The number and nature of the incidents that had occurred within a short period of time raised concerns internally, from the Competent Authority and the general public over the standards that were currently being applied to safety across the whole Complex.
In addition to the three BP incident investigation teams described above BP also set up a BP Task Force of experts from outside the Complex in order to complete a fundamental process and operations review of each facility including utilities areas.
The purpose of the BP Task Force was to provide enhanced assurance of safe operation and environmental performance.
The BP Task Force was commissioned on 12th June (Two days after the FCCU incident) and began its work on 16th June 2000. At this time some of the units on-site were shut down following the incidents whilst others remained operational.
Following the series of incidents the first objective of the BP Task Force was to complete an initial survey of the units on-site that were still operational to confirm that they were suitable for continued operation. This was followed by a fundamental process and operations review of each facility including utilities and areas associated with but outside the immediate vicinity of the facility (known as outside battery limits or OSBL).
The BP Task Force used an audit protocol derived from a number of BP documents and relied upon a combination of the audit protocol, their own experience, the information received and a variety of aide memoire lists in carrying out their investigations.
The following topics were reviewed for each operating area:
The BP Task Force was the largest ever assembled in BP. It involved approximately 30 experts including senior managers from both inside and outside BP (UOP Limited, Eutech etc.) and was lead by a Senior Manager from the USA. The teams included expertise in the areas of safety, mechanical, process, instruments and electrical. Specialist skills from internal or external to the company were seconded onto the team as considered necessary by the BP Task Force team leader.
The only personnel from the Complex involved on the BP Task Force were statutory workforce Trade Union safety representatives.
The review of the Complex was comprehensive and in-depth. All areas of the Complex were fully audited including all the Operational Units, the Central Resource Groups (HS&E/OSG – Operations Support Group) and processes and procedures. In addition the Grangemouth Leadership Team was interviewed and the recent major incidents were also reviewed.
In order to ensure that high priority items could be quickly addressed management and other key personnel received verbal feedback on the initial findings immediately after the audits had taken place. Audit development lists were then compiled and subjected to quality and consistency checks before being forwarded on a weekly basis to the Grangemouth Leadership Team. Actionees and target dates were agreed between the BP Task Force team leader and the Manufacturing Manager before the completed development lists were issued as final. Four man years of work was completed in eight weeks.
All unit and functional area development lists were reviewed at a BP Task Force workshop where they were refined into Complex wide themes. The themes were then presented to the Grangemouth Leadership Team and reviewed by a safety expert from outside BP before being submitted to the Complex Director.
The BP Task Force made a number of recommendations using a priority system ranging from:
Observations were also made and recorded by the BP Task Force where appropriate.
The BP Task Force approach was welcomed by the HSE and complemented the investigations being carried out by the HSE. The sharing of views and information throughout was a welcome feature and reduced the need for an independent HSE audit of the Complex.