Appendix 2 - Previous HSE and SEPA involvement
HSE - Current Inspection Regime at Grangemouth

The Complex is regulated by inspectors from the HSE - Hazardous Installations Directorate (HID) - Land Division, based in Edinburgh.

HSE Edinburgh
Belford House
59 Belford Road
Edinburgh
EH4 3UE

HID uses the Chemical & Downstream Oil Industry Forum (CDOIF) and the Refinery Issues Group (RIG) to develop intelligence and communicate issues within Land Division, to other regulators and with the industry and employee representatives.

The Refinery Issues Group (RIG)/Refinery Sector assists and provides guidance for the direction of inspection methodology for refineries such as Grangemouth.

The RIG consists of an HSE peer group of HM Principal Inspectors and technical specialists who provide a:

Coordinated review of the inspection plans across all the main refineries in the UK. Arising from the Lord Cullen Ladbroke Grove railway investigation report and the HSE prior role investigation reports into BP Grangemouth, Conoco and CSG COMAH major accidents in 2000/2001 a commitment has been made to review the inspection strategy and inspection methods for refineries and the most complex "top tier" multi installation sites, and consider if any changes are necessary to meet the COMAH regulation 19 duty on the Competent Authority to have an adequate system of inspection.
Coordinated approach to major hazard installations e.g. HF Alkylation: PLPG etc. Sub-groups have been formed to analyse HF Alkylation units and Fluidised Catalytic Cracker Units.

For BP Grangemouth, and certain other large multi-site companies such as Transco (formerly British Gas), and Calor Gas, the HSE operates a Lead Unit system (previously known as the HSE Lead Unit Principal Inspector system). For these companies the HSE Lead Unit Coordinating Inspector ensures consistent approach to inspection of these companies, and ensures impact at senior management levels.

A team of HSE inspectors report to an HSE Principal Inspector with overall responsibility for the Complex. Under the COMAH Regulations there is a duty on the competent authority to "organise an adequate system of inspections of establishments or other measures of control appropriate to the type of establishment concerned". Accordingly the HSE team carries out a programme of routine scheduled inspection visits of the Complex and facilities and investigations into incidents, working to an inspection plan.

The strategy underpinning the inspection plan recognised that risk controls in refinery operations could be improved and listed around 30 topics for inspection. A major thrust of the strategy was to target senior BP management to improve their management controls and the HSE Principal Inspector had discussed the strategy with the Complex Director and with Trade Union safety representatives prior to the incidents occurring, thus raising awareness in advance of inspection.

The Complex is subject to a wide range of legislative compliance requirements for which the HSE is responsible as the regulatory authority. Legislation relevant to the investigations at the time of the incidents was:

CIMAH/COMAH are relevant to all three incidents. At the time of the incidents not all the COMAH Safety Reports had been submitted or accepted by the Competent Authority and therefore the Complex was subject to both the requirements of CIMAH and COMAH.

Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000 (PSSR)
Relevant to the MP steam main rupture incident;
Construction Design and Management Regulations 1994 (CDM)
Relevant to the power distribution failure incident;
Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 (EWR)
Relevant to the power distribution failure incident.

Enforcement

The HSC (Health and Safety Commission) enforcement policy statement forms the basis for enforcement decisions. Enforcement strategy encompasses verbal advice, written recommendations to achieve action, enforcement notices (improvement and prohibition) and prosecutions. Notices and prosecution are known as formal enforcement. Prohibition notices are intended to ensure that the process or activity is not continued until adequate controls are in place. Improvement notices are designed to gain improvements in health and safety law compliance within fixed timescales. Prosecution may result in fines on companies for breaching health and safety law.

In addition to the HSE policy there is a practical enforcement management model (EMM), which assists enforcement decisions to ensure consistency, proportionality and that the appropriate enforcement decision is made.

A recent history of regulatory involvement and enforcement action taken by the HSE on-site is given below.

Previous incidents

Between July 1999 and June 2000 seven separate incidents occurred at BP Grangemouth each with significant off-site implications. These were investigated by the HSE and are summarised below:

27^th July 1999 - 33kV Interconnector Trip
A commissioning error on a new interconnector led to site wide loss of electricity supply. This subsequently resulted in loss of steam, shutdowns of plants and significant flaring.
20^th November 1999 - FCCU upset during start-up. ("torch oil explosion")
Whilst attempting to restart the FCCU from an abnormal state an overpressure event occurred in the ducting.
28^th December 1999 - Demineralised Water
An ion exchange bed collapsed due to high pressure drop leading to an effluent excursion.
20^th January 2000 - Multiple steam boiler trips
A cascade trip of steam boilers resulted in Complex wide shutdowns and fire damage to a boiler.
29^th May 2000 - Power distribution failure
7^th June 2000 - MP steam main rupture
10^th June 2000 - FCCU fire

Previous Enforcement Actions for the BP Oil Grangemouth Refinery Limited

Three enforcement actions have been taken for the BP Oil Grangemouth Refinery Limited since 1988.

In a prosecution in 1988, the Oil Refinery was fined £250,000 for a fatal incident in connection with a flare line and £500,000 for a fatal incident following an explosion in a hydrocracker.
December 1994 - The Company was prosecuted for a fire in a crude oil distillation unit and fined £50,000.
August 1996 - There was an unsuccessful prosecution over asbestos.

Improvement Notices issued to the BP Oil Grangemouth Refinery Limited

A number of improvement notices have been issued to BP Oil Grangemouth Refinery Limited since 1998.

October 1998 - Three improvement notices were issued relating to:
- Monitoring jetty loading operations following an incident (this was an EC reportable unignited propylene release);
- Maintenance of jetty loading equipment;
- Adequacy of training for jetty loading operations.
December 1999 - A system to identify major hazards arising from abnormal operations following the torch oil explosion in November 1999.
March 2000 - Pressurised LPG storage – the improvement notice was issued on a very complex ALARP issue. Initially BP appealed to an Employment Tribunal before withdrawing the appeal and presenting alternative options for compliance to the Competent Authority which were accepted. The improvement notice was formally extended until May 2003. BP complied by the due date.
July 2000 - Asbestos control resulting from a fire on the FCCU.

Previous Enforcement Actions for BP Chemicals Limited, Grangemouth

Two enforcement actions have been taken for BP Chemicals Limited, Grangemouth since 1999.