediately than from allowing the process to complete its normal cycle and then stopping the activity.

- Improvement notices that inspectors have powers to issue under the Health & Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and Regulation 20 of COMAH where, in their opinion, there is a breach of COMAH involving a less serious risk.
- For more minor breaches of compliance with COMAH a verbal warning, followed by a letter, may be used without recourse to notices.

(2) In how many cases have each of these instruments been used

		2006	2007	2008
Prosecutions associated with COMAH activity	Upper Tier	0	0	1
	Lower Tier	0	0	1
	Total	0	0	2
Formal cautions issued associated with COMAH activity	Upper Tier	0	0	0
	Lower Tier	0	0	1
	Total	0	0	1
Article 17 (COMAH Regulation 18) Prohibition Notices	Upper Tier	1	0	0
	Lower Tier	2	1	0
	Total	3	1	0
Prohibition Notices (Immediate) referencing a breach of COMAH	Upper Tier	5	4	2
	Lower Tier	2	0	2
	Total	7	4	4
Prohibition Notices (Deferred) referencing a breach of COMAH	Upper Tier	3	0	1
	Lower Tier	0	0	1
	Total	3	0	2
Improvement Notices referencing a breach of COMAH	Upper Tier	37	43	24
	Lower Tier	12	15	14
	Total	49	58	38
Food and Environment Protection Act (1985) Improvement Notices referencing a breach of COMAH	Upper Tier	0	1	0
	Lower Tier	0	0	0
	Total	0	1	0

## 8 Inspection

### (a) Overview of the strategy and means for inspection

Using Great Britain as an example, COMAH is regulated in England and Wales by a Competent Authority (CA) comprising the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA). In Scotland the CA comprises HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). Inspection plans are developed and agreed within the CA at local level and implemented either by visiting jointly or by one part of the CA taking the lead, depending on whether the inspection issues relate to people's health and safety or the environment.

Inspection plans based on a systematic appraisal of the major hazards present are required for all COMAH establishments. The plans identify all significant inspections required at establishments, embracing issues concerning conventional health and safety, major accidents and national initiatives e.g.: process safety performance indicators, maintenance of plant integrity, emergency response, etc.

One or more inspectors may carry out inspections. We ensure that the required technical skills are provided to deal with the topics identified in the plan. When on site - and depending on the reason(s) for the visit - inspectors will verify that conditions reflect the safety report descriptions, read additional

documentation (not provided in safety reports), interview management and employees, observe physical standards and assess operators' safety management systems. General guidance on enforcement action has been published by HSE and shared across the CA to enable a consistent approach. Advice will be given by inspectors, or enforcement action taken, proportionate to the shortfalls identified.

For upper tier establishments, inspection priorities have been set based on safety reports and past contacts. Inspection plans for each establishment are prepared by the assessment team following assessment of the safety report and are reviewed annually. The assessment team comprises inspectors with regulatory, safety management, technical, predictive and environmental specialist skills. The same people are also responsible for conducting the inspections and know the conditions at the establishment. Central direction on overall inspection policy and programming is issued from the headquarters of the respective CA partners. However, decisions on implementation with respect to individual sites are a matter for local decision making at CA divisional/ regional office level.

Inspection plans for upper tier establishments cover the period up to the next review/revision of the safety report - usually 4 to 5 years. The plans are based on the outcome of the assessment, knowledge of the establishment from previous inspections, investigations of complaints, accidents and incidents and industry sector intelligence. The plans are reviewed annually at local level.

Minimum qualifications of inspectors will vary according to their discipline. The site inspector from HSE will normally hold a Postgraduate Diploma in Health and Safety and specialist inspectors will hold a range of specialist/technical qualifications relevant to their particular disciplines. All inspectors will have attended a range of technical training courses run by HSE and will have undertaken a series of joint visits to COMAH establishments with more experienced colleagues, in order to develop the specific skills and competences required.

The site inspector from the Environment Agency or SEPA will normally hold a degree in engineering or the physical sciences and have several years experience working for the Agency or in the process industries. In the Environment Agency all COMAH inspectors will have attended a one day COMAH training course run by the Agency and will have undertaken a series of joint visits to COMAH establishments with more experienced colleagues, in order to develop the specific skills and competencies required.

The majority of the costs of the CA in carrying out its functions as required by the Directive and the COMAH Regulations are recovered from the site operator. The cost of the regime to site operators has been estimated in research reports. The CA is working on developing its intelligence functions in order to be able to better assess the effectiveness of the regime

The table below gives an indication of the number of man-hours spent on Seveso activities during each of the three years, including the number of man-hours spent on inspection.

#### Staff-hours spent on Seveso activities

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
Total staff-hours spent on Seveso activities <sup>1</sup>	43170	50338	50890
Staff-hours spent on inspection in relation to Seveso establishments	13965	18742	22497
Staff-hours spent on assessment in relation to Seveso establishments	6860	14205	16256
Staff-hours spent on enforcement in relation to establishments	1326	2047	1093
Staff-hours spent on Investigation in relation to establishments	21019	15344	11044
Note <sup>1</sup> The figures for total staff-hours spent on Seveso activities and inspection include those for Northern Ireland. The figures for the remaining individual activities are those for Great Britain alone.			

#### Establishments inspected

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
(b) For each of the three years covered by the reporting period, how many upper tier establishments have been inspected? <sup>1</sup>	243	291	303
(c) For each of the three years covered by the reporting period, how many lower tier establishments have been inspected? <sup>1</sup>	205	235	242
(d) How many upper tier establishments have not been inspected during the years 2006-2008? <sup>2</sup>	41		
(e) How many lower tier establishments have not been inspected during the years 2006-2008? <sup>3,4</sup>	352		

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The figures for the number of establishments inspected reflect the minimum number of different establishments that will have been inspected by the CA in each calendar year. Some of the inspections will have been carried out by HSE inspectors alone, some by Agency inspectors alone and some jointly. The total number of CA inspections of establishments will be greater than the figures quoted above, as many establishments will have received more than one inspection visit during the course of the calendar year.

<sup>2</sup> As indicated previously, intervention plans are based on a number of factors and are risk based and in compliance with Article 18.2(a). Annual visits may therefore not be paid to a limited number of upper tier establishments.

<sup>3</sup> As with upper tier establishments, inspection plans for lower tier establishments are based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards of the particular establishment concerned in compliance with Article 18.2(a).

<sup>4</sup> During the period covered by this report the CA's overall aim was to ensure that as well as basing inspection plans for lower tier establishments on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards each establishment received an inspection visit at least once in every five years.